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Chapter I 
 Introduction 
 
At the close of World War II, the victorious Allies grew polarized along East-
West lines. The story of the “Cold War” is the story of a contest for the supremacy of two 
distinct ideologies: democratic capitalism and international communism. A cold war as a 
historical novelty, characterized by historian John Lamberton Harper, lay in the fact that 
the protagonists preferred “to engage each other through proxies, via their intelligence 
services, using economic and psychological warfare, and in the arena of world public 
opinion”.1 The purport of this definition was vividly manifested in a frenetic and costly 
campaign by the great powers to win the hearts and minds of the prisoners during the 
Korean War.  
Prisoners of war became the prizes in the great-power contest between  
the United Nations countries and Communist China. The Chinese attempted to convert 
captured U.N. soldiers to prove the hypocrisy of American democracy, whereas the U.S. 
tried to expose the bankruptcy of communism, especially in reference to the “Chinese 
People’s Volunteers,” fighters in the Chinese Liberation Army who were enlisted by 
force or lies. The prisoner-of-war issue was bound up with national prestige and 
legitimacy, as well as Cold War ideology, and was so critical during the conflict that it 
almost singlehandedly torpedoed the prospects for an armistice.  																																																								
1 John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.  
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This crucial issue, which remained an unresolved for more than two years in 
Korea, was the problem of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The question of whether 
or not prisoners of war should have a choice in deciding their own postwar fates was a 
long-disputed point among the belligerents. This issue became the biggest stumbling 
block in reaching a truce agreement, as both sides were unable to find a solution. The 
Communists insisted that every prisoner be repatriated when the hostilities ceased, while 
the U.N. powers refused to agree to forcible repatriation.  
Drawing on local, national, and international news stories; newly declassified 
documents; memoir literature and biographical works from both U.S. and Communist 
Chinese prisoners; and historical documents, this dissertation argues that in the 
maneuvering of the issue of the prisoners of war, the United States gained an upper hand 
over Communist China, despite the stereotypical labels often attached by Americans to 
the Korean War as a “police action,” the “war we [the U.S.] didn’t win,” and the 
“forgotten war”.2 China yielded on the crucial issue of voluntary repatriation and lost two 
thirds of the captives to the island of Taiwan. In contrast, only a small portion of 
Americans, the infamous twenty-one non-repatriates, chose to stay with China rather than 
be repatriated to the United States at the end of hostilities. Despite these non-repatriates, 
the behavior of U.S. soldiers captured during the conflict was exploited by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. military to fortify the domestic ideological 
apparatus in the aftermath of the war.  
 
 																																																								
2 Harry P. Riconda, Prisoners of War in American Conflicts (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), 
235.  
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Historiography 
The recent decades saw an outpouring of literature considering the no-longer-
forgotten war. Classic scholars in the Korean War studies include Bruce Cumings and 
widely-cited general histories of the war by T. R. Fehrenbach. However, historians 
usually left detailed accounts of the struggles and politics within the prison camps out of 
the geopolitical analysis. The grand narrative of the Korean War and emerging Cold War 
in East Asia usually inadequately addresses the human face of the war and the individuals 
it involved.3 As Monica Kim points out in her dissertation,  
What has been lost in the histories of the Korean War is the human terrain 
of war and politics, a way of defining the global order by determining the 
order of relations—between states, between states and individuals, and 
between individuals and the international community.4 
 
The historiography surrounding prisoners of the Korean War has centered on negotiations 
of the armistice. Scholarly articles and significant monographs like Rosemary Foot’s A 
Substitute for Victory employed only western materials.5 
Based on interviews with POWs and survivors of the captivity experience in 
Korea, Carlson’s Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War stood up as the best lengthy 
and detailed account of individual experiences. Among the twenty-one non-repatriates, 
white American Morris Wills, African-American Clarence Adams, and Briton Andrew 
Condron provide the most detailed and informative autobiographical accounts. 
Basset and Calson (2002), Spiller’s oral histories, and many survivors of the POW camps 
wrote detailed memoirs of their confinement and how they coped with their 																																																								
3 For literature review on the Korean War as a whole, see Allan R. Millett, “A Reader’s Guide to the 
Korean War,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Jul. 1997): 583-597. 
4 Monica Kim, “Humanity Interrogated: Empire, Nation, and the Political Subject in U.S. and UN-
controlled POW Camps of the Korean War, 1942-1960” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2011), 4.  
5 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks 
(Ithaca: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 1990). 
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imprisonment. However, these autobiographical accounts did not adequately situate the 
stories of the POWs of the Korean War in the grand narrative of the Communist regime 
and emerging Cold War in East Asia.  
The political benefits reaped by the Communists from the twenty-one American 
“turncoats” who refused repatriation in 1953 were of much greater significance to them 
than any intelligence data they might have gained. The reported collaboration of 
American prisoners with their captors touched off a controversy in the United States that 
raged for years. The writings of Eugene Kinkead convinced many Americans that this 
conduct was inexcusable and the result of social and moral decay in this country. Adam J. 
Zweiback does an excellent job of intricately analyzing the domestic roots and 
ramifications, providing tremendous insights into the way American society looked at the 
twenty-one. 
A comparative perspective was presented in William Lindsay White’s book, The 
Captives of Korea, which was a study of both sides’ treatment of their captives and the 
behavior of the POWs.6 Koje Unscreened and Plain Perfidy, coauthored by Communist-
sympathizing western journalists Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, also provided 
useful but ideological slanted information regarding prisoners of war on both sides.7 Ron 
Theodore Robin’s fascinating work, The Making of the Cold War Enemy, addresses the 
intellectual underpinnings of Cold War behavioral sciences and examines how American 
academic behaviorists reinforced their ethnocentrism and became instrumental in 
																																																								
6 William Lindsay White, The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of War 
Prisoners; Our Treatment of Theirs, Their Treatment of Ours (Praeger, Revised ed., 1979). 
7 Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington, Koje Unscreened (Britain-China Friendship Association, 1952). 
	 5 
military-industrial complex. 8 In particular, Robin adroitly analyzed how American 
government and military employed social science to influence and interpret enemy 
behaviors in the Korean War by waging psychological warfare and conducting studies on 
both American prisoners and Communist prisoners. Charles S. Young’s Name, Rank, and 
Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad, was a more recent 
attempt to compare the POWs’ experience on both sides.9  
Under the aegis of Wilson Center, a new generation of scholars of international 
history emerged in the aftermath of the ending Cold War in Asia and Europe. These 
scholars employed both Asian and western materials and advocated a multi-archival 
approach to the international history of the Cold War. The rise of the Pacific Century and 
booming Chinese economy created new interest and even a sense of urgency in the West 
to better assess and understand Asian and Chinese perspectives more completely.  
Well versed in English and East Asian languages, a new group of scholars have 
added fresh perspectives to the historical research of American foreign relations and have 
stimulated the study of the prisoner-of-war issue during the Korean War. With innovative 
pioneering approaches, Hajimu Masuda examined how the war “functioned as a catalyst 
in the crucible of the postwar world and contributed to the materialization of the Cold 
War world”.10 He wove together a collection of local histories and contended that 
ordinary people participated and promoted the suppression of different ideas and 
practices to attain “order, unity, and a sense of national pride.”11 David Chang and 
																																																								
8 Ron Theodore Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-
intellectual Complex (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
9 Charles Young, Name, Rank, and Serial Number Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10 Hajimu Masuda, Cold War Crucible (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 6. 
11 Ibid., 189. 
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Monica Kim have been among those advancing the study of POWs. Chang argues that 
the majority of Chinese prisoners who made decisions in the prison compound followed 
the “choice of prison compound leaders, for reasons of conviction, interest calculation, 
coercion, and threat of retribution from leaders”.12 Chang is critical of early U.S. POW 
policies and argues that Nationalist agent infiltrators played a decisive role in mobilizing 
formerly Nationalist soldiers to go to Taiwan. Monica Kim blended analysis on empire 
building, decolonization, and memories with the POW interrogation reports, offering a 
transnational perspective on the studies of Korean War POWs. 
Despite the excellent aforementioned work, scholars have not yet fully explored 
the choices individuals made, and the options provided by the nation-states, and the 
intriguing connection between individual stories and national histories. Immanuel C. Y. 
Hsü predicted as early as 1979 that “The study of Chinese diplomatic history must be 
multi-archival, multilingual, interdisciplinary, intercultural, and interideological”.13 In his 
2009 article, Thomas W. Zeiler points out that the innovation of diplomatic history lay in 
three directions: “traditional realism’s engagement with ideology (mentalities), the 
embrace of international history, and the study of culture and identity”.14 Zeiler lamented, 
“While the methodological renaissance has expanded the playing field of approaches, 
actors, topics, and interactions, the study of U.S. foreign relations remains recognizable, 
with its power-and-policy oriented focus”.15 In “The LaPietra Report,” Thomas Bender 
challenged the historical profession to rethink national boundaries and personal identities 																																																								
12 Cheng David Chang, “To Return Home or ‘Return to Taiwan’: Conflicts and Survival in the ‘Voluntary 
Repatriation’ of Chinese POWs in the Korean War” (PhD diss.,University of California, San Diego, 2011), 
16.  
13 Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, “Modern Chinese Diplomatic History: A Guide to Research,” The International 
History Review Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan. 1979): 102.  
14 Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” Journal of American 
History, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Mar. 2009): 1053-1073.  
15 Ibid.  
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in a globalizing world, especially in the “cross-national,” “transnational,” and 
“comparative” frameworks:  
both the nation and the other historical phenomena we examine must be 
resituated in larger contexts because the movements of people, money, 
knowledges, and things are not contained by single political units…. Now 
we must extend our analysis of those histories to incorporate an awareness 
of larger, transnational contexts, processes, and identities.16 
 
The study of the prisoner-of-war issue through multiple perspectives remains 
remarkably understudied. Updated scholarship is needed in the burgeoning literature on 
POWs to reconstruct the turbulent history of the Korean War POWs, as well as how they 
served as “political pawns to be exploited in the propaganda, public opinion, and 
bargaining facets of modern limited war”.17 In particular, focus should be placed on how 
to use Chinese language scholarship, sources, and voices to bring them into a dialogue 
with western sources and to synthesize both into a coherent narrative of these prisoners of 
war, not only from a top-down perspective, but from a bottom-up lens as well. 
 
 
Approaches and Significance of the Study 
This dissertation brings an important human and personal dimension to the history 
of these POWs through the integration of rich oral history and memoir material from the 
U.S., Great Britain, Taiwan, and China. At the same time, it offers a fresh look at the 
complex history of prisoner-of-war policies and the camp politics of the Korean War.  																																																								
16 Thomas Bender (ed.), “The LaPietra Report: A Report to the Profession,” The Organization of American 
Historians / New York University Project on Internationalizing the Study of American History (September 
2000). Bender’s other writing on internationalizing American history, see —, Rethinking American History 
in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); —, A Nation Among Nations: America's 
Place in World History (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006). 
17 Colonel Robert M. Krone, “Politics and Prisoners of War,” Air University Review, March-April 1970, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1970/mar-apr/krone.html (accessed Mar. 23, 
2017). 
	 8 
This dissertation seeks to trace the history and scale of POW policies back to WWII and 
show how both sides improvised to adapt to new situations arising in the prison camps. It 
deals with how both sides engaged in wars of words at the armistice table and how 
propaganda wars raged in the media outlets to influence world opinion. It furthermore 
discusses the war to win “hearts and minds” of captured enemy soldiers in order to 
demonstrate the superiority of one political system over the other. Additionally, it shows 
how the prisoners of war transitioned from traitors in the eyes of one side to “heroes” and 
“peace-fighters” to the other side. These roles were molded and manipulated by nation 
states. 
What gives this dissertation its originality is its effort to illuminate many of the 
complexities and ambiguities surrounding the task of managing and repatriating prisoners 
of war by nation states driven by conflicting ideologies and agendas. The dissertation 
presents a transnational history of prisoner of war issues through three distinct yet 
interconnected narratives. It opens with the experience of U.N. prisoners and follows the 
Chinese’s administration policy; then it traces the journeys of prisoners of Communist 
China and North Korea and the rise of “anticommunist righteous men” in the prison-of-
war camps. Finally, the explanation sessions are examined as the “last battle of Korea,” 
when both sides waged psychological warfare to win the allegiance of the professed non-
repatriates.  
This project studies world affairs from the bottom up and advances new 
interpretations and directions for studying Cold War in Asia. In particular, this 
dissertation reintegrates the experiences of the prisoners into the grand narrative of the 
early Cold War in East Asia, which brought to the forefront the social tensions and 
	 9 
frustrations in the prisoner-of-war camps. It combines the study of elite policymakers and 
their decision-making processes with the study of social acceptance and participation in 
the construction of the Cold War in East Asia through an emphasis on personal stories 
and the voices of ordinary people. It also delineates the contours of the actions, journeys, 
struggles, and thoughts of prisoners of war, especially their own interpretations of the 
meaning of captivity and humanitarianism.  
Beginning with materials like memoirs and oral histories and continuing with 
prisoner testimonies recorded in intelligence files, interrogation reports, and newspaper 
publications and U.S. military documents, this project studies world affairs from the 
bottom up and advances new interpretations and directions for studying the Cold War in 
Asia. Both the political convulsions within the United Nations camps, agitated by 
Communist agents and Taiwanese translators, and the formation of the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) and heated fist-fighting over food in the Chinese-run camps, bring a human face 
to the Cold War in East Asia.  
This dissertation also makes a contribution to the historiography of the Korean 
War and the larger international context of the Cold War. Mainly I used sources of 
Communist China to challenge, engage, and reinforce the western sources, as well as to 
pinpoint subtle differences within the western bloc. I consulted secondary works from 
authors in various countries and incorporated the most up-to-date scholarship in English 
and Chinese; additionally, I used archival materials from the United States and Mainland 
China. My dissertation research has taken me to the Truman Presidential Library, the 
Eisenhower Presidential library, the National Archives, the Hoover Institution, the 
Harvard-Yenching Library, and the Foreign Ministry Archives of the PRC. I also 
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consulted digital archives in databases such as the Declassified Documents Reference 
System—U.S. (DDRS) and the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA). Sources used 
in this dissertation were also from a diverse range of resources in Chinese and English, 
including individual soldiers’ briefing reports, previously classified government 
documents and analysis, eyewitness accounts, as well as U.S. diplomatic records for 
information about POW policies and practices. I selected new stories from the United 
States, British Commonwealth (Great Britain, Australia, and Canada), People’s Republic 
of China (Communist Asia), India (neutral Asia), and Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(anticommunist Asia). I have also inserted into the narrative black-and-white historical 
photos, political cartoons, and posters.  
This dissertation also emphasizes the previously neglected role of India in the 
Cold War struggle. India’s neutrality diplomacy in ending the Korean War conflict, 
particularly in the prisoners of war entanglement, has often been overlooked.  
The Korean War was the first occasion in which modern India played a major role on the 
international stage. Differentiating from both the western democracy and Communist 
China, modern India had a distinct voice advocating a noncommunist Asian perspective 
in the Cold War. The Korean War served as a testing ground for India to practice her 
independent stance, striving to maintain a balance between the commonwealth and 
nonalignment movements in Asia, as well as serving as a mediator between Communist 
China and western democracies. India’s policy of neutrality played a critical yet 
understudied and understated role in ending the Korean War. 
Regarding Taiwan’s hidden role in the war, this project may be a not-so-subtle 
nod to Chang’s dissertation on the Chinese prisoners of war and the role Taiwan played 
	 11 
in the Korean War. The United States placed the responsibility for the escalating violence 
within the camp on the shoulders of Taiwan, as well as Communist China. Both states 
and individual prisoners of war made choices that led to solidification and fortification of 
the Cold War division in East Asia. This dissertation further argues that the “freedom of 
choice” bestowed by the American state turned out to be an ideological straightjacket for 
many individual soldiers on both sides. 
The most provocative part of the dissertation is the demonstration of the 
connections between legitimacy and power. The struggle over prisoners of war hinged on 
the legitimacy of the Cold War regimes and on nationalism in Asia. Taiwan and the 
People’s Republic were engaged in the unending Chinese civil war and in fierce rivalry 
for the legitimacy of representing the people’s will in China. The individual POWs who 
made life-risking decisions, either voluntarily or under duress, found their lives 
convulsed by the East-West confrontation that nearly divided the world into two 
oppositional camps.  
For the majority of Chinese references and resources, I have used the Pinyin 
system for translation. However, in some cases, I defer to the more common, well-
recognized spellings of Chinese places and names, such as Chiang Kai-shek, etc. I have 
kept references of people and places as they appear in primary documents. 
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Chapter II 
“Segregating” by Race, Rank, and Nationality:  
China’s Failed Ideological Indoctrination During the Korean War 
 
“Now is your opportunity!” The recorded voice of Major Edward Moorer, from 
the U.N. Command explainer group, came from a loudspeaker truck outside a prison 
compound under the neutral supervision of Indian troops in Panmunjom. It was the last 
day of the ninety-day explanation period, December 23, 1953.18 “Now is the time!” 
Moorer’s reassuring voice continued. “Come forward and inform the guards nearest 
you… Indian guards will protect you…. You have nothing to fear.”19 The American team 
used a loudspeaker broadcast to make the final call to the North Camp run by the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers. One day earlier, each of the twenty-two G.I.s had received a letter 
from Gen. Mark Clark, the United Nations Commander in Tokyo, to appeal them to come 
home.20  
Dressed in cotton-padded uniforms, twenty-two non-repatriated United Nations 
prisoners drowned out the U.N. tape recording by singing “The Internationale” and 
“Solidarity Forever” in both English and Korean. As a response to this appeal, the non-
repatriated U.N. prisoners even demanded that their Indian supervisors censor their own 
																																																								
18 The explanations for the U.S. and South Korean prisoners of war started on December 2, 1953.  
19 “POWs Jeer Last U. S. Plea: Group Roars ‘No’ and Sings Red Anthems, Broadcast Lost in Noise of 
Dance,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 Dec. 1953: 1. 
20 Raymond B. Lech, Broken Soldiers (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois, 2000), 198.  
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mail so they would not receive Allied propaganda, which they claimed aimed to 
“intimidate, slander, coerce and bribe” them.21 Called by The New Yorker magazine a 
“one-camera media circus,” these Caucasian westerners not only wore blue Mao suits, 
but they also seemingly turned themselves into converts of Communism by denouncing 
their own countries and by mouthing Communist slogans.22 
South China Morning Post, a Hong-Kong-based newspaper, reported this bizarre 
spectacle as follows: “Twenty-two American converts to Communism ignored their 
country’s final plea to come home to their families today in a weird orgy of wild dancing 
and singing of Soviet songs”.23 The same article further reported,  
Nineteen of the 22 unrepatriated Americans pressed against the barbed-
wire enclosures that symbolised [sic. symbolized] their choice of 
Communism and sang “The Internationale” as the last “come home” plea 
came from a sound truck. Then they danced with themselves and with 
South Koreans, five of whom wore gay women’s clothing, to primitive 
music.24  
 
With arms locked to demonstrate solidarity, the seventeen Americans, one lone British, 
and seventy-seven South Koreans sang the Communist anthem and stamped a Korean 
folk dance, defying a final broadcast appeal from their home countries.25 “No such safe 
opportunity to come home is likely to come again,” Moorer’s recorded voice warned, but 
it was drowned out in a cacophony of deafening shouting and cascading noises.26  
Among the prisoners stood twenty-two-old Corporal Claude J. Batchelor from 
Kermit, Texas, the professed leader of the original twenty-two non-repatriated Americans 																																																								
21 “POWs Hold Indians As Hostages: Long Protest Presented Panmunjom, Nov. 6,” South China Morning 
Post, 07 Nov. 1953: 1. 
22 Brendan McNally, “The Korean War Prisoner Who Never Came Home,” The New Yorker, 9 Dec. 2013. 
23 “American POWs Refuse To Go Home: Final Plea Rejected Panmunjom, Dec. 23,” South China 
Morning Post, 24 Dec. 1953: 1. 
24 Ibid.  
25 “POWs Jeer Last U. S. Plea,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 Dec. 1953: 1. Two other Americans walked 
into a hut and did not participate in the demonstration.   
26 Ibid.  
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after Operation Little Switch. On January 1, 1954, he reversed his non-repatriation 
position and returned to America at the end of the neutral custody.27 Batchelor was not 
the first one to switch sides during the four months the non-repatriated were held under 
neutral custody. Cp. Edward S. Dickenson was the other American G.I. who initially 
refused and then reversed his position to accept repatriation while in neutral custody on 
October 20, 1953. At this point, Dickenson had already returned to the U.S. and married. 
For many Americans and their U.N. allies, it was the prisoner-of-war issue of the 
Korean War that brought wars of ideologies to the forefront. Unprecedentedly, “What 
American POWs faced in Korea which was new, at least for Americans in the twentieth 
century, was a concerted attempt by their captors to influence them on ideological 
grounds.”28 In the press conference held in Panmunjom on January 26th, 1954, the 
twenty-one American G.I.s, one British marine, and three hundred twenty-five South 
Korean ex-POWs who rejected repatriation announced,   
Here, in our life in the prisoner camps, we have experienced true 
democracy for the very first time…. Among ourselves, we have 
experienced true equality and international camaraderie… We have 
learned so many things here, and come to realize the kind of achievement 
when one person strives for mutual interests rather than self-interest.29  
 
As the postwar POW report prepared by the British Ministry of Defense put it, “It was 
the prison camps set up by the Chinese and North Koreans that became the battleground 
																																																								
27 Batchelor said his decision had been influenced by the pleading letters of his Japanese wife. “Freed G.I. 
Urges Raid on Camp: Texan Says P.O.W. Probe Will Uncover Daggermen Who Rule Compound Returnee 
Admits He Captained American ‘Progressives’ in Korean Prison Daily,” The Boston Globe, 02 Jan. 1954: 
1. According to Time Magazine, most of the tender pleading letters were actually composed by Associated 
Press staff writers based in Tokyo; see “Flipflop at Panmunjom,” Time, 11 Jan. 1954, Vol. 63 Iss. 2: 13. 
28 Jeffrey Grey, “Other fronts: Resistance, collaboration and survival among United Nations prisoners 
during the Korean War”, in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey eds. The Korean War 1950-53: A 50 Year 
Retrospective; The Chief of Army's Military History Conference, 2000 (Canberra: Australian Army History 
Unit, Dept. of Defense, 2000), 144. 
29 Chao xian wen ti wen jian hui bian, di er ji (Ren min chu ban she, 1954), 239; Yao Xu, Cong ya lu jiang 
dao ban men dian [From Yalu River to Panmunjom] (Ren min chu ban she, 1985), 173. 
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for this war of minds.”30 Three years later, Walter Cronkite, an American broadcast 
journalist, proclaimed on his TV network that “brainwashing” and the broader question 
of “our preservation as individuals” had become “one of the underlying themes” of the 
twentieth century. 
The imagery of the Korean War within the United States, as popularized by a 
1962 movie The Manchurian Candidate, was of the American soldier as a prisoner of 
war, who was defeated, emaciated, and possibly a brainwashed Communist sympathizer. 
Thousands of U.S. enlisted men who were taken prisoners spent two-and-a-half years in 
prisoner-of-war camps in North Korea. According to the official POW report, a total of 
7,190 Americans were captured during the Korean War.31 Among them, only 4,428 
eventually returned. An appalling thirty-eight percent of American POWs languished in 
the hands of the enemy, almost four times that of American POWs during World War 
II.32 Not since the Revolutionary War had there been such a ghastly death toll.33  
Since Operation “Little Switch” from April 20 to May 3,1953, when 149 
American prisoners of war among 684 U.N. POWs were repatriated, there were already 
rumors that a few Americans had refused repatriation. The repatriates reported that more 
than twenty Americans and one British prisoner had identified themselves as 
“progressives” and had refused to go back. Under the armistice terms, these prisoners 
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must be brought to the Panmunjom neutral zone, where the U.N. teams would be allowed 
to try to change their minds. 
Referred to as “one of the greatest mysteries of our times,”34 the twenty-one 
Americans (including three African Americans) and one Scot turned their backs on their 
homelands and disappeared behind Red China’s “bamboo curtain” after February 24, 
1954. After denouncing racism, capitalism, and McCarthyism before Chinese newsreel 
crews, these twenty-one non-repatriated G.I.s became “one of the most extensively 
studied groups in American history”.35 They were referred to as “GI Chinks” or “Chink 
lovers” by the repatriates, who said they were joining the “pinkos,” whereas the Chinese 
dubbed them “progressives” and “peace-fighters”.36 Never before in American history 
had a small group of G.I.s chosen to stay with their captors and participated in a 
propaganda campaign denouncing American involvement in the war. The British 
Ministry of Defense claimed to hold a better record of resisting Chinese political 
indoctrination, with the exception of Andrew Condron, who became the only British non-
repatriate. Despite these men’s portentous profession to be Communists, their families 
still couldn’t understand why they chose China. 
In the ensuing decades, numerous studies conducted by a vengeful nation eagerly 
searched for the proper explanations for its own fighting men’s idolization of an alien 
“religion”—Chinese Communism.37 Not surprisingly, America’s soul-searching was 
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coupled with Communist China as the imaged enemy. As one 2008 New York Times 
article put it, the 1950s America was consumed by the “fear of a strange enemy driven by 
an alien ideology, killing Americans abroad, threatening Americans at home. And it 
created a new terror.”38 A China under Mao, with its peculiar cruelty and terrorism, 
possessed a “diabolic,” “fiendish” weapon in carrying out its own crusade against the 
imperialist America.39 The so-called “brainwashing” was a Chinese invention to add to 
the repertoire of Communist psychological warfare against the United States 
worldwide.40 American GIs, rendered powerless with the presence of such a potent 
weapon, hopelessly became “mentally and morally broken” after their capture. 
Immediately after returning to the U.S., the repatriated prisoners were “alternately under 
deep cover and then in the open for the most glaring and unfair publicity”.41 The media 
insisted that they had accepted communist indoctrination and “brainwashing”. As a 
result, almost all of the repatriated prisoners were extremely bitter and bewildered.42 
Rather than focusing on the suffering and hardships in captivity, this chapter 
examines the policies adopted by the Communist China, revealing how a fledgling 
revolutionary regime’s efforts to indoctrinate enemy soldiers proved to be a failed 																																																																																																																																																																					
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experiment. Despite an apparently enormous effort on the Chinese side, most of the U.N. 
prisoners balked at indoctrination into Communism. The dynamics with the Chinese-run 
prison compounds miniaturized the broader geopolitical situation of race, class, and 
nationalism. While Washington and Beijing furiously debated regarding the involuntary 
repatriation of prisoners, the prisoners themselves were faced with interpreting and 
reinventing their own version of humanitarianism in the midst of their extreme 
circumstances.  
 
 
Atrocity Charges and Leniency Policy 
In a 1953 U.N. report prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense, the American 
government charged that 29,815 soldiers and civilians were killed by “atrocity 
methods”.43 During the deadliest period of captivity, the winter of 1950-1951, 7,000 
prisoners suffered a thirty-eight percent death rate, higher than that of the Confederacy’s 
notorious Andersonville prison camp. The factors affecting the prisoners’ health included 
cold weather, mistreatment, food scarcity, and disease (such as dysentery and beriberi). 
According to Roger P. Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense, who wrote a letter to 
accompany this report, these atrocities were committed by the North Korean army, the 
North Korean political security police, and the Chinese Communist forces.44 The same 
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report summarized the most salient factors contributing to such a high death rate, saying 
there was 
a deliberate attempt by the Communists to dispose of prisoners by forced 
marches in frigid weather under conditions in which they would either die 
of malnutrition and disease, expire because of untended wounds or 
become so weak they could then be easily disposed of by open murder.45   
 
These atrocities reports triggered a great wave of disgust and moral outrage in the United 
States. However, these problems affected not just the prisoners but also the Communist 
soldiers who fought on the front. As U.S. Corporal Bill Richardson recalled, tortuous 
marches in the cold were “not only taking a toll on us, but also on the guards”.46 In most 
circumstances, the Chinese fed them “the same rations as they had themselves—rice, 
vegetables and sorghum,” said British rifleman G. L. Hobson.47 
When China entered the conflict, the tide turned against the United Nations 
forces, and many more prisoners were taken; it was during this time that tales of atrocities 
surfaced in the American media. North Koreans were neither equipped nor trained to take 
prisoners of war. Many U.N. prisoners of war were shot on the spot. On October 20, 
approximately seventy-five Americans were shot down by North Korean guards at what 
became known as the Sunchon Tunnel massacre, one of the most well-documented cases 
of American and South Korean soldiers being executed en masse after capture.48 The 
bulk of the American prisoners were taken between November 1950 and January 1951, 
including fourteen of the twenty-one prisoners who eventually chose to stay in China.  
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Thousands of Americans died in temporary prison camps and on death marches 
during the winter of 1950 until the peace talks began in the summer of 1951. Most deaths 
were from cold, starvation, dysentery, and beriberi. A Greek journalist working for the 
London Observer, Philip Deane (Philippe Deane Gigantes), was captured and later 
tortured and beaten by North Koreans. In his book, I Should Have Died, he described the 
primitive conditions a POW had to endure in the early stage of the war.49  
Initially, the prisoners were interned at temporary camps where American bomber 
planes frequently flew overhead. The temporary camps included the “Bean Camp” near 
Suan, the “Death Valley” near Pukchin, “The Valley” near Kanggye, the “Interrogation 
Center” near Pukchin, and three camps near Pyongyang which included “the Caves” and 
two interrogation centers known as “Pak’s Palace” and Camp 12.50 North Koreans placed 
little or no emphasis on the indoctrination of the enemy POWs,51 except that once they 
set up an indoctrination camp called “the Peace Fighters School” in Camp 12 near 
Pyongyang as a pilot program.52  
Later, prisoners were marched northward along the Yalu River in North Korea to 
a network of prisoner-of-war camps run by the CPV. Many U.N. prisoners languished 
during the notorious “death marches,” when North Koreans took them on the long 
journey by foot to the permanent camps.53 The West was shocked by the sheer 
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“inhumanity, brutality and degradation” of the North Koreans and attributed it to North 
Koreans’ effort to “illustrate the superiority of the Orientals over the ‘barbaric 
Westerners.’”54 The 1988 British documentary The Unknown War records that the North 
Korean officials admitted that they unscrupulously shot their American prisoners.55 
Brutality was the normal experience, whereas Major General William F. Dean, the 
highest-ranking U.N. prisoner, reported that he had enjoyed much better treatment in 
Camp 6 by North Koreans since his capture in August 1950.56    
The Leniency Policy had been a PLA tradition, which had risen during the three-
year Chinese Civil War and the eight-year war against Japan.57 Especially during the 
Chinese Civil War, the goal for dealing with war prisoners was to switch the political 
stance of enemy officers and soldiers and to persuade the fighters to join the revolution. 
However, in Korea, the POW administration had to adapt to the new situation of fighting 
a limited war with an armistice as the ultimate war aim.58 Using its previous experience, 
the CPV POW administration underwent new exploration and development in three 
areas: enemy propaganda on the front line, POW education management, and enemy 
family relation management.59 
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At the beginning of the war, the CPV adopted their old approach from their civil 
war experience—shouting out the Lenient Policy on the front lines and spreading 
propaganda pamphlets. This method achieved some success: for example, one black 
engineering company of the 25th division collectively surrendered collectively during the 
Second Campaign. As the CPV grew more familiar with the American troops, its political 
work began to place more emphasis on criticizing American imperialist polices and the 
South Korean government’s aggressive behavior while simultaneously expressing its own 
peacemaking intentions. In addition to using loudspeakers to propagandize their lenient 
policy, the Chinese used other forms of extensive communication with enemy soldiers. 
One source indicates that on Christmas Eve of 1951, interpreter Zhu Fuqian and other 
two CPV scouts were assigned to deliver Christmas gift bags and pamphlets explaining 
the Lenient Policy to the front lines of the U.N. troops. According to some of the 
captured American POWs, many of the American soldiers enjoyed these gift bags, which 
were sold on the black market for up to thirty dollars each.60 
During the first campaign, the CPV almost immediately released thirty newly 
captured G.I.s and seventy South Korean soldiers. American domestic media and military 
newspapers were dumbfounded by such a move, but the prisoners themselves understood 
that the Chinese Communists released them for propaganda purposes. A group of G.I.s 
called their experience of the Chinese “Lenient Policy” an “adventure and its strange and 
happy conclusion”.61 The Chinese handpicked twenty-seven captives, fed them rice, 
barley meal, and vegetables, and traveled with them in the trucks for two nights. Before 
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letting them loose into the night, the Chinese shook hands with them and gave them a 
last-minute lecture on “American imperialism” and Chinese peace-making intentions.62 
American POWs’ memoirs indicated that the Chinese usually picked the sick and 
wounded for early release while “the strongest men” remained and participated in the 
marches toward the permanent camps along the Yalu River.63 According to Lieutenant 
General Du Ping, the Director of the Political Departments in the CPVF General 
Headquarters, the CPV political work section thought this approach reflected the CPV’s 
revolutionary humanitarianism, expanded the CPV’s political influence, and relieved the 
burden of managing heavily wounded enemy prisoners.64  
In the initial stages of the war, due to the lack of preparation and the absence of a 
specialized organization to handle the POWs, many captured war prisoners were able to 
run away and escape. At the same time, the Chinese claimed that they had great difficulty 
receiving food through supply lines for both CPV soldiers and U.N. prisoners due to U.N. 
aircraft strafing. The Chinese blamed the American planes for dropping bombs, which 
caused many deaths on the road. The Chinese explained that they usually marched in the 
night to avoid the strafing of U.N. aircraft. In order to relieve the logistical burden, as 
well as to demonstrate humanitarianism, the CPV transferred the captured South Korean 
POWs to the North Koreans and released many who were injured. As a result, there were 
very few war prisoners initially held by the CPV at the beginning. When the exchange of 
POWs’ names on both sides occurred, the U.N. claimed to hold 130,000 North Korean 
and Chinese prisoners, while the Communist side said they held only slightly over 10,000 																																																								
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U.N. prisoners. This fact explains the later discrepancy between the number of MIA U.N. 
soldiers and the number of war prisoners the Communist side returned at the end of the 
conflict.65 
As one American postwar study aptly points out, “the very standard of living for 
which the boys were fighting was often their worst enemy.”66 American soldiers in Korea 
were considered to be “the most pampered soldiers in history” by Alan Winnington, one 
of the western journalists who had access to U.N. POWs in Korea.67 The U.S. Army had 
lavished their soldiers with extravagant combat rations including “meat, poultry, 
hamburgers, vegetables, fruits, biscuits, coffee, sugar, milk, vitamins, confectionery”.68 
They were also given “clothes in absurd variety, mostly unsuited to the terrain they faced 
but providing nice profits and free advertising”.69 The CPV political officers used the 
KMT defectors’ accounts to collect information about the very enemy they dealt with: the 
defectors were trained by the American military advisors, and they testified that 
American soldiers were “spoiled playboys” and largely inept.70 
The American POWs were the prisoners that the CPV POW administration found 
the greatest difficulty managing.71 After their capture, it had been a constant challenge for 
the Americans to adapt to the primitive conditions in the hands of their Asian enemies. 																																																								
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Many Chinese captors’ recollections pointed out there was a pervasive sense of lethargy 
and despair among the American prisoners.72 Historian Latham also points out that a 
“disturbing number of prisoners… simply lost the will to live”.73 This observation was 
reinforced by accounts written by western authors, and the general attitude was labeled 
“give-up-itis,” in which many POWs turned their faces to the wall and died away, one by 
one.74 Dickerson, one of the initial non-repatriates (later repatriated in October 1953) 
recalled, “I can’t say how many men died there. I counted 37 men go down. The men 
were not used to the food (cracked corn) and a lot starved to death. There was no morale 
and a lot of men just gave up”.75 Repatriated British and Australian prisoners confirmed 
the same perception and added that approximately 1,600 American POWs died in Camp 
5 because they were “too pampered, too young” and had become suicidal and simply 
“lost their will to survive”.76 By comparison, only twenty British died in the first six 
months, and few Turks, if any, died.77 Alan Winnington, the Communist-sympathizing 
British journalist, wrote that the reason the British survived while the Americans perished 
lay in their national cultures. He contended:  
The British prisoners lived because they were co-operative and organized; 
they set up democratic bodies to share out food and drugs, sacrificed their 
rations for sick comrades, maintained strict hygiene and above all were 
optimistic. They had a background of trade unionism and solidarity. Those 
fine American boys died because, through none of their own fault maybe, 																																																								
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they carried into battle and captivity the traditions of free enterprise and 
devil-take-the-hindmost.78 
 
The Britons survived because of their solidarity and camaraderie, according to 
Winnington, who quoted a Chinese ganbu (an English-speaking Chinese civilian 
functionary): “Where there are three British prisoners there is a committee,” whereas 
morale and discipline collapsed among the American prisoners.79 This difference may 
have had to do with the fact that Americans were usually captured and transferred as 
individuals, while the British were captured by regiments and the Turks, by company.80 
Jeff Erwin remembered, “A lot of guys didn’t want to waste any of their strength on 
others because they knew it would be hard to replace. So they did no more for anyone 
than they absolutely had to”.81 Though Catholic chaplain Father Emil Kapaun performed 
altruistic deeds to assist his fellow prisoners, on many occasions, stealing and murder 
occurred.82 One notorious case was that of James C. Gallagher, a corporal from 
Brooklyn, N.Y., who threw two dying American prisoners in the snow.83 Immediately 
after repatriation, he was court-martialed for murder.84 In another case, a black G.I. was 
seen stripping wallets and possessions from the dead and put them into his kitbag,85 while 
none of the other Americans in his compound did anything to stop him. Stealing and 
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murder served as good illustrations of what the Chinese Communists said could happen 
under the influence of “poisonous individualism”.86 
Not surprisingly, the Chinese astutely used food as a political weapon, though 
they did try to keep the prisoners alive. They maneuvered the quality and quantity of food 
to influence prisoners’ political orientations. One prisoner revealed that there was a 
distinction between rations for “reactionaries” and those for the others.87 “It was hard to 
resist…when your political opinion decided how you ate and how much medical care you 
got,” admitted one repatriated G.I.88 Later, as the armistice talks resumed, the Chinese 
felt compelled to feed U.N. prisoners for propaganda purposes. “You could always tell 
how chow would be from how things were going down there. When they were going 
good, they’d give us a little pig to eat. When they were going bad, it wwould [sic. would] 
be soup and rica [sic. rice]”.89 According to interviews with the repatriates, during the 
latter half of their captivity, most of the prisoners said they had been fed with good 
food—“the best that they could give us under the circumstances”.90 British historian T. R. 
Fehernbach argued that it was the “chemistry and culture” that killed Americans rather 
than the Chinese’s deliberate cruelty.91 It was the “disciplines, attitudes, and organization 
that Americans brought into captivity” that killed many of them.92 There was “a 
debasement of social morality,” observed Sergeant R.F. Matthews of the Gloucestershire 
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Regiment. He lamented the fact that the lack of communal support led to death of many 
Americans. 
From it arose a system that prostituted traditional American enterprise and 
incentive, favoured the strong, and gave no charity at all to the weak. We 
[the British] looked after our sick, and those who couldn’t stomach millet 
got sugar or dumplings from the communal ration. It was an accepted part 
of our way of living. The American sick, unless they had good friends, 
went into the death house, and, once there, only one journey remained. It 
was to the cemetery on Boot Hill.93  
 
In Camp 5, despite the Chinese’s repeated warnings to boil their water before 
drinking it, eighteen hundred prisoners contracted cholera from drinking water 
contaminated from animal and human waste seeping through the ground and into the well 
water. Robert Fletcher remembered the Chinese guards used to tell them, “Cold water, no 
good, no good!”94 The overcrowded prisoner population only made the scarcity of fresh 
water even worse.95  
Dysentery was another common cause of death, resulting from eating improperly 
cooked Asian food.96 Fehernbach pointed out, “to expect an Asian nation accustomed to 
famine to feed its prisoners of war better than its own half-starved peasantry was and 
remains wishful thinking on Americans’ part”.97 Still, the CPV dramatically improved the 
quality of ration food in the camps after diagnosing roots of sudden deaths of many 
POWs as “Serious Nutritional Deficiency Syndrome”.98 Rice, flour, and pork were 
transported to Pyoktong across the Yalu in the last years of captivity.  
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Rumors about homosexuality and marijuana use in the camp were reinforced by 
Chinese guards’ memoirs.99 “Half the Americans were bound together more by 
homosexuality than communism,” The Newsweek editorialized.100 Chinese prison officer 
Guo said homosexuality in the second squadron caused disturbances in Camp 5.101 The 
Chinese separated those who engaged in homosexual acts from the rest of the prisoners. 
Since most of the prisoners passed the days in captivity “in a state of acute sexual 
deprivation,” some consumed large quantities of marijuana to relax themselves.102 When 
G.I.s discovered marijuana and other narcotic weeds growing wild on the hillside, they 
dried and sucked the weeds, as the drugs’ “soothing effect provided an escape from the 
harsh reality of prison life”.103 One side effect of these drugs is that using them caused 
prisoners' appetites to increase, making their daily rations seem less sufficient.104 Most of 
the prisoners who smoked the weed were Turks, but some Americans and a few British 
also participated.105 Once the Chinese found out what was happening, they lectured the 
prisoners on the dangers of drugs and banned the practice immediately. 
At the end of spring 1951, Wang Yangong was assigned to manage Camp 5, and 
he ran the camp of prisoners from thirteen countries like a school. A seasoned political 
officer, Wang had experience managing senior prisoners from Manchukuo and former 
Nationalist officials. The U.N. prisoners addressed Commander Wang as the Chinese 
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“university president”.106 At first, even some Chinese instructors and translators were 
astounded at the idea of calling the prisoners “students”.107 “We had to call the instructors 
‘comrade’ and they called us ‘students.’ They never called us ‘prisoners’—always 
‘students,’” recalled Sergeant McCollum.108  
Initially, compulsory lectures and discussions were the basic means of 
indoctrination. One Chinese instructor, along with an English-speaking interpreter, 
conducted lectures continuously for two hours a day, beginning in early February 1951. 
In the lectures, the instructors propounded the political, economic, and social gospel of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, indoctrinating the prisoners with the principles of 
Communism. Approximately one hundred POWs were appointed as “monitors” to lead 
small study groups of about fourteen men to read and discuss current events for four 
hours. At the end of the sessions, prisoners were expected to turn in answered quizzes 
and written reports.  
Early release was a tantalizing incentive, so the Chinese captors promised the 
prisoners that they would be sent home as soon as the prisoners learned about the truth. 
“So we were all anxious to be good scholars,” recalled Sergeant McCollum, “We were 
prisoners, but… it looked just like a summer camp or school, with all the men walking 
around with books under their arms or papers in their hands. We used to joke a little, 
‘When are you going to graduate from the University of Pyoktong?”109 
Dubbed by prisoners as “P.U.,” Pyoktong University was “a high-powered 
interrogation center, and an exclusive one [that]…was reserved strictly for non-Korean 																																																								
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captives. …The faculty quickly informed us that they meant business and would give the 
business to anybody that didn’t learn their lessons properly.”110 The U.N. prisoners 
quickly found themselves to be “students of politics under the tutelage of their, mostly 
Chinese, Communist guards”.111 They were bombarded “by propaganda leaflets and 
films, by alleged pro-Communist testimonials from other prisoners, and by a daily series 
of three-hour propaganda lectures hammering at such points as the virtue of the 
Communist cause and evil of the capitalist world”.112 The prisoners were asked to write a 
biographical sketch about their home life and educational background. The prisoner 
students were also instructed to keep daily dairies to track their ideological 
transformation. They were issued a journal bearing the Chinese inscription “Peace Dairy” 
and “sketches of a Kremlin tower, Peking’s palace and the peace dove”.113 They also had 
to attend meetings to criticize themselves and others. British POW R. F. Matthew later 
recalled that to the Chinese, “self-criticism was the only effective way of showing 
penitence”.114 With fantastic self-abnegation, some of the confessors condemned 
themselves by going through the catalogue of their pasts and voicing penitence for their 
deeds.  
Labeled as the ‘Progressives’ Camp, Camp 5 in Pyoktong was established as a 
unique project. Its geographical proximity allowed the Chinese to transport POW 
supplies with railroad bridges spanning the Yalu, connecting Korea to Manchuria. The 
main headquarters of the CPV POW administration was located in Camp 5. Pyoktong’s 																																																								
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status in the whole POW indoctrination program, as one post-war study put it, was 
equivalent to “what Teachers College is to Deweyism.”115 Pyoktong soon became “the 
most progressive camp throughout the whole war”.116 A camp newspaper, Towards Truth 
and Peace, was published here roughly twice a month, and circulated through all the 
camps. Batchelor and Adams were the “progressives” who were regular contributors of 
this Communist publication. Camp 5 also was the place where held the biggest rally in 
June 1951 to celebrate the formation of a “peace” committee and the signing of a “peace” 
appeal. Once, prisoners in Camp 2 complained about how their food rations were smaller 
than food rations in Camp 5 and were told that the Camp 5 prisoners “were progressive 
and study well so of course they feed better”.117 The Communist-sympathizing western 
visitors usually received a much warmer welcome in Camp 5, compared to other camps. 
Alan Winnington’s propagandistic lectures were often greeted with shouts of “You’ll 
hang!” in Camp 1, whereas he appeared fairly welcome in Camp 5.118 
 
 
Battle for Ideological Supremacy 
The Chinese placed the prisoners in five segregated compounds: those with black 
Americans, white Americans, Turks, Englishmen, and those who spoke Spanish 
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(including Spanish-speaking Americans, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and Columbians.119 
The Chinese explained that the intentions behind the segregation practices were for 
“study purposes”.120 One repatriated G.I. summarized the Chinese policy, saying that 
they “played class against class, country against country and white men against black 
man … to stir up hatred and division among the prisoners”.121  
The Chinese’s first step in creating division was to undermine the existing rank 
and accepted loyalty and leadership restructures, which they accomplished by separating 
officers from sergeants and sergeants from other ranks in the POW camps.122 The 
Chinese put officers into Camp 2 and enlisted men in Camps 1 and 3. British historian T. 
R. Fehernbach called this approach “the most effective way of breaking down possible 
resistance and cohesion in any group of prisoners”.123 “No one here has any rank—you 
are all the same,” said the Chinese.124 In general, ordinary G.I.s received much better 
treatment than captured officers, and the Communists made a bigger effort to indoctrinate 
the enlisted men.125 Officers were subjected to more detailed interrogation than enlisted 
men, especially on the “types of bombs being used and the sort of targets selected for 
raids”.126 In addition, older, higher-ranking men were seen as a bad influence over some 
of the younger men and were suspected of impeding their acceptance of Communist 																																																								
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indoctrination. This suspicion was evident when the Chinese removed all the sergeants 
from Camp 5 and put them in Camp 4.127 The loss of esprit de corps not only created 
great confusion, but it also “created a leadership vacuum that the Communists readily 
filled”. As Fehernbach pointed out, it “strongly contributed to developing a psychological 
dependency of the POWs upon their Communist captors”.128  
Additionally, the Chinese skillfully exposed the shortcomings of American 
democracy by making use of its existing racism, for they viewed “the racial and social 
differences as a tool to disunite the POWs”.129 The Chinese played upon the racial and 
ethnic differences among the prisoners by segregating African-Americans, Puerto Ricans, 
and Filipinos. The Chinese exploited the prevalent racism among white Americans 
toward African-Americans and tapped into the resentment of African American soldiers 
against white G.I.s.130 Initially, Chinese put white and black G.I.s in the same camp areas 
and even the same room, which only led to racial conflicts.131 Later, black and white G.I.s 
were not allowed to work together nor attend lectures together.132 The Chinese segregated 
them and offered preferential treatment to black G.I.s as an inducement for them to 
become more “progressive”.133 A few times, Chinese instructors lectured on the evils of 
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segregation and urged African-Americans to forgo their “second class citizenship”.134 
Cpl. Richard Barnes, a black repatriate, said that if he did something wrong, he could 
easily get away with it. “But if a white boy did it,” Barnes added, “he would get from six 
months to a year in jail”.135 Besides using more lenient treatment to win over blacks, the 
Chinese also exploited racial tensions to create conflicts in the minds of black prisoners. 
Such topics as lynching, unfair labor practices, and other outrages against African 
Americans were used to portray prevailing social injustice in American society.136  
Chinese’s partial treatment toward the American blacks generated a variety of 
responses from the black G.I.s. “For the first time in my life, I felt I was being treated as 
an equal rather than as an outcast,” said Adams.137 He and a few other black prisoners 
eagerly went to voluntary lectures and came back and argued with each other about the 
shortcomings of America and the virtues of Communism. In a filmed Communist 
broadcast, black G.I. William C. White from Plumerville, AR. testified that it was his 
first encounter in which he “witnessed complete equality. South Koreans, Mexicans, 
Filipinos, white men all mixed together”.138 Some black G.I.s, however, disagreed, saying 
that they knew better about America than their Chinese instructors. Furthermore, they 
asserted, the Chinese lived in a manner “far inferior to” that of African Americans in 
America.139  
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China’s “racial segregation” policy was widely decried in America. Kansas Whip, 
a black newspaper from Topeka, Kansas, ridiculed the Chinese’s failure to win over no 
more than a few prisoners despite an intensive propaganda effort. An October 23, 1953 
article wrote:  
In Korea, Negro prisoners found themselves in a paradoxical situation; 
prior to their capture they had been fighting in the first unsegregated army 
in U.S. history, but as soon as they were taken prisoner, the 
Communists—self-styled saviors of oppressed minorities—placed them in 
segregated prison camps.140 
 
Clearly, the article carefully situated the civil rights reform within the ideological 
constraint of America’s Cold War narrative, so that “ the story of race in America,” as 
legal historian Mary L. Dudziak argued, was “used to compare democracy and 
communism”.141 Even though President Truman issued his executive order on 
desegregation in 1948, the U.S. Army’s slow implementation led to the fact that most of 
the African American G.I.s continued to serve in segregated units. The Confederate flag 
was exhibited in the United Nations troops as the blatant resistance to integration in the 
fall of 1951.142 The story of race was presented in the black American media outlets as “a 
story of progress” and “a story of U.S. moral superiority,” and the Chinese’s heavy-
handed endeavor to win friendship with African Americans was met with rebuffs.143 
Finally, non-American prisoners were also used to try to exploit the tensions 
between the U.S. and other United Nations countries. British prisoners were generally 
older than Americans, most of them being seasoned soldiers who had fought in World 																																																								
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War II. The Chinese held a total of 978 British prisoners, most of whom were housed in 
Pyoktong.144 Only a small percentage of them grew sick and died. A very few Japanese 
prisoners, who were culturally sophisticated, were hired to do translation or technical 
work for the U.S. Armed Forces.145 One Chinese source indicated that the Filipinos and 
Turks, who came from rough social-economic circumstances, tended to appreciate the 
Chinese “Lenient Policy”.146 Chinese guards exploited the divisions between the 
American prisoners and their U.N. allies. For example, the Chinese camp administrators 
worked to incite British prisoners to call Americans “bloodthirsty” and “selfish”.147 Wang 
Naiqing, one of the young camp officers at Pyoktong, saw that the Americans in captivity 
epitomized “all the shortcomings and all the dirty, dark side of their society: greed, 
indulgence, cowardice, selfishness, and indifference”.148 Otho G. Bellone, one of the 
three non-repatriates who returned to the U.S. in 1955, recalled that the Chinese used to 
ask him questions such as, “How about the friction between the United States and Great 
Britain?”149 The British soldiers were told that they were “dupes and cannon fodder of the 
American aggressors” and were sent to Korea by their “fascist rulers”.150 The interview 
records of repatriated British prisoners indicated that the Chinese adeptly exploited the 
anti-Americanism generated by some American prisoners’ despicable behaviors so that 
the Chinese could create tension between the American prisoners and prisoners of other 
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United Nations countries.151 Moreover, the CPV POW administration exploited the racial 
discrimination of U.S. troops toward the South Korean troops by explaining to the latter 
the objective of Chinese foreign policy for self-determination and anti-colonialism.152  
The five main groups of prisoners were African-Americans, white Americans, 
Turks, Englishmen, and Spanish-speaking U.N. prisoners; however, some prisoners of 
different ethnicities were exempted from racial pressuring.153 Greek solider Chletzos 
Constantinos of Lemnos Island said the Reds did not try to indoctrinate him, explaining, 
“I don’t know their language and they didn’t know mine”.154 In another case, one 
returned American Indian private commented that the Chinese “did not make any attempt 
to gain favor with or propagandize” American Indian prisoners because the Chinese had 
thought that Chinese shared the same origin with American Indians. The private said he 
had not found the Chinese’s explanations persuasive.155 When the Chinese tried to 
segregate the only black British prisoner from the rest of the Army Catering Corps 
attached to the Glosters in Camp 1, the rest of the British prisoners indignantly protested 
the separation: “He’s a Brit… not a bloody nigger, he’s British!” Facing unanimous 
resistance, the Chinese backed down and let the British cook stay where he was.156  
By instilling a radical Maoist egalitarianism, the Chinese Communists aimed to 
unsettle the previous power dynamics between white Americans and black Americans, 
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between officers and enlisted men, and between the U.S. and its allies. A combination of 
physical and psychological pressure was employed to challenge power structure, destroy 
existing loyalties, and sow dissension. “Everybody here is the same. No officers, no 
N.C.O.s here. Everybody is equal,”157 Fehrenbach wrote. Clarence Adams also testified, 
“as prisoners, we were all equal”.158 
The Chinese Communists’ reformist approach to U.N. prisoners stemmed from 
their domestic experience of transforming the “bad elements” of the Chinese society. It is 
impossible not to be struck by the parallels between the CCP’s policy toward domestic 
“lackeys of imperialism” and their policy toward the U.N. prisoners-of-war. In his The 
Dictatorship of the People’s Democracy, Chairman Mao claimed that the key distinction 
between “people” and “reactionaries” was whether or not they had accepted Communist 
leadership. Written for the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Communist Party, Mao 
argued that the “people” in China included “the working class, the peasant class, the petty 
bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie”. Under the leadership of the working class and the 
party, these classes united together to “carry out a dictatorship over the lackeys of 
imperialism—landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class, and the Nationalist 
reactionaries and their henchmen representing these classes”.159 In the land reform 
movement, the Communist regime saw wiping out the landlord class as the means to 
smash the roots of imperialism in China. One mass-line slogan for simultaneously 
conducting the “Anti-America, Aid-Korea” campaign and the land reform campaign was 
“kicking U.S. imperialism’s head in the front, and out-rooting U.S. imperialism in the 
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back”.160 For the Chinese, the attack on the American troops in the front joined hand in 
hand with the trial and execution of the landlord class, which was seen as being made up 
of “agents of foreign imperialism”. Both landlords and the Guomingdang were seen as 
the enemies of Chinese revolution, which was “anti-imperialist by character”.161  
In Red China’s arduous journey to achieve modernity, Mao practiced an 
egalitarianism, which now provoked the charge of utopianism. By defeating Chiang Kai-
shek in the civil war, Mao had unified China and liberated it from the fetters of 
imperialism and foreign aggression. As the chairman of the People’s Republic of China 
since 1949, Mao aimed to harness the revolutionary spirit of the people to recreate a 
utopian form of communism, first in their own country and then around the world. By 
embracing Mao Zedong Thought, or Maoism, the Chinese masses were to inoculate 
themselves against poisonous contagion of imperialism and colonialism, remaking their 
country with great enthusiasm. As historian Akira Iriye pointed out, “the 1950s saw an 
attempt by the Communist leaders at massive indoctrination of the Chinese people, both 
to ensure stability of the Communist regime and to prepare the nation ideologically for a 
showdown with the United States”.162  
In a similar vein, in North Korea, the Chinese Communists aimed to use their 
“superior” Marxist ideology to reform former enemy soldiers from the sixteen U.N. 
nations. The thought reform in Pyoktong, North Korea was a milder version of “thought 
reform” in China, with less violent and coercive approaches, compared to the massive 
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violence against landlords and merchants in the domestic scene.163 The Chinese 
Communists attempted to convince the prisoners that their attitudes and patterns of 
thinking were incorrect and must be reformed. Richard described how an English-
speaking Chinese interrogator announced his government’s policy: “The Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Army will not harm you, because we are a peace-loving people… We 
know you were being forced by your corrupt government to help South Korea in their 
invasion of North Korea.”164 
Class divisions and social segregation were heightened and even exaggerated in 
the indoctrination program. The Chinese lecturers iterated that the Korean War was a 
“rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight”.165 A typical line was that the “capitalists on 
Wall Street started this war to sell their arms and to gain markets and raw materials in 
Asia”.166 It was the “American imperialists” who were behind the Korean fighting, and 
President Truman, General MacArthur, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were “no-
good capitalists”.167 
A strong racial overtone was emphasized. African-American soldiers were 
promised homes, wives, and jobs if they would renounce their allegiance to the U.S.168 In 
a letter to his mother, the non-repatriate William C. White explained how Mao’s 
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egalitarian China appealed to him more than a racist, white-supremacist America, which 
made him to decide to choose China.169 White wrote: 
… for the first time in my life I have seen complete equality for men of all 
races and colors who worked together and played together. When I see 
things like this I am reminded of what happened to me in my own country 
where as children, I and other Negro boys were whipped by policemen 
because we didn’t take off our hats to them.170  
 
The political education of prisoners included not only oral indoctrination but also 
a rigorous censorship of their newspapers, periodicals, and other publications. 
Communist Chinese saw these media as vehicles for Communist or “progressive” 
messages. The tactic was successful, as more than one fourth of the non-repatriated 
Americans were either camp librarians or regular visitors of the camp library. Morris 
Wills, one of the twenty-one “turncoats,” wrote about how the Maoist egalitarianism 
influenced his decision of non-repatriation: 
The more I read in the library, the more I was convinced… Well, my God, 
this is just the thing that is needed. Equality for everyone. Everything’s 
organized, planned, secure. On paper, it looks very nice, especially to 
someone who doesn’t know anything about it.171  
 
Adams was put in charge of the camp library. The library stocked books written 
by Russian and Chinese authors, such as Maxim Gorky and Lu Xun, and were published 
by the Foreign Language Publishing Houses in Moscow and Peking.172 Books by 
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“progressive” western writers were carefully selected and stocked. Among them were 
Charles Dickens, Mark Twain, Jack London, and W. E. B. Du Bois, who were strongly 
opposed to social injustice in the capitalist world. Batchelor later admitted that he had 
become a “progressive” through reading Communist literature in the library.173 In one 
exclusive report he wrote for the Associated Press, Batchelor mentioned that reading the 
Daily Workers from New York, London, and San Francisco had also had an impact on 
him.174 Morris Wills also revealed that the daily readings of Marx, Engels, and the Daily 
Workers had likewise intensified his sympathy toward Communism and China.175   
Themes of social injustice and hardships of the downtrodden in America were 
intentionally pitted against glowing pictures of life in Red China. New China and the 
progress it had made became another theme of the “Pyoktong University” education. 
With a genuine belief in the potential of the revolutionary transformation of China, the 
Chinese instructors tirelessly described the progress “New China” was making with “new 
roads, dams, and schools, and the happy life of peasants”.176 Books like Economic 
Progress of the Chinese People’s Republic showcased the “statistics” and “tremendous 
gains” being made in different sectors of the Chinese economy.177 A silver-tongued 
Chinese instructor named Lin, dubbed “Screaming Skull” by many prisoners, was skilled 
at paining rosy, inviting pictures of China under Mao. Maoism was portrayed as an 
essential unity of interests and values widely shared by Chinese of all classes, regions, 
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and creeds. Mao’s China was described as “a utopia where everyone would share 
equally”.178 The White Haired Girl, a lengthy Chinese revolutionary opera, was 
performed twice at Camp 5 to demonstrate the contrast between the old China and the 
new China.179 The constant bombardment of lectures on a glowing new China definitely 
impacted the captured soldiers’ views on China and Communism. When many of the 
American prisoners returned from Korea, they told the press, “Although communism 
won’t work in America, I think it’s a good thing for Asia”.180 
In the meantime, the Chinese Communists seemed to work hard to expand the 
influence of the Chinese Communist revolution.181 Upon returning to the U.S., Corporal 
Edward S. Dickenson reported that the Chinese Communists had told him and other non-
repatriates that the American Communist Party was preparing to launch a revolution by 
the year 1958.182 Dickenson added that the Chinese prisoners were told that they would 
be sent off to China for training to take over leading government positions in America. 
“You are revolutionaries now and will go to China to study Marx and Lenin,” the 
Chinese told the prisoners when they first rejected repatriation.183 The Chinese promised 
them that they would be generals or other high-power leaders; in this way, “we would 
become ‘masters of our own country,’” said Dickenson.184 Dickenson also mentioned that 
the Chinese had promised non-repatriates women, homes, and free education.185  
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Collaborators’ Humanitarianism? 
Most of the alleged acts of collaboration took place from late 1950 to the spring 
of 1951. It was estimated that a third of the American prisoners in Chinese-run camps 
collaborated with their captors; the British record also shows that at least one third of 
British servicemen collaborated.186 After the negotiations began between the United 
Nations and Chinese in August of 1951, the physical status of the POW improved 
considerably. Reportedly, 10-12% of the 1, 200 U.N. prisoners in Camp 5 were 
progressives.187 The U.N. prisoners gradually fell into three categories, according to 
political behavior of individual prisoners: progressives, reactionaries, and non-
committals.  
Progressives, called “pros” for short, were the Chinese’s favorite students. 
Progressives were later characterized by the American media as “young” and “poorly 
educated and trained”. They were seen as not necessarily being Communists but as being 
people truly believing that communism was a superior form of government. They 
received extra food and other favors in return for their cooperation, but most of the other 
prisoners regarded them with distaste.188 Some of the progressives, such as Adams, were 
appointed as monitors who often guest-lectured on topics like feudalism, slavery, 
imperialism, capitalism, social development, and the accumulation of wealth.189 Adams 
also became a regular contributor of the camp propaganda newspaper, Toward Truth and 
Peace.190 The progressives joined “peace committees” and got special privileges, such as 
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extra cigarettes, matches, shoes and clothing, pens and ink, and writing paper.191 
However, the perception that “the ‘progressives’ lived high in the camp, never had to 
work, and frequently got drunk with their Communist captors” was not true.192 
The progressives served as propagandists for the Communist cause, and their 
efforts were manifested in written articles, speeches, and recordings about the “The 
Chinese Lenient Treatment Policy”. The letters, articles, and pictures compiled by United 
Nations POWs were later distributed throughout the world in an attempt to prove that 
POWs were receiving excellent treatment in captivity. Among them, in particular, was 
United Nations P.O.W.’s in Korea and Thinking Soldiers: By Men Who Fought in Korea, 
published for foreign consumption.193 At the end of 1951, when the Chinese abandoned 
the compulsory indoctrination program and set up a volunteer study group, most of the 
attendees were progressives. On February 22, 1953, several of the progressives signed a 
peace petition to the United Nations to bring a faster end to the war:  
To: Representatives of all countries in the United Nations General 
Assembly  
From: POW Camp, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, February 22, 
1953  
Dear Sirs:  
We, the undersigned, have been prisoners of war for over two years. 
During these two years our welfare has never been neglected and our stay 
here has been made as comfortable as possible. But personal comfort can 
never substitute for the yearning which we all have to return to our 
families and our natural desire to return home still remains in spite of the 
fact that we are being treated well and living comfortably.194 
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Some of the returned prisoners complained that many “progressives” were given 
early release. One repatriated G.I. swore vengeance on fellow prisoners who turned 
informers: “You couldn’t say anything against the Reds without the Chinese finding out 
about it within 20 minutes. If they (informers) get on the boat with me, they’ll be shark 
bait. They were hated worse than the Chinks”.195 However, only twenty out of the early 
released 149 G.I.s were suspected as having been compromised and subsequently singled 
out for further mental and medical examination at the Valley Forge Army Hospital in 
Pennsylvania.196 Rather than all 149 of the early-released G.I.’s being seen as 
“progressives,” only these “Valley Forge 20” were seen as “having succumbed to 
Communist indoctrination”.197 
Making up less than five percent of the U.N. POWs,198 informers were not 
necessarily progressives or Communists.199 Not all the prisoners who mouthed 
Communist slogans and “toed the Communist line” were informers.200 Also, those who 
informed or actively assisted the Chinese were not necessarily Communists. In one 
extreme case, the incentive for one G.I.’s informant behavior was “to get the money to 
purchase marijuana,”201 rather than being a result of successful Chinese indoctrination. 
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Consisting of approximately 209 POWs, reactionaries were famous for their 
tough stand against Communism.202 The Chinese called them “problem children” or 
“stubborn students”. The Chinese put them in a squad of their own, named “reactionary 
squad”. A Ku Klux Klan unit was formed among the reactionaries to “straighten out 
communistic tendencies of some of the boys,” according to Pfc. James R. Dunn, a 
repatriated G.I. from Anderson, N.C.203 The unit was located in Prison Camp 1 close to 
Pyongyang; however, the KKK members eventually expanded their influence to every 
single camp except Camp 2. The concept of race served more as an organizational 
strategy for general opposition to communist indoctrination,” especially within the 
overarching theme of equality.204 Members were organized to obstruct Chinese 
reeducation efforts, threaten suspected “progressives,” and disrupt camp life.205 
According to the Army record, sergeant Lloyd W. Pate, the famous American 
reactionary,  
organized groups of fellow prisoners to disrupt attempts at Communist 
indoctrination and harass their instructors. Each time the groups were 
disbanded because of informants, Sergeant Pate formed other resistance 
groups…. he raised the morale of fellow prisoners, stiffened their 
resistance and contributed in great measure to the failure of the 
Communist program to convert prisoners of war to Communism.206  
 
Pate was awarded the Commendation Ribbon by the U.S. Army in 1954 for being a 
reactionary in the prisoner camps.  
Actual disciplinary punishments were reserved for the small minority of hard-core 
prisoners who fought back or sabotaged Chinese indoctrination efforts. For example, if 																																																								
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these prisoners offended or threatened a progressive, they were likely to be thrown into 
the “hole” or the “icebox” and placed in solitary confinement.207 Many returned ex-
POWs said they had been “whipped, beaten and forced to stand immobile for hours in 
freezing cold because of tales carried to the Chinese by “Progressives”.208 The British 
Ministry of Defence 1955 Report records the punishment given to an American officer:  
He was kept in solitary confinement for three weeks. During his 
confinement, he was savagely beaten and tortured. When he returned to 
the compound he was morally and physically broken. He told the other 
officers never to discuss anything in his presence as he had been sent back 
to act as an informer and threatened with worse torture if he did not 
comply. His treatment had left him very weak and he no longer had any 
will to live … and he eventually died about two weeks after his release.209 
 
The vast majority of the U.N. prisoners were “non-committals”. They “played it cool” by 
keeping a low profile, drifting along with Communist discipline and avoiding 
mistreatment, in the in hopes of surviving until the war ended. Postwar studies sponsored 
by the army offered the surprising conclusion that maintaining a neutral attitude was 
actually the best approach to cope with captivity.210 The neutrals, or the “in-betweens,” 
constituted approximately eighty percent of the POW population. Not surprisingly, these 
people were the sources through which the Chinese were able to get acquainted with the 
prisoner situations within the camps. A lot of “rats” were actually from this group.211 
        Upon repatriation, while facing his court-martial charge for collaborating with 
enemy, Claude Batchelor claimed his alleged collaborations were actually “humanitarian 
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leadership”.212 As someone who enjoyed great favor with the Chinese, Batchelor was 
appointed the chairman of the Living Affairs Committee. His Chinese captors referred to 
him as a “young Lenin” and complimented his “mass line.”213 He argued that he was 
using his position in captivity to reinvent humanitarianism in a way different from that of 
the Geneva version of humanitarianism or the Chinese Lenient Treatment policy. He 
thought he had managed to earn respect among his fellow prisoners despite his 
progressive tendency because he was sincere and always kept his “progressive activities 
out in the open”.214 He further explained why he was well regarded, saying, “because I 
got along with the Chinese and made friends with them; because I believed that what I 
was doing was right and wanted to help my people”.215 
Even though Batchelor’s theory was met with skepticism, some of his fellow 
prisoners confirmed the fact that Batchelor used his position to assist the sick and 
wounded. One witness, Corp. Harold M. Dunn of Brooklyn, testified that “Batchelor 
helped other POWs in his company when they were ill, including Corp. Edward 
Dickenson. Dunn said Batchelor also helped, by his contacts with Chinese guards, to 
“bring about an improvement in food”.216  
             Batchelor was not the only non-repatriates who exhibited this “humanitarian 
leadership”. Andrew Condron, a member of the British Royal Marines, was the only 
British non-repatriate during the Korean War. His fellow prisoners later vehemently 
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defended him for his selfless assistance in captivity.217 Pf. John R. Dunn was another 
non-repatriate who was “known for his efforts to take care of other sick prisoners”.218  
One Marine private, McKnight, testified after the war that “he owed his life to Dunn for 
sharing his food with him, giving him his blanket, and taking care of him when he was 
sick”.219 One British solider found another way to provide aid: he later admitted the 
reason he attended voluntary study groups after the Chinese abandoned the compulsory 
mass indoctrination was “to get in with the Chinese”.220 By appearing to be attracted to 
Communism, he was able to obtain extra medical attention for fellow prisoners and 
acquire medical books for self-study. Colonel Harry Fleming, who was elected camp 
leader after twenty G.I.s were transferred from Camp 5 to Camp 12, succeeded in 
keeping a far lower death rate than any other prison camp. One witness testified that 
Fleming was in a “truly terrible position, for no man can serve two masters; he must 
remain loyal to his government yet someone must emerge from the prisoners to be a go-
between between them and the enemy.”221 Fleming himself stated, “I will give my soul in 
hell to get every man out of here alive.”222 
 Despite cultivating a mild affinity toward communism and China, the 
indoctrination program in general was a failure. The Communists “made a concerted but 
unsuccessful attempt to indoctrinate captured officers with their ideas,” said 28-year-old 
Captain Billy B. Foshee. He added that although the Communists talked “until we were 
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almost deaf and blind,” they had little luck in their attempts to make Communists.223 “A 
few men went over to Communism as a result of indoctrination, but the majority came 
out even more anti-Communistic than before they went in,” said Corporal H. Hogg.224 
Hogg said the Communists coerced prisoners to sign Communist peace appeals by 
threatening to cut their food rations.225  
As early as June 1952, the CPV switched gears and adopted Premier Zhou Enlai’s 
directives of focusing on the improvement of U.N. POWs’ living situations and working 
on libraries, clubs, and committees. As Cheng Shaokun, a Chinese camp officer, later 
recalled, “Primer Minister Zhou [Enlai] told us… Not too much lecturing, not too much 
political education. Concentrate on the principle of opposing the war, for peace”.226 
With the information provided by some progressives, the Chinese POW administration 
finally switched from promoting ideological indoctrination to fighting against war and 
advocating peace.227 As a senior camp administrator, Zhou Bosheng attended the second 
CPV meeting to work against the enemy at Pyoktong in June 1952. The POW 
administration decided to abandon compulsory lectures in the meeting. A 1952 yearly 
report of the POW Work Section of the Division’s Political Affairs Department of CPVA 
states that although the CPV successfully persuaded the U.N. prisoners to criticize U.S. 
government policy in Korea, the class struggle education was a recognized failure.228 By 
mid-1952, the Chinese decided to abandon the compulsory “re-education,” though the 
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principles were “fundamental to the ‘Lenient Policy’ as originally formulated”.229 The 
Chinese report also said almost all the prisoners agreed that the U.S. had no business in 
Korea and that the Korean problem should be decided by the Korean people themselves. 
Topics like “monopoly capitalists,” “war trash for Wall-Street bosses,” “hypocritical 
democracy,” and “American aggression in Korea” not only became topics of laughter and 
ridicule for the POWs, but they were also taken as propaganda tactics to slander the 
American way of life.230 Additionally, the Chinese report also admitted that some of the 
prisoners viewed the POW education as spiritual torture. Their propaganda campaign, 
which targeted against families and relatives of enemy POWs, also encountered setbacks, 
as all the mail sent back home from POW compounds was seen as Communist 
propaganda. After these facts became clear, the POW education switched to only 
emphasizing the peace campaign, and the CPVA completely gave up the idea of  
“exporting revolution”.   
A close examination of the way the Chinese treated U.N. POWs reveals that 
despite the extensive efforts to propagandize the humanitarianism of the new socialist 
regime, as evidenced by the self-proclaimed “Lenient Policy,” the efforts to ideologically 
indoctrinate and proselytize western enemies proved to be a failed experiment. The POW 
Work Section of the Division’s Political Affairs Department of the CPVA did not 
formulate a coherent policy in dealing with enemy prisoners of war; instead, they made 
haphazard exploitation attempts, including extracting filmed “confessions” from thirty-
eight U.S. air force men for conducting a “germ warfare” campaign in 1952.231 
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Confessions were released in May 1952 saying that U.S. airmen dropped “explosive germ 
bombs” over North Korea in January 1952.232 The United States government persistently 
denied these germ warfare charges, which had been orchestrated by the Soviet Union and 
Communist China.233 The allegations resulted in an international controversy until 1998, 
when the public disclosure of Soviet Central Committee documents confirmed that the 
germ warfare had been a Chinese fraud. However, a few Chinese scholars continued to 
argue that the U.S. did indeed employ biological warfare against Chinese and North 
Korean forces during the Korean War.234 
Chinese revolutionaries tried out their methods on the western minds, provoking 
both cultural and political vulnerabilities. Their tactics were developed slowly and 
carefully, based on the PLA’s past experience of dealing with captured soldiers of 
Kuomingdang and Japanese. However, their experience was based primarily on illiterate 
peasant soldiers who were raised in a “culture that strongly emphasized obedience, 
loyalty, and sacrifice”.235 Though the instructors were intelligent and well trained, 
“hardly any of them had lived outside China, and they had no first-hand knowledge of 
Western mentality”.236 The same explanation applied to the Korean People's Army’s 
policy of early release of enemy prisoners. Lieutenant General Du Ping argued that it was 
the U.S.’s entrance into the war that changed the nature of the war from a civil war into 
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an international war, resulting in a complicated prisoner-of-war issue.237 Early release 
revealed a fledging Communist regime without much world credentials applied 
mechanically its old practices from the civil war, disregarding the fact that the new 
enemy came from totally different cultural contexts. The Chinese’s efforts to break down 
the morale of U.N. prisoners in Korea ran parallel to their domestic policy of “thought 
reform”. Systematic attempts were made to convert their prisoners to the Communist 
viewpoint and use them to further their Communist goals in the propaganda campaigns 
worldwide.  
The notion of race was extensively employed and exploited prominently in anti-
American propaganda and in POW education. Even though the POW indoctrination 
touched off sensitive issues, such as the ethnic strife and racism, most of the American 
prisoners, including the African-American servicemen, remained resistant to Communist 
indoctrination efforts, as testified by the formulation of clandestine racist organizations, 
such as the KKK, to resist Chinese propaganda. As historian Zhang Shuguang points out, 
“the CPV’s political indoctrination faltered in the face of poor logistics, resulting in 
inadequate clothing and poor food, repeated military setbacks, and an effective US/UN 
propaganda war”.238 Time magazine reported in 1953 that a mere thirty of the 3,500 
POWs proved “really susceptible to enemy propaganda”.239  
For the sake of surviving the captivity, “progressives” collaborated with their 
captors to improve their living situations. Even the infamous twenty-one non-repatriates 
chose to stay in China not out of ideological convictions but out of pursuing opportunities 
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to elevate their own life situations or play the “peace fighter” role modeled by 
Communist China. Andrew Condron, the only British non-repatriate, insisted that he was 
“not a Communist but a pacifist who wanted to prove that ‘war is evil and people can live 
together in peace.’”240 S. P. MacKenzie’s research demonstrated that Condron’s 
motivations and actions to stay behind had more to do with him “as an individual rather 
than reflecting some broader ideological position”.241 Looking back on his experience 
after several years, Adams recalled his years as a prisoner in Chinese-run camps: “I never 
became a Communist or a Chinese citizen,” Adams remarked. He continued, 
I was looking for something much more fundamental. I wanted to be 
treated as a human being, and I wanted the opportunity to live a better life. 
Although our Chinese captors never became close to any prisoners, they at 
least treated black and white prisoners with equal dignity—or indifference. 
Thus, for the first time in my life, I felt I was being treated as an equal 
rather than as an outcast.242 
 
The non-repatriation of one small group of opportunistic and troubled young men 
triggered paranoid anxiety in Cold War America. Lurid accounts of germ warfare and the 
twenty-one non-repatriates gave momentum to sensational depiction of China being a 
formidable “brainwashing” regime. U.S. journalist and CIA agent Edward Hunter’s 
serialized publications on “brainwashing” dramatized the physical and mental coercion in 
the hands of Chinese Communists.243 In 1958, his testimony in “United States House 
Committee on Un-American Activities” further fanned the flame of virulent 
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anticommunism in the MacCarthyite era and provided fuel for further dividing an 
America searching for enemies within.244 
In the aftermath of the repatriation of prisoners of war, an anxious America 
groped for a new POW policy. In 1955, President Eisenhower issued a Code of Conduct 
to regulate the servicemen’s conduct in captivity. The Report of the Secretary of 
Defense’s Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War warned the American people that the 
lesson from Korea was that the spread of Communism, whether by armed aggression or 
by internal infiltration, constituted a direct challenge to American way of life. Americans 
must work against Communism by being vigilant on the home front:   
The responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of the United 
States and all it stands for is one which must be shared by every citizen. 
Every American is in the front line in the war for the minds of men …The 
home front is but an extension of the fighting front.245 
 
The promulgation of Codes of Conduct within the U.S. and other western militaries 
regulated and enforced behavior norms in an ideological total war.  As historian Elizabeth 
Lutes Hillman put it,  
Defending America during the Cold War meant not only bearing arms on 
behalf of the nation, but also protecting American ideological superiority 
by spurning communist indoctrination—even under the duress and 
deprivation of a remote POW camp.246 
 
However, the newly issued code of conduct in the aftermath of court-martialing 
repatriated prisoners of war for collaboration “established an impossibly high standard of 
ideological loyalty that was unevenly enforced”.247  
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Ironically, what was perceived by the Chinese as a failure triggered potent 
countermeasures from the U.S. to combat future psychological warfare initiatives. 
Major W. E. Mayer, an Amy psychiatrist from the Brooke Army Medical Service 
School in San Antonio, Tex., kept warning the American people that the Chinese 
Communists had acquired “the ultimate weapon” in the ideological total war:  
Communist objectives as revealed in Korea are much more mature, far-
seeing and long-range…If there is an ultimate weapon, it is not a bomb or 
a gun, but the psychological or ideological weapon as used by the Chinese 
Communists.248 
 
The attacks from journalist Eugene Kinkead and Army psychiatrist Major 
William E. Mayer propagandized the image of American servicemen in captivity as 
collaborators.  Kinkead concluded that the American prisoners “appeared to lose all sense 
of allegiance not only to their country but to their fellow prisoners”.249 In a similar vein, 
Mayer argued,  
The behavior of many Americans in Korean prisoner camps appears to 
raise serious questions about American character, and about the education 
of Americans… The behavior of too many of our soldiers in prison fell far 
short of the historical American standards of honor, loyalty, courage and 
personal integrity.250  
 
Mayer based on his conclusion on the interviews of over 4,000 returning prisoners of war 
from Korea and described brainwashing as “simply a well organized educational 
program”.251 
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“Pyoktong University” outdoor classroom in a valley close to Camp 5 in  
Pyoktong. The mud huts at the top of the picture are the dorms where  
the “students” lived. The prisoners all sat on the ground or on bricks or  
homemade stools, while the Chinese instructor stood alone to lecture.  
 
by Wang Nai-qing, source: Internet 
 
 
 
 
 
U.N. POWs watching The White-Haired Girl stage show 
performed by a touring drama troupe in Pyoktong in 1952 
 
by Wang Nai-qing, source: Internet 
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Chapter III 
 “Bugout” 252 in Death Island and the Price of Non-Repatriation   
 
General Dodd went down by the compound.  
Everything was dull inside  
When all at once two Commies grabbed him, 
James Van Fleet sat down and cried . . .253    
 
This song, sung to the tune of The Little White Cloud That Cried, narrates a 
specular series of events in May, 1952, when an unwary American general was seized 
and held for ransom by his mutinous prisoners under the United States-led United 
Nations Command. During the spring of 1952, a barrage of violent riots culminated in the 
kidnapping of this American general in the grisly island prison of Koje. The general 
signaled his subordinates not to fight and said he would court-martial anyone who fired. 
The mortified American troops at the gate witnessed their general being hauled away by 
his own captives.  
Referred to by General Clark as “the biggest flap of the whole war,” this 
extraordinary incident immediately drew widespread attention.254 The New York Times 
stated that it took on “such a fantastic character as to be almost unbelievable”.255 The 
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ensuing turbulence and the U.N.’s mishandling of the POWs generated headlines—
especially adverse publicity for the U.N.—in the foreign press all over the world.  
An observer in 1952 would have been shocked by the extent of agency that North 
Korean and Chinese prisoners of war were able to exercise while in captivity: they not 
only managed their living-related issues, but they also “defied guards, silenced dissenters, 
traded with the natives, made demands, and staged demonstrations and within the 
stockades”.256 A postwar analysis from the University of Chicago characterized the 
popular image of the Koje-do POWs as “fanatically active and rebellious against their 
captors”.257 
At its height, the U.N.C. Camp on the island of Koje held 173,218 prisoners of 
war who fought for the Communist side (North Korea and the People's Republic of 
China), including 151,589 Koreans and 21,629 Chinese.258 Koje held the largest POW 
camp run under U.S. military auspices. On October 15, 1950, during the meeting with 
President Truman at Wake Island, General Douglas MacArthur had reported of his 
60,000 North Korean prisoners:  
The prisoners are the happiest Koreans in Korea. They are clean and well-
fed for the first time. They have been de-loused and have good jobs for 
which they are being paid under the Geneva Convention.259  
 
Granted, in their best conditions, Communist prisoners in United Nations camps were 
adequately clothed, appeared well fed, and had medical care available. They were housed 
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in neat, winter-proofed buildings which they themselves had constructed out of stone, 
mud, and cement. However, within two years of MacArthur’s claim, these same prisoners 
had written and signed blood petitions, instigated prison riots, shouted out derogatory 
“pro-and-con” Communist songs, kidnapped a U.S. general, waved Communist and 
anticommunist flags, and manufactured handmade weapons behind the barbed wire 
fences. Moreover, at the end of the war, the emotional upheaval of the POWs was not 
ultimately resolved by the prisoners’ return to their native cultures.  
Despite the rebelliousness within the camps, the majority of the POWs did not 
ultimately wish to return to their native lands, contrary to the claims laid out by the 
Communist press.260 In fact, by the end of the war, more than two-thirds of the Chinese 
POWs and more than one third of the North Korean POWs had decided not to return to 
Communist control. To the consternation of Chinese and North Korean Communists, 
only 70,000 of the 132,000 prisoners held by the U.N. chose repatriation. Out of 
approximately 21,700 Chinese prisoners of war, 14,066 chose to go to Taiwan. “This 
kind of mass resistance to repatriation has been almost unknown in modern warfare until 
very recent times,” commented the previously mentioned University of Chicago postwar 
analysis.261  
This chapter is an effort to provide an understanding of the turmoil and unrest 
within the United Nations Command (U.N.C.) prison compounds, of the way the 
prisoners’ behavior provided insights into Chinese and North Korean Communist 
societies, and of America’s psychological war initiative surrounding the enemy 
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prisoners.262 The chapter explores some of the unusual circumstances, particularly those 
of the Chinese prisoners of war, which led to subsequent prison riots and mass non-
repatriation in the U.N.C. prison compounds. The chapter asks such questions as: to what 
extent did these soldiers’ fates in captivity become a focus point of struggle for Beijing, 
Taipei, and Washington? How did these powers strive to turn the knotty problem of 
Communist prisoners into a strategic advantage in the Cold War struggle? How did the 
progress of truce talks affect political developments within the prison compounds? How 
did the “democratically oriented” prisoner-students of the “Civilian Information and 
Education Divisions” program eventually galvanize the captives into becoming militant 
and fanatical prisoners? How was the prison compound subdued and restored to order by 
an old China hand?  
The answers to these questions are crucial to understanding America’s role in the 
Asian civil wars within the context of global cold war. Cultural and linguistic competence 
proved to be essential in effectively engaging enemy POWs in Asia. Under pressure from 
their allies and from world opinion, Americans eventually sent one of their best talents to 
handle the Oriental prisoners, and General “Bull” Boater came to Koje and finally 
subdued the prisoner munity.  
While the non-repatriation principle served as a stroke of brilliance in American 
psychological warfare in delegitimizing Communist regimes in China and Korea, 
Communist and anticommunist prisoners’ ferocious infighting behind the barbed wires 
and America’s overall mismanagement of prison camps revealed that voluntary 
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repatriation was no more than American-style rhetoric of democratic empowerment and 
the celebration of individual choice over Communist collectivism.  
Whereas it became a self-serving, self-perpetuating myth for Cold War America 
that a person only accepted Communism at the point of a bayonet, it was the masses of 
Asian prisoners of war who paid the price for the American policy of non-repatriation by 
subjecting themselves to either Communist or anticommunist revolutionary violence.263  
The horrific violence in Koje underscored how American Cold War ideology, although 
championing individual choice over totalitarian Communism, ended up providing limited 
options for prisoners and instigating destructive violence in the camps. 
 
 
The Composition and Motivations of the Communist POWs 
During the truce talks, the number of the U.N.-controlled Communist POWs 
provided by the Red Cross delegate was 169,000. However, when both sides exchanged 
the list of POWs in December 1951, the number submitted by U.N. was 132,000. Only 
about 70,000 people would not forcibly resist repatriation to China or North Korea. This 
discrepancy enraged the Communist side. The Americans claimed that they had deducted 
38,000 South Koreans, who had been captured and impressed into the North Korean 
Army and had later been taken into custody by the United Nations forces at the end of 
1950. The United Nations did not consider them to be genuine prisoners of war and 
reclassified them as civilians. If these residents in South Korea had been repatriated, they 
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would have been turned over to North Korea instead of returning to their homes in the 
South.264  
Among the 132,000 were more than 20,000 Chinese POWs, half of whom were 
soldiers of the ill-fated 180th Division of the 60th Army, who had been captured during 
their encounters with the U.S. 24th Infantry Division during China’s unsuccessful “Fifth 
Phase” Offensive (April 22—June 10,1951).265 During this attack, the Communist 
Chinese Forces (CCF) had commanded nine armies of approximately 250,000 men.266 
According to Liang Shiqiu, during the five offensives, up to 173,700 Communist soldiers 
were captured as prisoners of war, among whom the Chinese POWs comprised 
approximately 21,300.267  
The internal makeup of North Korean POWs was simple and straightforward. 
Before the Inchon Landing in September of 1950, the U.N. side only held 1,000 North 
Korean POWs. In the following two months, almost 130,000 prisoners were held under 
U.N. control. By mid-1951, there was a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants at 
Koje-do.268 
Approximately 110,000 were actually North Korean. The remaining 
40,000 were South Koreans pressed into service with the KPA … the 
average prisoner of war (POW) had been in the KPA for less than six 
months.269  
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According to the survey statistics collected by the U.S., the Korean POWs included North 
Korean soldiers, drafted North Korean civilians, ex-South Korean POWs, straggling 
South Korean soldiers, and civilians.270 Soviet diplomatic documents also confirmed that 
the North Korean army had regrouped some South Korean POWs into their units.271 The 
POWs were first held under South Korean control near Pusan and were later transferred 
to Koje by the winter of 1951.  
The composition of the Chinese POWs was more complicated, resulting from the 
indiscriminate recruiting of the Chinese Communist Party in 1950-1951. The Chinese 
POWs were made up of die-hard Communists who attempted to hide their true identities, 
as well as new recruits of dubious political allegiance. The Chinese government had, in 
early October 1950, scrambled to raise a “volunteer” army of 1.2 million men, who were 
not soldiers of the highest caliber. The Chinese government aimed to convince the world 
that Chinese “volunteers,” not the Chinese government, had organized the CPV.272 The 
government had rounded up an assortment of men, ranging in age from fifteen to early 
twenties. The fledging Communist regime had actively recruited WWII veterans and 
seasoned Communist soldiers who had suffered tremendous losses during the Chinese 
Civil War. The new recruits also included naïve university graduates who had wanted 
some experience but had not anticipated the brutality of the battlefield. The regime had 
even accepted “spoiled capitalists” from “wealthy families, such as landlords, business 
owners, bankers, and other bourgeois and capitalist classes accustomed to exploiting the 
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less fortunate members of society”.273 To members of the old exploiting classes, fighting 
in the CPVA provided the opportunity to seek redemption in a new China teeming with 
Maoist revolution slogans.  
A large number of CPV prisoners, as U.S. Army historian Walter G. Hermes 
pointed out, lacked enthusiasm for returning to Communist control because many of them 
were former Nationalist soldiers who defected to the Communists during the Chinese 
Civil War.274 During the final stage of the Chinese Civil War, the PLA picked up a large 
number of Nationalist soldiers and integrated them into the Communist Army en masse 
via the Lenient Policy.275 British historian Rosemary Foot estimated that former 
Nationalist soldiers comprised 50-70 percent of CPV forces.276 Of these soldiers, 7,094 
expressed repatriation wishes and eventually returned to the mainland. More than 14,000 
went to Taiwan when the conflict ceased, and very few went to neutral nations.277 In his 
1954 government report, Lieutenant-General Chiang Ching-kuo, then the director of the 
political affairs bureau of the Defense Ministry of the Nationalist government of China, 
mentioned that 66% of the non-repatriated Chinese POWs were actually ex-Nationalist 
soldiers.278  
Historians have debated over the reasons accounting for the defeat of the Chinese 
during the “Fifth Phase” Offensive (April 22-30,1951), when the majority of Chinese 
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POWs were captured.279. Reuter reported that it was the first time that “massed groups of 
Chinese prisoners lay down their arms and surrendered” to South Koreans and 
Americans.280 During the second stage of the offensive, more than 16,000 Chinese were 
captured, which made up 80% of the whole CPV POW population.281 Despite 
overextended supply lines and outdated facilities, the CCP leaders launched the campaign 
to avoid having to fight on both fronts to prevent another U.S./U.N. landing. Chinese 
historian Zhang Shuguang noted, the CCP leaders’ “war of attrition” strategy not only 
weakened the U.S./U.N. forces as the Chinese had predicted, but it also had a devastating 
effect on the development of Chinese economy and society, as well as damaging the 
morale of the CPV soldiers”.282 Replenishment of the troops became problematic when 
the front line became overextended and the Russian air force failed to deliver the goods it 
had promised. The PRC was under tremendous pressure fighting a new war within five 
years of the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War. As the war in Korea progressed, the 
Chinese supply lines became thin and overstretched. As a consequence, weaponry, food, 
and medicines were in seriously short supply. The CPV leadership had entered Korea in 
1950 expecting to fight a defensive battle, but from the onset, the Chinese found 
themselves drawn into offensive operations to clear North Korea of the U.N. troops. The 
CPV’s military unpreparedness for this type of operation caused their troops to suffer 
greatly. The CPV leadership generally believed that their numerical and moral superiority 
would yield a complete victory over American technological prowess. The Chinese side 
																																																								
279 Foot, A Substitute for Victory, 109; Mahoney, Formidable Enemies, 41. 
280 P.T.L.-Reuter, “U. N. Forces Enter Hwachon: ‘Reds’ Surrender En Masse,” The Times of India, 28 May 
1951: 1. 
281 Xu yan, Mao ze dong yu kang mei yuan chao zhan zheng (Jie fang jun chu ban she, 2003), 217.  
282 Zhang Shuguang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1995), 246.  
	 69 
never expected that the U.N. forces would recover so quickly from their long retreat. 
Furthermore, the CPV vastly underestimated their enemy’s superior weaponry. Finally, 
their political and military leaders had expected practically unlimited support from their 
ally, the Soviet Union; however, the promised air force coverage was never provided.283 
Throughout the course of the war, the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers lost approximately 
21,000 men as prisoners of war. On the U.N. side, the United States was caught by 
surprise at the massive numbers of Communist prisoners that their forces accumulated so 
quickly.284 
After July 1951, U.N. psychological warfare messages proved to be a crucial 
factor in the heavy increase of Communist prisoners.285 Since the beginning of the war, 
the Untied Nations Command had utilized leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers to 
persuade Communist soldiers to capitulate voluntarily. The surrender leaflets were 
particularly compelling for the Chinese enlisted men, as hundreds of them had reportedly 
crossed the U.N. line, waving surrender-safe conduct psychological warfare leaflets.286 
Later interrogations of Communist prisoners of war demonstrated that one in three were 
influenced to surrender by leaflets.287    
The complicated makeup of personnel set the stage for the adoption of the 
“voluntary repatriation” policy and the “bloody screening” of POWs. In the meantime, 
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the complex composition of prisoner population also heightened and multiplied the level 
of hardship POWs suffered in captivity, as well as provided opportunities for those trying 
to divide the POWs along certain political lines. The dramatic influx of enemy prisoners 
caught the Americans off guard, for they had not anticipated collecting such a large 
number of enemy prisoners, let alone managing them. To feed, house, clothe, and guard 
an ever-mounting prisoner population posed an insurmountable problem for the United 
Nations Command. 
 
 
The POWs’ Living Situation 
The Chinese and North Korean prisoners were mainly held by the American and 
South Korean troops. The South Koreans, like their counterparts in the North, initially 
had no policy for prisoners and simply shot the North Koreans they captured. A South 
Korean officer reported that at other times, South Korean soldiers released enemy 
prisoners on the spot out of convenience instead of sending them to POW camps.288 Since 
September 1950, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSAK) POW Command began to bear the 
brunt of the custodial responsibility of managing and controlling all the Communist 
prisoners captured.289 Later, the U.S., as the executive agent for the U.N., collected all the 
North Korean POWs and placed them in different camps.290 The prisoners stayed in 
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settlement camps along the southern coast of Korea, located at Pusan, Koje Island, and 
Jeju Island. The temporary prison stockades resided in Pusan, Pyongyang, and Inchon.  
Pusan, the principal U.N. post for transporting military materials, became the post 
where the U.S. Army Prisoners of War Headquarters was first based.291 Located in the 
southern tip of Korea, this port city primarily held wounded prisoners, women, and 
children. Generally a total of about 12,000 wounded prisoners were held for treatment at 
the 64th Field Hospital in Pusan.  
Simultaneously, Pusan also held transiting camps, where newly captured 
prisoners came and were registered. Photographs and fingerprints were taken, and each 
person received a POW tag with the date and their registration number. The tag included 
comprehensive information about individual POWs—their places of origin, age, class 
origins, experience, family background, education, date of joining the army, ranking, 
office appointments, battles fought in the war, etc.292 The Chinese POWs called the POW 
tag their “POW ticket”. Only after a POW received the POW ticket could he or she could 
be officially called a U.N. POW and begin to enjoy the privileges of a POW under the 
Geneva Convention.293 Such privileges meant that the prisoners would be “treated as 
human beings who had ceased to be combatants and were entitled to adequate food, 
shelter, and facilities for their physical, spiritual, and intellectual welfare”.294 
After being deloused and sprayed with D.D.T., prisoners were given POW 
uniforms and old military blankets. Then they were categorized according to the 
condition of their wounds and sent to different destinations. Healthy and newly recovered 																																																								
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prisoners were sent to other camps in groups of five hundred. One Chinese prisoner’s 
memoir mentioned that each of the prisoners was allocated half box of cigarettes, which 
the prisoners used in gambling to kill time.295 By September 24, after Indian custodian 
forces took full custody of the non-repatriated POWs, the main concentration of 
anticommunist Chinese POWs was on Cheju-do Island.296  
During the first two years of the war, different ideas were proposed regarding 
where to construct prisoner-of-war camps. Before January 1951, General MacArthur 
proposed to transfer all the enemy POWs to the United States territory, as had been done 
with the majority of German POWs back in World War II; however, the U.S. government 
rejected this proposal on the basis of practicality.297 One scholar surmised in retrospect 
that such a move might have prevented the Dodd Incident.298 Eventually, all the prison 
camps were built in South Korea and on offshore islands. In his memoir, Ridgway 
recalled the U.N.’s consideration in choosing the locations of prison camps. Initially, 
attention was focused on Cheju-do; however, Koje-do was eventually chosen due to its 
smaller population density, despite its rocky, mountainous terrain.299 The U.N. also made 
public the location of the camp to “avoid any possibility of enemy attack”.300 After the 
screenings of 1952, the U.N.C. decided to move some of the excessive POW population 
to Pongam-do, as well as Cheju-do.  
Most of the prisoners were sent to Koje, a 150-square-mile mountainous island in 
the vicinity of Pusan, thirty miles off the southeastern tip of Korea. The island itself was 																																																								
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twenty-three miles long and from two to fifteen miles wide. It was the same place the 
Japanese had held their American POWs during World War II, when Korea was a colony 
of Japan. Known as the “island of death,” Koje had held banished prisoners as early as 
Korea’s Koryo Dynasty (918-1392). Korean civilians used the island as a fishing post.  
In January 1951, the U.S. Army decided to construct the camp despite the 
vociferous protests from Korean peasants, as it was built on a former rice paddy. In Koje, 
about 100,000 farmers and fishermen made up the general population.301 The local 
civilian population was made up of about 46,000, but at the beginning of the war, the 
sleepy island had suddenly found 65,000 refugees pouring onto its shores for safety. Two 
valleys in the northeastern part of the island were chosen for the location for the camp. 
On May 30, 1951, the U.S. Army began to ship up to 50,000 POWs from temporary 
camps in Pusan to Koje in groups of 500 via cargo ships. Up to 150,000 North Korean 
and Chinese prisoners and Korean civilian internees were incarcerated in a camp 
designed to hold a maximum of 38,400 people.302 Additionally, 15,000 U.N. troops were 
stationed to guard them. A total of thirty compounds were established in Koje, though the 
compounds were of different sizes and some were only used as warehouses. The 
prisoners lived in squad tents, which accommodated 120 people each. U.S. Army 
quartermasters gave every prisoner a full issue of clothes, from head to toe, out of the 
class X stores, with a total value of $54.80 spent for each person. This amount 
represented more than nine years’ pay for a South Korean soldier.303  
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There was a division of labor among the American and South Korean staff at 
Koje. Americans occupied all the leadership roles in the camps, mainly in interrogation, 
education, and propaganda, while Syngman Rhee’s troops covered the daily groundwork 
and were under the supervision of the Americans. The camp commander and military 
police headquarters of the logistics department of EUSAK took charge of all the 
administration work.  
On the surface, the camps seemed to be under close surveillance. There were five 
formidable layers of barbed wire outside every compound. A twenty-meter-high 
watchtower was erected at every corner of the compound. Barbed-wire fences up to five 
meters high surrounded the camps, as well as ten-meter-high post buildings at the camp’s 
four corners. At night, searchlights glared over the compounds for the purpose of 
preventing prison riot attempts.304 Tanks constantly patrolled around iron houses and 
tents which inhabited prisoners and administrative personnel. At the top of the mountains 
nearby were searchlights, and lower inland was a helicopter airport. Besides the standard 
prison camps, the U.S. Armed forces also installed additional prisons for war criminals, 
such as iron camps and water camps.   
However, camp security was not as good as it appeared to be; in fact, the camps 
were poorly organized. All the records indicate that the Koje prison compounds were 
understaffed, overcrowded, and above all, woefully mismanaged. Generally speaking, the 
U.S. armed forces’ management style was to leave prisoners to their own “self-
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administration” (“Yi fu zhi fu”).305 According to the rationale of the U.N.C., these 
prisoners ceased to be instruments of the enemy and became subject to “the laws, 
regulations, and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power”; thus, the 
captives were allowed a “generous measure of self-government”.306 As a result of the 
U.N.C.’s carelessness, laxity, and indifference, the prisoners themselves normally “ran 
the show,” and the guards’ control stopped at the compound gates. The POWs were 
“virtually masters of their compounds,” wrote George Forty, while the guards “could do 
no more than stay outside [the barbed wire], under orders not to use force”.307 The U.N. 
guards at Compound 76 even abandoned their command posts in April 1952 because, as 
one American captain in charge of the stockade put it, “We felt our lives were in 
danger.”308 Each compound selected its own spokesman to deal with camp authorities; 
this man served as a representative for all the POWs in the compound. POW Guards 
(P.G.s) and Compound Monitors (C.M.s) were selected among the POWs themselves to 
maintain security and order. As one prison guard witnessed, “there was no bed check, no 
roll call, no inspection of quarters…when a prisoner walked into one of the Koje 
compounds, he actually passed out of the control of his captors.”309 One United Nations 
camp office credited the anti-Communist Young Men’s League with maintaining order in 
a prison camp close to Pusan. The camp housed 10,400 Korean prisoners, four-fifth of 
whom belonged to the anticommunist organization.310   
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The U.N. administration separated the Korean POWs from the Chinese POWs 
because the unequal distribution of food and clothing led to conflicts and disputes 
between the Chinese and North Koreans.311 Initially, North Koreans dominated almost all 
the POW leadership positions, and the Chinese received discriminatory treatment under 
the Koreans in receiving food and shelter.312 Compared to the Chinese prisoners, the 
Koreans enjoyed numerical superiority, and the camps were built on their homeland. The 
United Nations delegated the responsibility of security and management to the North 
Koreas, fueling their sense of condescension toward the Chinese. The Korean cooks in 
the kitchen manipulated the allocation of food to be favorable to the Korean POWs. One 
night, an angry, starving Chinese POW could not put up with this situation any more: he 
snatched the North Koreans’ rice bucket and took it to the Chinese crowd. A battle 
ensued over food distribution.313 The U.N. troops came in promptly to prevent any 
casualties from either side. This incident proved to be a turning point for the organization 
of Communist and anticommunist Chinese prisoners. With the removal of the external 
focus for their resentment (the North Koreans’ discriminatory food policy), the tension 
among the group of Chinese prisoners turned inward, and the division among the 
anticommunists and Communists emerged.314  
The Chinese POWs went through different compounds during their stay in Koje.  
They primarily stayed in Compound 72 (containing more than 7,000 people) and 
Compound 86 (containing more than 8,000 people), while Compound 70 and 61 also held 
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a few Chinese POWs.315 After being captured, most of the CPV soldiers were 
overwhelmed with enormous shame humiliation and despair. The Communist doctrine 
viewed being captured as “Shi jie” [shameful] and “Tan sheng pa si”[cowardly].316 After 
November 8, 1951, 219 Chinese prisoners who insisted on repatriation were taken out of 
Compound 72 and 86, and Compound 71 was set up, which was designed to be the first 
“CPV POW Repatriation Camp”.317 After the April 8 Screening, more than 5,000 
Chinese prisoners were gathered in a new compound, Compound 602, which had been 
established for those who opted to return to the PRC.318 In July 1951, these 5,000-odd 
men were transferred to Compound 21, which later became No. 8 POW Camp, until 
repatriation.319  
The official political apparatus was based on a four-layer leadership system. The 
prison camps were divided into basic units called regiments. Each regiment 
accommodated seven or eight thousand prisoners. The next echelons were battalions, 
companies, and platoons. Above the battalion were security guards; both the captain and 
guards were made up of prisoners of war.  
General James Van Fleet, the Eighth Army Commander, instructed the Americans 
to run the camps as loosely as possible, as the armistice could be reached at any time;320 
however, Communist Chinese Colonel Zhao interpreted the Americans’ lack of 
supervision in the camp as conspiratorial:  																																																								
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Many of the guards treated the prisoners like animals. The UN officers 
and men believed that we, the Chinese and North Koreans, were not 
people like themselves, but near animals, who could be controlled by the 
use of the same brutality we were accustomed to employ against each 
other. They selected traitors and defectors from the prisoners and used 
them to watch us.321  
 
Colonel Zhao’s emotional characterization of U.N.C. guardians as a mass with 
racial prejudice and the captors’ cruel treatment of Asian prisoners clearly attested 
to Zhao’s sense of victimization produced by his captivity and the degrading 
camp circumstances. 
 
 
Vocational or Ideological? The CI&E and the POW Education  
The idea of creating a prisoner reeducation program began on September 27, 
1950, when General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote to 
General Douglas MacArthur and told him to come up with a reeducation program, 
waging psychological warfare against the POWs to alter their political orientations.322 
The Department of the Army initiated a rehabilitation program for the Korean POWs 
with Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Nugent, USMC, as the director.323 Former officers 
working with denazification and officers who had experience working with Asians, 
particularly in China and Japan, staffed the “Civil Information and Education Section” 
Program, calling it the CI&E.324 Notably, two Presbyterian missionaries were also hired 
in Tokyo to prepare the CI&E to set up an elaborate series of educational courses. The 																																																								
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goal of the CI&E was to immerse the POWs in an alternative ideology to Communism. 
Monta L. Osborne served as the director of the pilot program on November 16, 1950.325 
Major General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare of U.S. Army, 
became the final director of the program, also serving as the chief instructor. The 
“Rehabilitation Project for Prisoners of War” received the personal endorsement of 
President Truman.326  
There were two stages of development of the POW education program. The first 
stage was the U.S. Army pilot program, which was implemented with 500 Korean POWs 
in October 1950 at Yongdong-po, near Seoul. The instructors used materials ranging 
from Army news releases and updates, weekly Korean translation of United States 
Information Services (USIS), and films with Japanese subtitles to explain “democracy”. 
The program was terminated after China’s entry into the war and was later reinitiated and 
transferred to the hands of the U.N. Command. In the second stage, which started in the 
spring of 1951, all POWs were expected to participate in the reeducation program.327 
After the screenings and clear-cut separation of Communist and anticommunist 
compounds in 1952, the orientation classes in the Communist compounds were dropped 
entirely.328  
Based on the lessons learned during the denazification program in Germany and 
de-militarization program in Japan, the CIE program in Korea was a crash course on 
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American democracy, the origins of the Korean War, and the role of the United 
Nations.329 The goals of these classes were to increase  
knowledge and understanding of democratic precautions and democratic 
ideals; the development of attitudes favorable to the United States and the 
United Nations; and the development of attitudes which will make of the 
POWs democratic citizens of their nations and of the world.330  
 
These classes aimed to wash away the prisoners’ mental image of Americans as 
evil capitalists on Wall Street or warmongers in Washington, D.C. and instead to 
create a sense of longing for the capitalist way of life.  
The CI&E aimed to project America as a country of democracy, material 
affluence, and sophisticated technology. One of the standard textbooks the CI&E 
supplied to prisoners was called Today’s America. The instructors encouraged group 
participation and discussion while keeping the lectures to a minimum.331 Kenneth 
Hansen, a Colonel in the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division, commented: 
They were now to receive, for the first time in their lives…completely 
objective information. They did not have to believe it unless they wished 
to. They could ask questions, discuss it among themselves, and make up 
their own minds.332  
 
Prisoners in Korea, as Rear Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, Chief of the United Nations sub-
delegation recalled, were “being taught the fundamental concepts of democracy,” as well 
as the basic principles of the Four Freedoms which upheld universal human dignity and 
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rights.333 The Sears Roebuck catalogs were provided to showcase the American way of 
life and the abundance of consumer goods in a democracy characterized by individual 
choice in the marketplace.334 
The CI&E program at Koje also included literacy and vocational training, juvenile 
education, and health and sanitation instruction, as well as an extensive program of 
recreation, which included athletics, arts, drama, music, and literature.335 A literacy 
program was developed, as the great bulk of prisoner students were illiterate; (a survey 
by CI&E head John Benben showed that 24% of the Koreans and 60% of the Chinese 
were illiterate).336According to White, the illiteracy rates for North Koreans and Chinese 
prisoners were 34% and 82%, respectively.337 The vocational training included carpentry, 
tailoring, mechanic repair, wielding, painting, pottery, and sculpting. R.W. Alderson from 
The Christian Science Monitor described how the C.I.E. as a benevolent institution 
infused a sense of purpose among the enemy prisoners:  
Here they learn arts and crafts, both to improve their camp 
accommodations, and to prepare for building a better standard of living in 
their homelands when they are released. American soldiers there have 
seen the prisoners learn to make splendid hand tools from discard scarps 
of steel.338  
 
Within the compounds, English-language newspapers, magazines, and films 
served as the main media from which the prisoners gleaned information. Material for 
indoctrination lectures was prepared from the newspapers such as the U.N.C. newsletter 
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Free World Weekly Digest, with its favorable comments about U.N. forces.339 
Newspapers enabled prisoners in the camps to keep current on developments in the 
Armistice negotiations, on which their fate relied. Films such as Abe Lincoln in Illinois 
and documentaries were supplied by the USIS (the United States Information Agency). 
Also available were nineteen feature films and twenty cartoons made by six American 
film companies, including Columbia, MGM, RKO, 20th Century-Fox, United Artists, and 
Warner Bros.340 Additionally, the prisoners had access to English-language magazines 
and journals.  
Nationalist Chinese educators were deeply involved in the planning and 
programming of the indoctrination of Chinese prisoners. At Koje, South Korean and 
Nationalist Chinese educators taught approximately 80-90 percent of the classes for 
prisoners.341 For the Chinese prisoners, the main subject of study was China’s Destiny, 
written by the “Generalissimo” Chiang Kai-shek. The reason for indoctrinating 
Generalissimo’s interpretation of Chinese nationalism was to rebuild the image of Chiang 
and to establish the legitimacy and orthodoxy of his regime in the minds of Chinese 
POWs. The POW students attended classes twice a week. Monthly examinations were 
held, and prisoners were taught to sing Nationalist revolutionary songs to praise Chiang 
and denounce Mao. All class sessions met for two hours, and every prisoner was required 
to attend four hours a week.342 At the end of each class, they shouted out anticommunist 
slogans. The classroom in each enclosure accommodated 500 men at a time, all sitting on 
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the dirt floor, while the instructor lectured from a small stage, using loudspeakers and 
visual aids.343  
The CI&E also sought religious means to extract Asian prisoners’ allegiance and 
invited a few “old China hands” to exhort prisoners in fluent Chinese to join the cause to 
“Oppose the Communists and Resist Russia”.344 The CI&E employed Christian 
clergymen (Protestant and Catholic) to offer alternative perspectives on the present and 
the future.345 Military Chaplain Earle J. Woodberry, and Father Thomas O’Sullivan were 
assigned to work with Chinese POWs. Rev. Woodberry, the son of American 
missionaries born in China [Rev. John Woodberry], was the notorious “Wu pei li” [literal 
translation of Woodberry] who appeared in the memoirs of many Chinese POWs.  The 
Communist Chinese prisoners rejected the preaching of Woodberry, as they interpreted 
Christianity as an agent of western colonialism and imperialism.346 A Chinese-speaking 
Korean pastor also worked closely with Chinese POWs.347 
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   348 
 
Satirical cartoon entitled “Such a Father” to mock Woodberry, 
drawn by Chinese Communist prisoner Wu Chunsheng349 
 
When asked whether or not they would need religious services, many of the first 
500 Korean POWs, who had been trained in Tokyo, asked for Christian services rather 
than Buddhist services, though Buddhism (along with Confucianism) dominated most of 
Korean history. The second Sunday after the request was made, forty-five prisoners 
attended a Catholic Mass and 165 attended Protestant services.350 Apparently, the U.N.C. 
leveraged the CI&E in converting Communist prisoners into Catholicism and Christianity 
as a means to fight against Communism. According to the Catholic Fides News Agency 
in Rome, 900 Communist prisoners reportedly had converted to Catholicism from August 
to October 1952 at a prisoner camp in South Korea.351  
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The establishment of the CI&E was an attempt to bring American-style liberal 
arts education to prisoners in Korea, not only in terms of content, but also in the 
procedure and approach of teaching and learning. “There is nothing that remotely 
resembles coercion or intimidation,” said Libby proudly.352 A 1960 American book on 
Koje prisoners praised the CI&E, contrasting it with the Chinese brainwashing practice 
and pointing out that there was “no coercion, no intimidation, no calculated malnutrition, 
no Pavlovian conditioning, no relays of brutal inquisitors with endless questions”.353  
If the CI&E in Japan was an American effort to rebuild postwar Japanese society 
in its image, the CI&E in Korea was an effort to win the hearts and minds of the rank-
and-file soldiers from both Korea and China—countries that were already ravaged by 
fratricidal civil wars. Additionally, the Korean organization’s purpose was to prove the 
superiority of the American way of life over the totalitarian Communism. Both CI&E 
programs were assigned a propaganda mission—the dissemination of democratic ideals 
and principles354—making the goals of both programs more propagandistic than 
educational.355 The bottom line of the CI&E in Korea was, in the words of the field 
operations commander Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. O’Brien, “to show the POWs that 
they would be better off socially, politically, and economically under a democratic 
regime”.356  
The CI&E also equipped the Asian prisoners with a drastically different angle 
from which to view the relationship between the individual and society. In traditional 																																																								
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Chinese and Korean cultures, “the individual cannot hope to influence the pattern of 
authority; he can only hope to improve his own situation by adapting to it,” as described 
by the University of Chicago report. By infusing a mindset of individual choice and 
democratic empowerment, the CI&E strived to reverse the pattern of rank-and-file 
behavior as “passivity and resignation in the face of any evident power” by eliciting more 
active roles of individuals.357  
The development of the CI&E anticommunist indoctrination program served as 
catalyst for the emergence of two distinct ideological organized groups of anticommunist 
and Communist prisoners. The vocational training also enabled POWs to manufacture an 
impressive arsenal of makeshift weaponry within their own compounds. The two groups 
employed the home-made weaponry to fight for domination, escalating the level of 
violence in the compounds. Because of the CI&E’s pronounced impact on polarized 
camp politics, on March 26, 1953, the U.N.C. forbade the CI&E’s to use explicit 
anticommunist themes in their teaching.358 The 1992 RAND report regretfully admitted 
that the overall program of the CI&E aggravated the polarization of the prisoners.359 
 
 
Politics of Prisoners: A Very Uncivil War360 
To feed, clothe, shelter, and guard the enormous number of enemy POWs was 
indeed a feat for both the ROK Army and the United Nations Command; however, 
Americans made a few unwitting blunders that caused serious problems for the U.N.C. in 																																																								
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managing the camps. First of all, in the summer of 1951, the U.N.C. issued red-dyed, 
short-trouser prison uniforms, ignorant of the fact that during Japan’s colonial period, 
those who wore red were prisoners under the sentence of death.361 The misunderstanding 
caused great confusion and a huge outcry from the prisoners, and Communist prisoners 
exploited the Americans’ ignorance by aggravating the prisoners’ grievances and 
organizing a resistance movement.362 Secondly, the CI&E program used movies dubbed 
with Japanese voices, which generated great resentment among the Korean prisoners 
because they still harbored lingering animosities against Japan for the period of Japanese 
colonialism and military aggression. The U.S. forces’ failure to give consideration to 
these complex feelings or to be mindful of the psychology of superiority and oppression 
revealed a lack of prior understanding of the Korean people and their history. Thirdly, the 
U.S. allowed Taiwan to secretly enter the war by participating in the America’s 
psychological war effort.363 Shao Yulin, the first Republic of China ambassador to the 
Republic of Korea, later admitted in his memoir that he had appointed one Taiwanese 
psychological war agent named Chen Jianzhong to closely monitor the prisoner situation 
in Korea and to work on C&IE-related issues.364 Taiwan’s intervention aggravated the 
polarization of the Chinese prisoners and especially emboldened the anticommunists. 
Lastly, the U.N.C. was not adequately prepared to handle a large prison population and 																																																								
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failed to complete the systematic photographing and fingerprinting of the captives until 
the spring of 1953.365 This delay enabled the prisoners to “switch identities or adopt 
aliases without fear of detection by the Americans.”366 Records of behaviors and 
practices can be found in Chinese POWs’ memoirs. 
The system in which the Americans ran the camps also provided opportunities for 
both Communists and anticommunists to wrangle for control of prison compounds. The 
understaffed, outnumbered Americans actively sought out and hired pro-American, 
English-speaking Korean and Chinese prisoners and civilians to run the camps.367 Among 
all the qualities they sought, “knowledge of English was… the most valuable asset for 
any PW who desired appointment to an official position within the camp”.368 The hired 
POW officers usually consisted of people who “generally spoke some English” and were 
“intelligent, well educated, and actively cooperative with the American authorities”.369 
For example, one prisoner commander, Zhang Zeshi, “served principally as an 
intermediary between the camp authorities and the prisoners, transmitting orders, 
arranging for work details, and performing other tasks as directed.”370 Colonel Lee Hak-
koo, the highest-ranking North Korean officer, was put in charge of the construction 
work details team because of his good command of English and his cordial relationship 
with the Americans guards.371  
An American officer later penned his observation of one of the early spring prison 
riots at Koje: it “reminded me in some ways of a football pep rally: A ‘cheerleader’ 																																																								
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mounted a box, facing the mass of prisoners. He would yell out a sentence, and the 
prisoners would repeat it over and over.”372 With the assistance of a South Korean 
soldier, the officer came to realize that the slogans chanted by the Chinese prisoners 
were, “Down with the American Imperialism,” “Down with Capitalism,” “Up with 
Communism,” and “Hooray for Mao Zedong”.373 The vigor and energy the POWs 
manifested in these demonstrations deeply struck the American officer.  
As time went by, the division between Communists and anticommunists began to 
surface, and later it was further politicized and polarized. Based on the idea of class 
struggle, the ideological baggage the C.P.V. soldiers carried with them prior to capture 
became one source of conflict in the camps.374 The ongoing civil war, including the 
opposing claims to sovereignty and the path of China’s future, became another point of 
contention in the camps. The majority of the Chinese prisoners were “political neutral” 
and did not understand politics, as one American civilian observed; they did not know 
where they were or why.375 Eventually, the situation within the prison compounds rapidly 
deteriorated, as succinctly characterized by James L. Stokesbury:  
Some wanted to go home to China, some wanted to go to Taiwan, some 
did not know where they wanted to go and many wanted to do only 
whatever was necessary to survive at the hands of their fellow prisoners.376 
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Colonel Zhao Zuorui’s story sheds some light on the development of the internal 
political struggles within the POW resistance movement. Colonel Zhao was a former 
Political Commissar for CPVF Sixtieth Army, who became the Secretary General for the 
Communist organization structure, the “Chinese Communist United Front (CCUF)” at 
Koje-do. Founded in April 1952, the CCUF at Compound 71 was referred as the “Little 
Yenan” on Koje Island.377 Starting in the fall of 1951, the establishment of underground 
Communist party apparatus also included launching the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and the CCP-sponsored mass leadership. 
Colonel Zhao estimated that 2,000 of the CCP members constituted 20 percent of the 
Chinese prisoners, and at least half of them were organized.378 These organized 
Communists worked hard to unite non-CCP and non-CCYL members in the camps. 
Colonel Zhao later recalled, “The compound brigade leaders, or the traitors, tried to 
persuade Chinese prisoners to go to Taiwan. We had to stop their efforts and bring all our 
men back to China.”379 The Communist Chinese prisoners launched study groups to 
study how to become good Chinese Communists, emulating the fervent, self-denying 
Marxist revolutionaries who had fostered stringent military discipline to defy great 
difficulties. The purpose of the study groups was to whip up a spirit of fervent fanaticism 
among Communist prisoners, claiming their resistance movement to be as heroic as the 
acts of devoted revolutionaries trained in the rigorous experience of the Long March and 
the wartime days of Yan’an.  
By the later half of 1951, most of the POW leadership positions gradually fell into 
the hands of ex-Nationalists, who were hostile and oppressive to the Communists and 																																																								
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Communist sympathizers.380 Most Communist prisoners were illiterate and lacked 
administrative experience. By the end of July 1951, Compound 72 was under firm control 
of anticommunist prisoners. At Compound 86, the Communists first dominated the 
situation by leveraging the role of translators for leadership positions and soliciting 
sympathy from a few low-level American prison guards, including African American 
Taylor, Puerto Rican Louis, Mexican-American Hernandez, and Captain Logan.381 
However, by April 1952, Communist prisoners completely lost control to the Nationalists 
and became marginalized in the camp fight, while barely holding ground at Compound 
71 and Casualty Settlement in Pusan.382  
In March 1952, Zhang Zeshi served as an interpreter accompanying an American 
officer from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) who was sent to 
look into a curious “suicide” case at Compound 86: an illiterate prisoner supposedly left a 
well-written will before his body was discovered hanging from a beam. The letter 
expressed that the Communists had coerced him to go back to mainland China and that 
he was committing suicide to express his loyalty to the KMT.383 However, his corpse 
bore the marks of recent beating and mutilation, and the tent beam was estimated to not 
be high enough to hang oneself to death. This murder case bore witness to the bloody 
struggles for control within the compounds.  
Communication among the rebels proved to be key in their detailed planning and 
organization. The 64th Field Hospital in Pusan became the “message center,” and the 
officers’ ward served as the “nerve center” of the clandestine communication system 																																																								
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within the hospital.384 Men feigned illness to enter the hospital and received orders from 
new prisoners from the North. Although the hospital served as the best channel for 
communications between compounds and enclosures, the Communists also developed an 
unobtrusive, highly efficient communication system that included semaphore flags, hand 
signals, whistling, chanting, and throwing letters wrapped around rocks. Notes pieces 
were also hidden in rations, clothing, and supplies. No possible means of communication 
was overlooked, as evidenced by the effort of some prisoners in tying messages to large 
dragonflies.385 A simplified version of Morse Code was developed to communicate 
among the Communist prisoners, named “Wang Fang Code,” after Colonel Zhao’s 
alias.386 Prisoners also maneuvered shades and lights to send signals. By the time the 
Dodd Incident occurred, the Communists had fashioned a “tightly knit, cohesive, and 
smoothly functioning organization, both within and outside the camp”.387 The 
communication system enabled the prisoners to keep in close touch with one another and 
to coordinate plans for demonstrations and riots. 
Compound 72 eventually became a Nationalist-controlled camp. The United 
States flag, the United Nations flag, and the Republic of China flag were kept flying high 
over the compound. A white plastic Statute of Liberty was manufactured and erected 
within the confine of the prison compound. Corruption and undemocratic practices 
prevailed in Compound 72. After anticommunist prisoners gained an upper hand in the 
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compound, anticommunists were given big bowls of food to eat, whereas Communists 
had to eat from small bowls. 
As the vice chief, Li Da’an imposed a reign of terror in Compound 72 by giving 
impassioned anticommunist speeches, distributing homemade clubs and knives to 
anticommunist prisoners. He not only committed outright murder, but also implemented a 
forcible tattooing campaign. Li, unlike many of his fellow prisoners, had allowed himself 
to be captured voluntarily in the battlefield of Korea. He had driven a supply truck and 
carried an airdropped U.N. surrender pass and had deliberately rushed into the arms of 
the U.N. side. Before the Civil War, Li had served as a police officer in the Nationalist 
government in Manchuria. He was reputed to be one of the most stalwart anticommunists 
on Koje Island and “the worst torturer of all”.388 Li was later executed by the Chinese 
government in 1958, after being airdropped by Americans as a spy along the Korean-
Chinese border at the end of April 1953.389  
Upon capture, Li testified how he had terrorized and murdered Lin Xuepu, a 
POW from the 2nd Battalion, after Lin, a nineteen year-old college freshmen, had shouted 
pro-Communist slogans such as “Long Live Chairman Mao! Long Live the Communist 
Party!”390 Many Chinese prisoners, boxed up in the narrow compound, witnessed the 
whole murder scene.391 A pro-Communist prisoner, Wu Chunsheng, drew a satirical 
cartoon entitled “Li da an ding hao” [Number One Li Da’an] to capture the monstrosities 																																																								
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of the murder.392 In the cartoon below, the line “li da an ding hao” comes (curiously) out 
of the mouth of a devilish Uncle Sam, while the pro-Communist author called Li “Zhong 
hua min zu de bai lei, mei jun te wu de zou cu” [the scum of the Chinese nation, the 
lackey of the U.S. Army spies]!393  According to Zhang Zeshi, in June 1952, Li and a few 
other former KMT soldiers were sent by the U.S. Army to Tokyo to receive espionage 
and anticommunism training. They were sent back to install top-down control within 
Compounds 72 and 86.394  
 
395 
 
This cartoon captures the sanguinary scene in which Li Da’an murdered  
Lin Xuepu. Li, with a grotesque and ferocious face, holds a dagger  
piercing Lin’s heart. Li’s exceeding brutality made him the most hated  
man in the compound, even among some of the anticommunist prisoners;  
however, the United Nations Command saw him as a “model collaborator”.396    
 
 In June 1951, a tattooing campaign began to rage in Camp 72 when all the five 
thousand inmates were required to tattoo ideographs on their bodies disclaiming 
Communism. The body parts that were tattooed included the arm, hand, back, belly, leg, 																																																								
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bottom, and even forehead. Slogans included “Fangongkanger” [Oppose the Communists 
and Resist Russia], “Jian mie gong fei” [Wipe out Communist Bandits], “Sha zhu ba mao 
huo zhuo mao ze dong” [Kill the pig for its hair; Kill [Marshal] Zhu [De] and Capture 
Mao [Zedong] Alive],” “hui Taiwan” [Return to Taiwan], “Huo zhuo Zhu Mao” [Capture 
Zhu De and Mao Zedong Alive], “Sha jin gong fei”[Kill all the Communist Bandits], 
“Mie gong fu guo” [Exterminate Communists and Reviving the Nation], and “Bu cheng 
gong bian cheng ren” [We Win, or We Perish]. Those POWs who chose to be tattooed 
readily accepted the tattooing as a way to demonstrate their loyalty to the Nationalist 
Party, whereas thousands of Chinese prisoners who opted for repatriation were also 
tattooed against their will.397 The individual who received the most tattoos was Wang 
Fulin, who eventually had 136 characters on his body.398 According to Burchett and 
Winnington, “Before the end of October, orders had been handed down by the 
Kuomingtang headquarters to compete the tattooing of the prisoners at high speed.”399   
For many prisoners, the forced tattooing served as visual evidence of their 
mandatory incarceration, since there had been no individual choice involved. While 
coercive tattooing could be seen as surrendering the ownership of one’s skin, body, and 
even soul, voluntary tattooing vigorously claimed the prisoners’ own ideological stances, 
which could have potentially fatal consequences in the ongoing Cold War. As Cardinal 
Spellman observed as he eye-witnessed the prisoners stripped to the waist to greet him in 
Korea, “[tattooing anticommunist slogans on one’s body] is equivalent to writing one’s 
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own death warrant if the Communists ever capture them or we [the Americans] 
ignominiously surrender them”.400  
The custom of tattooing was not new in historical China. It was a despised 
practice used to brand thieves and evildoers in feudal times. Modern warlords such as 
Yan Xishan in Taiyuan, and even Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, also 
imposed tattooing on military personnel. The Nationalist troops in Taiyuan used to set up 
a system called “Zi bai zhuan sheng” [Reincarnation through Confession].401 Captured 
Communist soldiers were able to start a new life in the Nationalist troops by disavowing 
and tattooing themselves with anticommunist slogans such as “Da si zhu mao”(Beating 
Zhu [de] and Mao [Zedong] to death).402 When Chiang fled to Taiwan in late 1949, he 
allegedly ordered the tattooing of all the garrison troops on the coastal island near 
mainland China.403  
Meanwhile, waves of blood petitions (petitions written and signed in literal blood 
of anticommunist Chinese prisoners who wanted to go to Taiwan) were launched in 
anticommunist compounds. The Chinese Nationalist Party Anticommunist Youth 
Patriotic Corps was the main advocate and planner of the blood petition movement.404 On 
July 2, 1951, a group of 179 avowed anticommunist Chinese POWs decided to write five 
copies of blood petitions to President Chiang Kai-shek, General Ridgway, President 
Truman, U.N. Security Council, and Francis Cardinal Spellman—the powerful 
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Archbishop of New York and Apostolic Vicar for the U.S. Armed Forces—who was 
visiting the U.N. troops in Korea.405 More than 1,000 men participated in two more blood 
petitions in August. The entire prison population of Compound 72—up to 9,000 
petitioners in total—wrote four blood petitions during the fourth petition initiative in 
December 1951.406 On December 29, 85 ex-Whampoa military academy graduates 
among the Chinese POWs signed a petition to Ridgway in blood against returning to 
Communist China. Two days earlier, the same group also petitioned to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek, pleading to be returned to Taiwan and allowed to join the Nationalist 
army to fight Communism.407  
Along with signing petitions in their own blood, the anticommunist Chinese 
prisoners ritualized and demonstrated their anticommunist identity through other 
collective behaviors—shouting out ideological slogans, drinking blood wine, and wearing 
sun emblems, badges, and armbands of the Nationalist Party.408 These KMT symbols, 
icons, and traditions provided continuity and a sense of community, connecting 
anticommunist compounds to the ROC regime in Taiwan. The written and pictorial 
documentations emphasized loyalty and service to the KMT, the anticommunist 
community on Koje, and the China nation that the ROC represented. The tattoos, blood 
petitions, and other expressions and performances of anticommunist identity seemed to 
work in concert with Washington’s non-repatriation policy.  																																																								
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In many other ways, acts of rebellion were rampant. The Communist Compound 
602 even published a compound newspaper entitled Xiao xi bao. This newspaper was 
first published on August 1, 1952, and it based most of its content on the U.S. Army 
newspaper The Stars and Stripes.409 The prisoners also organized mutual support groups 
studying foreign languages and singing revolutionary songs, such as “The Internationale” 
and “No New China Without Communist Party” to raise morale. Another tool the 
Communists used involved instigating riots against the U.S. guards to demand better 
treatment, food, and shelter. An army report detailed all the homemade weapons that 
prisoners used against one another: “Steel pickets, spiked wooden clubs, barbed wire 
flails, blackjacks, metal tent pole spikes, and sections of iron pipe were employed freely 
by the Communists, in addition to rocks and knives.”410 
Each compound fell into the control of a ruling oligarchy of unofficial leaders 
who, in the confined space of a prison camp, exercised an inescapable tyranny over their 
fellow prisoners. The compound leaders perpetrated a reign of terror over the majority of 
prisoners within the compounds. The succession of reigns and horrors mimicked the 
changes of dynasties in the Chinese history. The camp commanders, when their 
Communist or anticommunist regime was instituted and its power was solidified, 
succeeded in personalizing the space and creating a uniform ideological appearance of 
the compounds. Brutal coercion was used to influence the borderline prisoners who were 
not yet committed to either Communism or anticommunism. As one postwar study based 
on the interrogation of Chinese prisoners points out, “highly organized pressures, both 																																																								
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Communist and anticommunist, limited the freedom of choice within the Korean PW 
compounds”.411 For months, the bulk of prisoners were terrorized into submission. 
Numerous gruesome stories arose of prisoners whose loyalty was suspect being 
murdered, mutilated, buried alive, or burned after being minced; these appalling accounts 
appeared in the surviving prisoners’ memoirs.412   
As the terror escalated, prisoners were infused with militant and political 
nationalism, either of a Communist or anticommunist brand, along with a tenacious 
instinct to survive their grueling captivity. One might be aghast at the scale and severity 
of the violence in the camps. The continuing escalation of horrific violence—tattooing, 
forced signing of blood petitions, beatings, and murders—constituted the forces shaping 
the prisoners’ everyday lives. The Irish Times reported that one method favored by the 
prisoners to kill their fellow inmates was “to beat them to death with tent poles”.413 Wang 
Shuiyi, a non-repatriated Chinese, later testified that he killed more than ten Communist 
suspects and threw their corpses into the sea in the dark of night.414 Both sides set up 
kangaroo courts to execute prisoners considered to be disloyal. Even as late as the last 
year of the prison’s existence, the throes of life-and-death compound struggles did not 
wane. With grisly detail, one American officer recalled how during his tenure on Koje in 
1953, he and his colleagues had to stir human waste in honey buckets to see if any limb 
or any other pieces of human body were in the material.415 This detail was later 
																																																								
411 Allen S. Whiting, “The New Chinese Communist,” World Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jul. 1955): 593. 
412 Han zhan fan gong yi shi fang tan lu, 92, 101, 128, 290.   
413 “Executions by Koje Communists,” The Irish Times, 27 May 1952: 1.   
414 Jiang Donghai, yi wan si qian ge zheng ren (Fourteen Thousand Witnesses) (Taipei: xin zhong guo chu 
ban she, 1955), 68. 
415 Bob Kirby, entry date 5/15/2011, reply to “Koje-do Prison Camp – Gallery Jennifer Berry 8/21/2009,” 
http://www.historynet.com/koje-do-prison-camp-gallery.htm (accessed Oct. 17, 2015) 
	 100 
confirmed by one non-repatriated Chinese POW’s memoir, which was recorded in 
Taiwan and published by Academia Historica in 2013.416 
Americans, as the supervisors of the camps, hesitated in directly intervening as 
long as the scale of the violence did not require them to do so. Facing such a scale of 
violence, the American administrators had turned a blind or uncomprehending eye on the 
terror inside the compounds and shirked their responsibility to stem the violence. 
 First of all, the American guards on Koje were “mostly second-rate,” since first-
class troops were usually reserved for combat purposes.417 To the guards, Koje 
represented something like “the end of the line—isolation, no glory, fewer rotation 
points, and living conditions that quite literally stank”.418 They had to put up with crude 
makeshift accommodations while guarding the prisoners day and night. “Anybody who 
couldn’t make it on the line was sent down to do duty on Koje-do. We ended up with the 
scum of the Army—the drunks, the drug addicts, the nutters, the deadbeats,” recalled an 
American officer stationed in Koje.419 Both American and R.O.K guards were poorly 
trained and were seldom disciplined for any offense. With only a one-to-188 U.S. 
military policemen (MP) to prisoner ratio, the majority of the guards were made up of 
South Koreans, who had been recommended by the Red Cross in May 1952 that they be 
withdrawn because of their “brutality and venality”.420 On top of having a lower caliber 
and a dearth of staff, the quality of POW administration was also compromised by the 
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incredibly high turnover rate of American camp commanders.421 Before Francis T. Dodd 
assumed the twelfth commandant at Koje, there was a fifteen-month period of revolving-
door leadership since the opening of the camp.422 
The second reason Americans upheld a hands-off position was because their 
prejudice and sense of racial superiority prevented them from taking Chinese and Korean 
prisoners seriously. Throughout the war, it was commonplace for Americans to call 
Asians ”Gooks” and “Chinks”. British historian Hastings noted, “Many UN soldiers did 
not regard North Korean soldiers as fellow combatants, entitled to humane treatment, but 
as near-animals, to be treated as such.”423 Many American officers “admitted knowledge 
of, or participation in, the shooting of Communist prisoners when it was inconvenient to 
keep them alive”.424 Historian Foot also noticed that the Communist prisoners were 
treated with “hostility, contempt, or indifference”.425 Communist-sympathizing western 
journalists Wilfred Burchett (Australian correspondent for the French Communist 
newspaper L'Humanité) and Alan Winnington (British journalist working for the 
American Communist newspaper The Daily Worker) further criticized Americans for 
treating Koreans and Chinese as “just unidentifiable objects” and failing to “think of 
them as individuals with a history and culture that has extended over five thousand 
years”.426  
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The third reason Americans acted standoffishly had something to do with the 
prisoners’ enmity. Because of the prisoners’ anti-American sentiment, Americans had 
great difficulty managing the camps effectively. The American guards became easy 
targets of outrage for captured North Korean soldiers and civilians, as many of them had 
seen numerous comrades and relatives burned alive by American napalm or white 
phosphorous strikes.427 Also, the Chinese government had conducted a “Hate-America” 
campaign before it sent the CPV to Korea, and the campaign had only gotten more 
intense as the war went on. Stanley Weinstraub, who used to work in the American-run 
64th POW Field Hospital in Pusan, recorded in his diary descriptions of an anti-American 
Communist parade on May 1, 1951:  
…with a colorful pageant, featuring huge portraits of Mao, Kim II Sung, 
and Stalin, plus other Communist saints I can’t identify. Possibly the bald-
headed Communist is Lenin, although Oriental in the local artist’s 
conception. The prisoners marched around the compound with paper floral 
wreaths, flags, and banner emblazoned with propaganda…PWs…climb on 
their hut roofs to display propaganda banners—even one in English, which 
advises, “AMERICANS! GO BACK TO YOUR HAPPY HOMES. 
YOUR FAMILIES DO NOT WANT YOU TO DIE INVADING OTHER 
LANDS.428  
 
In the same vein, Collier’s Magazine reported that on weekend nights, when American 
and R.O.C. guards enjoyed their leisure time watching Korean dance bands perform, 
competing voices floated in from Compound 62, “where the prisoners passed their 
evenings singing hymns of hate against the Americans”.429 Ultimately, the epidemic anti-
Americanism made the U.N.C. administration later employ battalions of Dutch and Greek 
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soldiers to replace American guards. British and Canadian troops were also brought in 
after the Dodd Incident to restore order.430  
While the United Nations was short of personnel and senior generals were 
exclusively preoccupied with fighting on the front, the management of prisoner-of-war 
camps in Koje was seriously compromised by cultural barriers and Cold War biases. The 
ensuing incidents and riots in the camps continued to raise the important issue of the 
responsibilities and duties of a detaining power in such cases of violence. 
 
 
The Non-Repatriation Policy and Prison Riots 
On July 5, 1951, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the U.S. Army Chief of 
Psychological Warfare, submitted a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
exploit the prisoners-of-war issue for psychological warfare purposes.431 In the memo, 
McClure predicted that ex-Nationalist CPV soldiers would opt for going to Taiwan, 
fearing that the Beijing government would seek reprisal after their repatriation. If these 
POWs eventually chose Taiwan, it would strengthen Taiwan’s military might, reinforce 
respect for the principle of individual choice, and prevent the soldiers from becoming 
victims of the Chinese Communist regime. McClure, the Army Chief of Psychological 
Warfare, had special consideration for the Chinese Nationalist POWs: since the United 
States recognized the exiled regime of Chiang Kai-shek as the only legitimate 
government of China, the release of these thousands of prisoners to Taiwan would not be 
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a violation of the precepts of the Geneva Convention.432 However, if the United States 
returned the entire captured Communist prisoners to their native countries, it would be a 
blow to the human rights cause that America was advocating.433  
The Joints Chief of Staff later passed the memo for discussion to the National 
Security Council, whose members included President Truman and his Secretary of State. 
Truman developed strong interests in this issue, as he was deeply influenced by the tragic 
fate of millions of Soviet POWs who had been forcibly repatriated under the Yalta 
Agreement and had suffered long imprisonment or death in the hands of Stalin. These 
Soviets had been captured by Germans and liberated by Americans. In the aftermath of 
World War II, hundreds of thousands of them had resisted repatriation, and nearly a 
thousand had chosen to commit suicide in Tyrol.434 Among those who eventually 
returned, nearly one of ten were shot; the rest worked in hard labor camps in Siberia.435 
Therefore, Truman pushed the direction of the internal debate of his cabinet toward the 
adoption of non-repatriation. On February 27, 1952, the non-repatriation principle was 
officially established as America’s “final and irrevocable” offer at Panmunjom.436  
Initially, both South Korea and Taiwan demonstrated little enthusiasm about the 
proposal.437 President Rhee told John Muccio, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, that 																																																								
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he did not object to integrating non-repatriated North Korean POWs. However, he did 
hope a large number of Chinese would return to China, simply because he did not want to 
see them staying in South Korea endlessly and “just eating rice”.438 Similarly, Chiang 
Kai-shek approved of offering a choice to Chinese POWs; however, he did not want to 
directly integrate thousands of soldiers with untested loyalty into his army.439  
The spring of 1952 marked the most deadly and tumultuous season in the long 
history of Communist prisoner violence in Korea. On February 12, 1952, in an unusually 
violent prison revolt, 179 prisoners perished. Six days later, 78 Korean prisoners and one 
American guard lost their lives, and 136 prisoners were wounded. On February 18, 76 
North Korean prisoners were killed at Compound 62. On March 13, a rock fight between 
Communist and anticommunist prisoners resulted in twelve deaths.440 On April 6, a 
violent flag-raising protest began at Compound 71, leaving three wounded. At Casualty 
Settlement in Pusan, red flags were also raised, and prisoners refused to let American 
troops enter to screen them. American tanks then entered the camp by force and took the 
repatriated Chinese prisoners to Compound 602.  
Prior to May 1952, the only issue that remained in the armistice agreement was 
the exchange of POWs, after an agreement had already been reached concerning the other 
four items of the armistice. POWs fought against the Americans’ screening attempts on  
April 8, 1952, calling it the “bloody screening”. The authorities on Koje deliberately 
adopted an appeasement policy and did not pursue further investigation.441 Back in 
March, 1952, in a statement responding to a riot, Dodd had disclosed to correspondents 																																																								
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that “‘definite instructions’ had been given at Koje that there was to be no shooting 
except in extreme situations—to prevent mass escapes or in self-defense [sic. self-
defense].”442 In This Kind of War, historian T. R. Fehrenbach suggests that the U.N.’s 
decision not to use force against the POWs was due to the constant vigilance and 
complaints from the International Red Cross and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams 
(NITS). The decision was issued from higher headquarters in the Eighth Army and Far 
East Command (FECOM).443  
Even though lackadaisical camp administrators got wind of the increasing 
organization efforts by the prisoners, the officials were neither concerned with 
minimizing or avoiding bloodshed, nor were they interested in monitoring emerging 
threats. They received minimal support from their higher commanders. As one American 
officer commented, “No commander could get any backing from General Yount in 
Pusan, General Van Fleet, General Ridgway, or anyone else. Ridgway himself never 
seemed to care a hoot in hell about what happened in Koje-do.”444 Compared to the 
ongoing armistice negotiations at Panmunjom, the prison mutinies and other incidents in 
Koje were lower on the priority list of these generals. As the world watched impatiently, 
both sides in Panmunjom haggled over the only remaining unresolved issue, the 
repatriation of prisoners of war. The wily North Korean and Chinese Communist 
prisoners tenaciously and effectively organized themselves under the auspices of the 
Communist high command in North Korea. The abduction of General Dodd was the 
climax of an eight-month succession of bloody and dramatic outbursts of rebellion and 
revolts. Communist prisoners had already rehearsed and executed minor prison riots and 																																																								
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kidnappings before the Dodd Incident. The inmates had kidnapped and briefly held 
U.N.C. officers hostage before, as in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur Raven, the 
commanding officer of the camp’s military police guards. 
As tensions mounted, the prisoners on Koje were emboldened to orchestrate the 
kidnapping of their camp commander. The 62-year-old U.N.C. Brigadier General Francis 
T. Dodd was seized and held hostage by his own prisoners on May 7, 1952. His junior 
officer, Lt.-Col. Wilbur Robert, clung to a gate post to avoid being dragged away and 
managed to escape after a U.N. guard bayonetted one of the prisoners in face. All efforts 
to rescue the beleaguered commander failed. Almost immediately, the North Koreans 
unfurled a banner that read, “We Captured Dodd. As long as our demands will be solved, 
his safety is secured. If there happens brutal act such as shooting, his life is danger.”  
Earlier, on April 28, 1952, General Mark W. Clark had replaced Ridgway as the 
United Nations Commander-in-chief, and Koje was one of the headaches Clark inherited 
from Ridgway. When Ridgway received the report of his replacement, his successor 
Clark had already arrived in Tokyo. Clark wrote in his memoir that back then “…was the 
first time I had ever heard of Koje or the critical prisoner-of-war problem that existed 
behind our lines”.445   
On May 9, General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, made a 
quick visit to Koje with 15,000 heavily armed U.N. troops. He expressed the view that 
force would be used, if necessary, to rescue Dodd.446 The rebellious prisoners requested 
telephones, writing paper, permission to organize, and other concessions before they 
would release their hostage. Dodd’s deputy, Brigadier-General Charles F. Colson, 																																																								
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succeeded him as the prison camp commander, so Dodd was, as a prisoner of war 
himself, no longer a commander but only an individual. In a letter from Mr. Pace, 
Secretary of the Army, to Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
Pace stated, “It is clear that the seizure of General Dodd was the result of a premeditated 
plot by the Communist prisoners on Koje Island.”447 After Dodd’s capture, the prisoners 
were reportedly to be in absolute command of their compounds. In order to ransom Dodd, 
General Charles F. Colson, Dodd’s successor, agreed to the conditions and admitted to 
forced screening, murder, maltreatment, and conscription of prisoners, and he promised 
to abide by the Geneva Convention. On May 10, 1952, Dodd was released, and he slowly 
and dejectedly walked out of Compound 76.  
Generals Dodd and Colson’s confessions, later published in U.N. troops 
newspaper Stars and Stripes, caused great commotion and anxiety within the U.N. 
administration. Two four-star generals, Clark and Ridgway, along with Van Fleet, flew to 
Koje to resolve this thorny public relations issue. A few days later, Dodd spoke about his 
captivity experience in a press conference held by Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul. 
He talked about how he was captured by his own prisoners and was released, then 
claimed that the demands of the prisoners were insignificant and the concessions made by 
the UN administration were likewise hardly worth mentioning.448 The Associated Press 
also reported on May 11 that Dodd had spoken about his treatment as “courteous, 
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respectful and dignified”.449 “I have never been treated more courteously in any place in 
my life,” Dodd told the AP.450 
America’s European allies saw Koje-do as a stinging defeat for the United 
Nations and the United States, though the prison resistance movement was eventually 
brutally put down. All of the Korean and Chinese representatives and delegates were 
sentenced to three months of imprisonment in the highest POW prison, the “War 
Criminal Camp” on Koje-do.451 The fiasco at the Koje Island prison camp invited 
criticism from “the military fiasco which has made a laughing stock [sic. laughingstock] 
of the United Nations Command and lost the West shocking face in the Far East,” as 
reported by the Irish Times.452 Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, commented on the Koje situation in the British House of Commons on May 30, 
1952, saying that the United Nations Command had been grossly incompetent in handing 
Communist POWs and that control had been lost.453 
Communist newspapers and broadcasting stations around the world celebrated 
this incident as a stunning propaganda victory. The Communists, who were eager to 
exploit this opportunity to discredit the non-forcible repatriation, jubilantly seized this 
new piece of information. The Pyongyang Radio reported that the incident had “exposed 
the falsity of the Americans’ claim that many of the prisoners they hold are opposed to 
forced repatriation”.454 By contrast, Major-Gen. William Harrison, Senior Allied Truce 
Delegate, charged that the Communist-instigated riots on Koje Island had been plotted 																																																								
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“to divert world attention” and that the Communists were covering up the fact that 
thousands of prisoners would rather die than return to Communist rule.455 Regardless of 
the points that each side tried to make against each other, it was clear that what happened 
on Koje revealed how the lack of proper security precautions had seriously compromised 
the principle of non-forcible repatriation and embarrassed the U.N. Command.  
General Clark was absolutely flabbergasted by what happened at Koje. He was 
incensed at the idea of prisoners taking control of their compound and making demands 
on camp officials. “Prisoners-of-war do not negotiate,” Clark simply blurted out.456 On 
May 12th, he announced the statement made by Colson and Odd invalid as they were 
made under duress and “involving physical threat to the life of a United Nations 
officer.”457  Clark later recorded how upset he was by Dodd and Colson negotiation: 
Of one thing I was certain. You don’t negotiate with prisoners of war, 
particularly fanatical Communist PWs who consider themselves 
combatants despite capture. At best, negotiation with prisoners is a losing 
game.458 
 
In his reflection, General Clark did not hide his exasperation at the “poor judgment” of 
Dodd and Colson and his injured pride that the Communists had been able to capitalize 
on the ignorance on the U.N. side. 
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The Subduing of the Prisoners and Restoration of Order  
On May 14, General James Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, 
appointed Brigadier General Hayden Lemaire Boatner as the new commandant of the 
turbulent prison land. After landing on the island, Boatner called upon camp officials for 
a meeting within fifteen minutes, and he also inspected the increased security 
arrangements around the island. Just one day after he took office, newspaper reports sent 
from the island shouted out, “The toughest regime is already evident.”459 Previously, 
Boatner served as the assistant commander of the United States 2nd Infantry Division. He 
had been chosen for this position because he spoke impeccable Mandarin Chinese and 
was an expert on Chinese affairs. He had even allegedly criticized the Eighth Army 
Psych War Branch’s leaflets (which were written in high literary Chinese) for their lack 
of understanding of Chinese soldiers’ rank-and-file mentality.460 Now his task was to 
restore discipline and order among 80, 000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war.   
Tough General “Bull” Boatner, the fifteenth commander of Koje, was determined 
to re-conquer the prisoners of war when he replaced Colson on May 14th. Collier’s 
magazine described the newest “strong man” commandant of the troublesome Koje as 
“profane, scholarly,” saying that he “looks like a schoolteacher and roars like a mule 
skinner”.461 Born in New Orleans in 1900, Boatner attended the U.S. Military Academy 
after WWI. His first contact with China was during 1930-1934, when he studied Chinese 
and served as an assistant military attaché in Tianjin. During World War II, Boatner 
served in a variety of posts in Burma, India, and China. When the war broke out, he was 
assigned to Korea and became assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea 																																																								
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in August 1951. In a conversation with a U.N. psychological warfare officer, Boater 
described himself as the best person who understood the need for effective psywar in 
Asia.462  
Based on his conviction that the great trouble with Koje lay in the prison officials’ 
“inability to cope with the Oriental,”463 Boatner took drastic measures to achieve a rapid 
restoration of order among the Koje prisoners. Contemporary readers will not fail to 
notice a certain patronizing orientation in his analysis, but Boatner, boasting of a 
diversified background of service in Asia, was determined to regain uncontested control 
in Koje-do. Boater believed that “the oriental despises weakness and worships strength, 
even in prison”; thus, his first job was to show who was in command.464 
The initial changes and reforms that he initiated were to track “the blunders by the 
designers of the compounds and the inexcusable carelessness, laxity, or indifference 
which allowed the scandal to flourish and spread”.465 Three days later, three thousand 
American parachute troops with impressive fighting records in the war—the 187th 
Regimental Combat team—were sent to Koje as the reinforcement unit.466 On May 26, 
Boatner communicated to the British enforcement guards, “we have control of the prison 
camp outside the barbed wire, but we do not have control inside”.467 Boatner’s strategy to 
wrestle control from the prisoners included restructuring the management organization, 
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reshuffling management personnel, keeping the entire group of POW representatives in 
Compound 76, and rebuilding the camp.  
On May 27, an American airborne force of 3,000 people dug an eight-foot-deep 
trench outside Koje’s barbed wire fences. The aim of this move was to disclose 
Communist escape tunnels underneath the ground. Boatner also delivered an ultimatum 
to two prisoner compounds to haul down Communist flags and banners by 7:00 a.m. on 
June 4. After the time limit expired, battle-equipped American troops, with eighteen 
tanks, tear gas, and flame throwers, smashed into the prison compounds and destroyed 
openly displayed pro-Communist slogans and flags. The U.N. side boasted that Boatner 
subdued the unruly Communist leaders without firing a single shot and released 
seventeen anticommunist prisoners.468 
General Clark, General Ridgway, and General Boatner all agreed that the 
situation at Koje needed a quick cure, so the three-step “Operation Break-up” was 
created. On June 2, after a tour around the island, General Clark, Supreme Commander 
for Korea, “likened the present situation in the camp to the case of a sick patient who is 
liable to be killed by a too-quick, overnight cure”.469 Though Ridgway was assuming his 
new job as Eisenhower’s successor in NATO, he later recalled that he also preferred “a 
swift and prompt crushing of the defiance at Koje-do”.470 Clark and Boatner formulated 
plans and came up with three phases of “Operation Break-Up” to restore order at Koje. 
First, Boatner worked to “restore a captor-prisoner relationship” in the prison 
compounds.471 Next, he proposed to build new compounds. The final step was to break 
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up the large compounds of 5,000-6,000 captives into barbed wire cages holding only 500 
or 600. 
In addition, Boatner frequently used the threat of tanks in order to gain 
uncontested control over the island’s 80,000 prisoners. He picked Compound 76 to 
launch “Operation Breakup”. Overseeing from a watchtower on June 10, Boatner 
directed his “Operation Big Shift” and ordered six tanks and two battalions of the 
American 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment to smash the notorious Compound 76, 
reputed to be the toughest compound on the island. The purpose of this operation was to 
split up the 80,000 unruly prisoners into smaller, manageable groups of 150 people each. 
After a fierce brawl, gas-masked American paratroopers successfully subdued prisoners 
with “a terrific barrage of tear gas and concussion grenades”.472 Within one hour of 
bloody confrontation, guards killed or wounded 150 Communist prisoners, while one 
American died and thirteen others were injured.473 In the end, the paratroopers removed 
4,000 prisoners from the compound and confiscated a number of homemade weapons.474 
All of the North Korean and pro-Communist Chinese POW leaders were placed in a 
“special prison” as “war criminals”.475 Eventually all the North Korean and Chinese 
prisoners held in Koje's seventeen sprawling, teeming compounds were put into the 500-																																																								
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man stockades. Communist signs and flags were ripped down and burned, attesting to the 
fact that Koje prisoners were under control.  
The British soldiers of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry and Royal Canadian 
Regiment helped in quelling the rebellion, though they were quite unhappy with the task. 
The British media raised questions regarding whether or not it was the job of the British 
to clear up the mess that the Americans had created. The Irish Times called the task, 
“subjugating the Communist mutineers in the great prison camp at Koje”.476 The 
newspaper further commented, “The conditions in the camp are a result of American 
laxity and maladministration, and that the risking of British lives in an effort to rectify 
them is unjust.”477 On a similar note, the Canadian government also expressed 
displeasure over the U.S. sending Canadian detachments to Koje without previous 
consultation with the Canadian government.478  
The British troops were assigned to maintain security for Compound 66, which 
housed 6,000 North Korean officers. This compound was “regarded as the island’s most 
closely organized group”.479 The Royal Canadian Regiment was assigned to guard 
Compound 85, which held 5,000 North Koreans. This Compound was called “Kidnap 
Valley,” where Brigadier General Dodd had been incarcerated after his capture.480 On 
June 13, Boater visited this compound and released twenty-one anticommunists, who said 
the “clean-up” had saved their lives, as their compound “court” had marked them for 
execution.481 Two tunnels were discovered running from Compound 76 to the adjacent 																																																								
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Compounds 77 and 78. A third tunnel was found at Compound 66, leading outside of the 
barbed wire.482 
Two months later, Boater was promoted to become the Pusan POW Commander 
and took responsibility for all POWs held by the U.N. In September 1952, Boatner left 
Koje for an appointment in the U.S. Because of his excellent work in quelling the riots on 
Koje Island, he was awarded the Oak Leaf Cluster of the Distinguished Service Medal.483  
 
 
Conclusion 
In late 1953, Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. delegate to the United Nations General 
Assembly, brought the case before the U.N. to debate whether or not General Nam II had 
directed the Koje prison riots while conducting armistice negotiations with Americans at 
Panmunjom.484 In a study conducted during the war, titled “The Oriental Communist 
Prisoner of War: A Study from the Intelligence Viewpoint,” the writer states,  
The United States Army has never had to deal with this type of prisoner 
before. [...] He has taken unto himself many duties and missions to 
perform to further the interest of his fatherland. He has not stopped 
fighting just because he is a prisoner of war. He continued his fight with 
all the zeal and patriotism he had on the fighting line.485  
 
The U.N. recognized that the United States had paid a heavy price for not fully 
understanding the nature of their Communist enemies—that even the prisoners of war 
deployed as ground troops were determined to actively continue fighting in whatever way 
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their leaders dictated.486 In his memoir, General Clark later reflected on lack of 
understanding of the role of POWs on the U.N. side:  
My experience had been with old-fashioned wars, in which prisoners were 
people who had to be fed, housed, clothed and guarded, nothing more. 
Never had I experienced a situation in which prisoners remained 
combatants and carried out orders smuggled to them from the enemy high 
command.487  
 
For the United Nations Command, the challenge of the Communist resistance movement 
generated powerful lessons in handling captives who still considered themselves to be 
combatants.488 On January 28, 1953, General Clark, on behalf of United Nations 
headquarters, publicly announced a lengthy intelligence report charging Nam, North 
Korea chief truce delegate, with masterminding the bloody riots at Koje, Pongam, and 
other camps.  
In retrospect, oral histories of U.S. officials and Chinese prisoners uncovered how 
both the United States and Taiwan had escalated the entangled internal political struggle 
within the POW resistance movement and had contributed to the ensuing violence. 
Despite repeated Communist accusations that Chiang and Rhee’s agents “tampered with” 
Communist prisoners of war, Rear-Adm. R. E. Libby, Allied negotiator, denied such 
charges and referred to them as merely Communist propaganda.489 However, in an oral 
history interview with John Muccio, the first U.S. Ambassador to South Korea (April 20, 
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1949–September 8, 1952), Muccio belatedly admitted that the Taiwanese representatives 
in the POW administration project appeared to be “members of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Gestapo” and that the Americans should be held responsible for the brutality in the 
camps.490 Oral history of non-repatriated Chinese POWs also confirmed that many of the 
CI&E teachers from Taiwan who the investigators had met in the camps turned out to be 
senior military officers in the Nationalist Army.491  
The prisoners of war became a source of struggle for rival Korean regimes and 
Chinese regimes and their claims to sovereignty. The bloody life-and-death compound 
battles served as a miniaturized reenactment of the unfinished Asian civil wars. Truman’s 
inability to bring a stalemated war to an end led him to seek a political exigency to exit 
Korea without losing face. The U.N. side did not want to return the anticommunist 
prisoners back to Communist China and Korea, whereas Beijing and Pyongyang would 
not admit that individual soldiers were entitled to the right to renounce their allegiance to 
a country. “So there we sit,” said Walter Lippmann, “Or rather, there sit the unhappy 
prisoners of war—waiting”.492  
The prisoner-of-war issue in Korea posed a moral dilemma for Americans, as it 
was framed in such way that Americans were convinced that it would be un-American to 
send these anticommunist enemy prisoners back to their own countries. As General 
Ridgway put it, “It is the principle which is anathema to them, since the question of the 
individual versus the state is the essential difference between democracy and 																																																								
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Communism.”493 As President Truman famously pronounced, to agree to forced 
repatriation “would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles 
which underlie our action in Korea…We will not buy an armistice by turning over human 
beings for slaughter or slavery.”494 Secretary of State Dean Acheson further expanded the 
idea by saying that if the allied nations had essentially committed murder when they 
returned Soviet POWs to the hands of Stalin, then the U.S. would likewise be resigning 
the North Korean and Chinese POWs to the same fate if they handed them over to their 
native lands.495 C. H. Peake of the Far Eastern division went even further and infused this 
principle into a Cold War mission by saying that the West was engaged in a struggle to 
maintain the “fundamental humanitarian principle of individual human rights” against 
“the totalitarian state and the assertion of the rulers of such states that the individual lives 
only to serve the state”.496 In November 1952, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 
President-elect, emphasized that there should be no forcible repatriation of war prisoners 
under the U.N. custody in Korea.497 After being sworn into office, he openly endorsed the 
principle of “non-forcible repatriation”: “To force those people to go back to a life of 
terror and persecution is something that would violate every moral standards by which 
America lives. Therefore, it would be unacceptable to the American code, and it cannot 
be done.”498 Admittedly, the moral appeal was quite compelling for the American 
government to sell the policy to its people, for as one historian pointed out, “Americans 																																																								
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had always fought for moral issues since 1776, not for the balance of power, not to 
restore world order. And they had always struck hard for victory, not balance, even if 
such victory left the world in ruins.”499 
 Nevertheless, the high-pitched triumphalist proclamations of American leaders 
conveniently overlooked the uncomfortable fact that the atrocities committed against the 
prisoner population took place in the prison compounds under the supervision of 
American troops. The U.N. and the U.S. professed to be carrying on the battle in Korea to 
secure free choice for the POWs on both sides to determine their destinies. However, the 
fact remained that the very POWs that the Americans/U.N. side claimed to protect and 
for whom they were securing this freedom were revolting and being murdered by their 
fellow prisoners in significant numbers. As historian Bruce Cumings put it,  
in spite of endless American statements of their allegiance to individual 
rights, human dignity, and the Geneva Convention, a virtual war ensued in 
the South’s camps, as pro-North, pro-South, pro-China, and pro-Taiwan 
POW groups fought with one another, and for the allegiance of other 
POWs.500  
 
Despite its pronounced commitment to the rule of law and the value of the individual, 
America’s failure to live up to its ennobled creed undermined its efforts to appeal to these 
ideals to end the war.501 On the same day Truman proclaimed his “moral and 
humanitarian principles,” rebellious Communist prisoners in the notorious Koje Island 
kidnapped their camp commander Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd and presented a list of 
grievances, which gave the world a different version of the screening of POWs and of 
“voluntary repatriation”. The surges of violence at Koje Island demonstrated that “the 																																																								
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Communists had taken what could have, would have, and should have been a stunning 
U.S. and UNC propaganda victory and turned into a dismal defeat”.502 The Communist 
high command in North Korea, in collaboration with the Chinese, successfully exploited 
the rioting of the prisoners to embarrass the U.N.C. in the eyes of the world and weaken 
the position of the U.N.C. in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. 
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Chapter IV 
India, Taiwan, and “Last Battle of the Korean War”503: 
The Controversy Concerning the POW Explanations 
 
Explainer:   Don’t you know we are building a new country now? There 
is no unemployment in our country.  
Prisoner:     You egg of a turtle [about the worst thing you can call 
someone in Chinese], I myself was unemployed for ten 
months in Peiping!  
Explainer:   Yes, but things are better organized now. We are putting to 
work the principles of Lenin and Marx.   
Prisoner:   Don’t tell me about Lenin and Marx, you Communist dog! I 
know more about Marx and Lenin than you will ever know 
and I was a higher-ranking officer than you will ever be!   
Explainer:  I can see you are a man of some education. We need men 
like you to help build our country. If you go to Formosa, you 
will be under that bandit Chiang and we will liberate that 
island soon. Then where will you be? 
Prisoner:   You Communist dog. If the neutrals were not here I would 
tear you to pieces.504 
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Un-Repatriation Meets Brainwashing 
Rowdy and ill-disposed Chinese prisoners unabashedly manifested their defiance, 
shouting their scorn for Communism and preference for “Taiwan, Taiwan” in a frenzied 
manner. Their violent political emotions, reflected in tough words and truculent attitudes 
toward representatives from their Communist-ruled homeland, caused consternation. 
Dumbfounded and speechless, an international working team made up of Poles, Czechs, 
North Koreans, Indians, Chinese, and Americans, was compelled to watch these painful 
scenes. 
A truly unique chapter in the history of warfare, the tug-of-war ensuing in the 
prisoner explanation program was seen as “lively” and “as far from the dullest” 
performance.505 For three months, the United Nations, Communist China, and Korea 
attempted in the prison explanation program to convince their non-repatriates to return to 
their homeland.506 Referred to as the “last battle of the Korean War,” the prisoner 
explanations program, under the oversight of India-led Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission (N.N.R.C.), took place during the last three months of 1953. During the 
explanations sessions, United Nations and Communist representatives attempted to 
convince reluctant prisoners from their respective forces to change their minds. The 
explanations sessions, delivered by NKPA and CPVA representatives, were violently 
resisted and condemned by many anticommunist North Koreans and Chinese. More than 
20,000 anti-Red North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war and 359 pro-Communist 
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U.N. prisoners in the Indian forces’ care went through the final screening process by 
which prisoners’ views were determined.507  
In the intensity of the tumult in the “explaining” tents, war prisoners from North 
Korea and China faced their Communist compatriots and pronounced a verdict on their 
own ultimate fates. The conversations took place in a shabby makeshift hut, hastily put 
together by U.S. Army engineers. Outside their tents, prisoners awaiting interviews 
shouted raucous chants, which drowned out Communist broadcasts. Occasionally, 
hysterical men would be dragged past the tent, pushing, yelling, and stamping their feet. 
Close to Panmunjom, the Freedom Village in Munsan lay vulnerable to an East-West 
zigzag battle for capturing the hearts and minds of the captives. This conflict would 
culminate in the dramatic finale of the struggle over prisoners of war in Korea. 
Desperate men in frustrating confinement fought ferociously, chanting 
anticommunist songs and shouting out obscenities in Korean and Chinese. However 
irksome the antics of the prisoners were, these insolent men carried themselves with a 
captivating vitality; it was this vitality that dominated the newspapers’ front pages 
worldwide. The prisoners’ wildly inflammable statements provided grist for the 
anticommunist propaganda. Media fanfare around the prisoner issue conveniently 
overshadowed the ongoing shooting on the front, which remained largely unreported. As 
Demaree Bess from The Saturday Evening Post pointed out, these prisoners not only 
“stole the show in Korea,” but they also “constituted a gigantic monkey wrench thrown 
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into the truce-negotiating machinery in Korea, acting as the sole obstacle to some sort of 
settlement which would bring an end to the fighting there”.508 
The last year of captivity became a test of political persuasion over the prisoners 
reluctant to be repatriated. The struggle for hearts and minds of the captives was carried 
on with renewed vigor. As the commander of the U.N. Command Repatriation Group, 
General Thimayya saw what many consider to be the most bizarre aspect of the war, as 
both sides grew numb and indifferent toward the stalemated outcome of the military 
battlefield but “obviously considered the problem of prisoners who refused repatriation to 
be vitally important, more important perhaps than the fighting itself”.509 Later, Thimayya 
recorded his reflections in his memoir, saying, “the emphasis of the military objectives of 
each side was on capturing the minds as much as the property of the enemy”.510  
This chapter analyzes how the prisoner-of-war issue evolved into a highly 
complicated international problem. This chapter discusses how the prisoner-of-war issue 
truly developed from a local conflagration into a worldwide controversy, confronted by 
Cold War powers in the East and West. Special attention was given to the work of the 
N.N.R.C. in Korea, insofar as the commission brought out the role of India and the 
United Nations in the solution of the Korean prisoner entanglement.  
This chapter analyzes the significant role India played in easing the thorny 
diplomatic operations and facilitating a peaceful settlement of the prisoners-of-war 
dispute. Administering the prisoner explanation program became India’s experiment in 
neutrality in a divided world. India, a non-aligned nation, bore the brunt of being the 
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virtual foster parent of strong-willed prisoners who refused to go back to their 
Communist homelands. It was the time when India, as a free modern nation state, made 
its debut on the international scene.511 India chose to assume this thankless role of 
arbitrating a dispute between nations of conflicting ideologies relating to the issue of the 
prisoners-of-war in Korea. Worthy of examination is the question of why India emerged 
as the “neutral” power that assumed the custody of the non-repatriated POWs. 
India’s role of maintaining neutrality in the Korean War marked the nations' 
emergence as a modern nation state on the international stage, showcasing India’s official 
attitude concerning the ideological struggle in Asia. This chapter analyzes and assesses 
India’s mission, rationale, and priorities—in particular, its stance of “neutrality” 
guaranteeing that prisoners could exercise their bona fide rights of repatriation. This 
paper argues that as the executive agent for the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission, was integral in challenging the presumptions behind the Voluntary 
Repatriation policy—freedom of choice—that barely existed in prisoner-of-war camps.  
Furthermore, this chapter argues that by stripping away Taiwan’s oratorical 
rhetoric, secret agents from Taiwan made a mockery of America’s pious declaration of 
freedom of choice. The benevolent American state granted to its enemy prisoners the 
right to decide which side of the armistice demarcation line they should be set free on. In 
addition to choosing the detaining side or that of their home countries, the prisoners were 
presented with a third option: they could also choose to go to a “neutral country,” 
although which country had not yet been determined. Within the U.S.-dominated liberal 
geopolitical global order, the options for the prisoners of war were placed amidst 																																																								
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“competing notions of citizenship, human rights, and sovereignty in the age of three 
worlds”.512 However, Admiral C. Turner Joy, the Chief delegate of the U.N. Command, 
took a dim view of the choices given the prisoners, because “to require prisoners to make 
a highly important and permanent choice under the conditions of imprisonment was to 
ask of them a decision they were probably not best prepared to make”.513 The application 
of the “Voluntary Repatriation” principle proved to be rather difficult and tortuous. In the 
meantime, more than 14,000 self-declared Chinese anticommunists succeeded in 
undergoing the perturbing metamorphosis from “15,000 Men Without a Country” to 
“anticommunist righteous men” who infused renewed purpose and conviction to the 
Nationalist regime.514 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s personal attention to this issue 
played a significant role in Nationalist policies and efforts in the relocation of anti-
Communist prisoners to Taiwan, whereas the Nationalist government effectively 
exploited the non-repatriated Chinese prisoners in its political lobbying in U.S. Congress, 
as well as public diplomacy in Japan and Southeast Asia.  
 
 
Communist POWs After Koje 
Before moving to reconstruct and examine the explanations, it is necessary to 
examine the living situation of Communist POWs after they left Koje Island. This 
analysis allows the reader to get a solid grasp on the state of mind of these prisoners 																																																								
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before they entered into the explanation sessions. It will also give the reader a sense of 
the new management challenges posed for the United Nations Command.  
As an outgrowth of the Voluntary Repatriation policy, the U.S.-led United 
Nations Command had to shoulder the undue burden of settling more than 10,000 
prisoners in the last year of the war. Various physical difficulties were inherent in the 
United Nations’ handling of the prisoners who refused repatriation. First, feeding and 
housing them continued to represent a considerable expense in the United Nations’ 
budget. Second, an unnaturally large force was needed to guard the prisoners. Third, the 
question of how to manage and oversee them caused dissension among the United 
Nations allies. As a result, the United Nations Command faced a grueling test of logistics, 
administration, and credibility, as managing the enemy prisoner camps continued to be a 
ongoing burden. 
The United Nations completed the relocation of surly Red prisoners in small 
barbed wire stockades in Koje Island in June 1952. General Boatner’s “Operation 
breakup” ended with the “transfer of 5,650 civilian internes from compound 62 to 
compound 602, which had been divided into four smaller stockades;” while “some 5,800 
Chinese prisoners, formerly held in compound 602,” were shipped to Cheju Island.515  
In the last year of the war, Cheju-do became the prison home of almost 15,000 
anticommunist Chinese captives and approximately 5,000 Chinese Communists.516 This 
all-Chinese island lay fifty miles off the south coast of Korea and was 150 miles 
southwest of Koje. Camp No. 21 held the approximately 5,000 pro-Communist Chinese 
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prisoners in Cheju City, while 15,000 anticommunists were held at Mosulpo (which 
means “Poor Port”), also on Cheju Island.517  
In July and August 1952, Chinese prisoners who objected to being sent back were 
moved to Cheju Island. Approximately 5,000 pro-Communist Chinese prisoners were 
quartered around Cheju City on the north shore of Cheju Island. The hard-core 
Communist prisoners were held “under maximum security restrictions” enforced by 
American military police detachments and South Korean guards, who had learned their 
lesson from Koje.518 These prisoners were reported to have hoisted Communist flags, 
sung revolutionary songs, and refused work details, which included constructing roads 
and assisting in unloading the little steamers that ran from the mainland. Whereas singing 
“became a weapon for the empty-handed POWs” to invigorate themselves, American 
guards had to stomach their prisoners’ streams of invective and “harassing Communistic” 
chants”.519  
The craftsmanship and ingenuity of these prisoners caught the interest of their 
American guards, as one report marveled at a striking array of homemade weapons and 
artistic forms of expression. Communist prisoners learned to make splendid tools and 
items, including “knives, spears, daggers, grenades, maps, medals, MP armbands, 
telegraph keys, electric bells, epaulets, pens, pen points, petitions, pamphlets, compasses, 
clarinets, books, and newspapers (printed on cigarette paper with shoe heels)”.520 
Additionally, the prisoners made for themselves little tin stars and painted them red, 																																																								
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which the captives were allowed to wear. They also improved their camp 
accommodations by making pink bricks out of clay for building better quarters and 
beautifying their compounds with statues, walks, and temple arches made of beer can 
strips. Also out of the ubiquitous beer can, the captives made ashtrays and stove pipes for 
the gasoline drum stoves used to warm up the compounds during the winter days.521   
Every now and again, part of the camp exploded into defiant violence, and the 
prisoners sang, linked arms, and hurled rocks, even though these actions risked retaliation 
and death. This ongoing violence took three main forms in the camps: rioting, murder, 
and coercive tattooing. Between July 7 and 12, one prisoner was killed and seven were 
wounded on the Cheju Islands.  
The first major Chinese Communist prisoner riot occurred October 1, 1952, at 
Cheju. October 1 was celebrated as Independence Day for the new Chinese Communist 
state. The Communist prisoners requested permission to commemorate the third 
anniversary of the People's Republic, but this request was denied. As early as August 15, 
they organized singing contests, art shows, theatrical performances, and sporting events 
to celebrate the Chinese victory in the war against Japan. However, this time they defied 
American guards by raising ten makeshift Chinese flags and singing their national 
anthem on National Day.522 This disturbance was the first full-scale uprising since the 
transfer from the Koje Island.         
The mutinous rioting occurred at Compound No. 7, where more than 5,000 die-
hard Chinese Communist prisoners were held. The reaction was triggered when the camp 
commander refused permission to celebrate and requested that prisoners take down the 																																																								
521 “Freedom Through Truth,” October 1953, Pacific Stars & Stripe; Hoover Institution Archives, 
Alexander Liosnoff Collection, Box. No. 15, Accession No. 2005C19-31.01/02. 
522 “Brave soldiers highly praised,” South China Morning Post, 2 Nov. 1981: 11.  
	 131 
flags and stop singing.523 The Hartford Courant reported 500 Chinese prisoners 
unleashed their first big riot on their independence day, and a third of them were “cut 
down in a melee with U.S. guard”.524 The outbreak occurred at 7:30 a.m., when 600 
Chinese began hurling rocks in an uprising that was to have signaled simultaneous 
outbreaks from nine other compounds, as reported by The Washington Post.525 Prisoners 
brazenly raised a red flag behind the barbed wire enclosure and wore white paper 
carnations to commemorate their dead comrades.526 The prisoners exhibited their 
defiance not only by waving Communist flags and shouting insults but also by refusing to 
go on work details.527 While some of the organized Chinese prisoners began throwing 
rocks, others attacked guards with clubs, barbed wire flails, and sharpened tent poles.528 
The guards had to open fire to control the prisoners.529 Order was restored in half an hour. 
Fifty-six prisoner deaths and 120 wounded marked the riot as the “second most deadly in 
the long and bloody history of Communist prisoner violence in Korea”.530 Two American 
soldiers were slightly injured. It was believed that American infantrymen thwarted a mass 
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outbreak of 5,800 tough Chinese Communist prisoners of war when they quelled this 
rebellion in POW Compound No.7.531  
Even though pro-communist Chinese prisoners generated provocative headlines 
with their emboldened defiance, their performance at Cheju paled in comparison with 
that of their anticommunist brothers. The stage was set when more than 14,000 self-
declared anticommunists, originally from Camp 72 and 86 on Koje Island, went through 
investigations and were transferred to Mosulpo as Units 1, 2, and 3, which formed the 
United Nations Prisoner-of-War Camp No. 13 off the southwestern tip of Cheju Island. 
Each unit was comprised of about five thousand men. These units were divided into ten 
smaller groups of 500 men each, located at individual shelter places. The prisoners were 
taken in groups of 500 to the seashore for bathing and swimming.532 Colonel Wilson, the 
commander of Camp 13, commented that within the nine-foot-high barbed-wire fences, 
these prisoners’ compounds were well maintained.533 The guards did not see attempted 
escapes except in one dramatic scene, which involved a “stir-happy prisoner who climbed 
over the fence one night, reached the water and set out to swim to Formosa”.534  
After settling in Cheju, the prisoners were instructed to build their own new 
standard enclosures: 5,000 prisoners were accommodated within an enclosure, and each 
enclosure was broken down into ten compounds.535 Anticommunist Chinese prisoners 
grew deeply frustrated at the perception that their anticommunist stance went 
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unappreciated, as evidenced by no superior or differentiating treatment by the U.N. 
Command.536 Resenting the prospect that they would build and live in the same quality of 
quarters as their pro-Communist brothers, the prisoners staged a sit-down strike in the 
middle of the construction and once again declared their will to resist repatriation to their 
Red homeland:  
The new compounds will make it easier for you to turn us over to the 
Communists when the time comes. Why don’t you machine-gun us here? 
It is better to die here and now than to be put in new compounds and 
turned over to the Communists.537 
 
Mac R. Johnson from the New York Herald Tribune aptly labeled this group of 
Chinese prisoners in Camp 13 as “15,000 Men Without a Country”. Even though the 
great bulk of them would have preferred to return to the government of Chiang Kai-shek, 
they were deeply “distrusted by Chiang and unwanted by Allies”.538 Syngman Rhee did 
not want them turned loose in South Korean territory. The United States Government was 
not ready to give them political asylum in America. Johnson comments sarcastically:  
No one denies the humanitarianism of the principle, but it has left the U.N. 
command with no armistice and with 15,000 unwanted anti-Communist 
Chinese who have an ideology, a barbed-wire home and a most uncertain 
future.539  
 
The tragedy of these 15,000 Chinese anti-Communist prisoners of war was exactly as 
New York Herald Tribune journalist Mac R. Johnson described:  
…no nation except communist China wants them. And Communist China 
cannot have them, because the prisoners themselves do not want to go 
back to live under communism and the U.N. command feels that to send 
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them back would mean an automatic sentence to death by torture, slave 
labor or a firing squad.540    
 
Chiang did not want these prisoners circulating among the loyal troops in Taiwan. Even 
though the Communist regime in China verbally welcomed its estranged children, the 
West could not take the risk of sending them back to repeat what had happened to 
Russian POWs who returned to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of WWII.  
Johnson did, however, recognize that there were distinct differences between the 
anticommunist and Communist camps at Cheju, where all the Chinese nationals were 
confined. Although guard towers, barbed wire, and security troops also existed in the 
anticommunist camps, they served as no more than a quiet background rather than the 
“bristling first line of defense that they are at the explosive Communist enclosures”.541 
“The extreme willingness of all the anti-Reds to cooperate,” Johnson continued, gave 
these camps “a ‘happy’ look” that was “missing in the grim Communist camps”.542        
Despite the seemingly cheerful faces they put on, the anticommunist Chinese did 
have other inner misgivings about the way the United Nations Command was treating 
them. In their opinion, the United Nations was     
missing the bus by not releasing this friendly, pent-up manpower to fight 
on the Allied side. And they are quite seriously worried that their present 
easy situation may deteriorate if, say, the confinement lasts another year, 
or if the U.N. ever makes a move to sell out these men to the Communists 
in hopes of a quick truce.543    
 
Even though the anticommunist prisoners had been given assurance of “Voluntary 
Repatriation,” they were concerned that the U.N. Command would fail to carry out its 																																																								
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promises and turn them back over to the Communists. The captives continued to plead 
that they be incorporated into the United Nations Armies and be allowed to fight against 
the Communists. Moreover, they harbored deep distrust toward the U.N. command and 
trepidation toward their ultimate fate:  
They have one unfounded fear—that ultimately they may be double-
crossed by the United Nations and handed over to the Communists … 
They want special personalized assurances from some high-ranking 
authority ... that they will not be turned back to the Reds.544 
 
The main reason for the anticommunist prisoners' fears was that if they were sent back to 
China or North Korea, they would likely face punishment as traitors. 
Many times, the prisoners took their appeals to higher authority figures in the 
West and pleaded for their support. Though most of the prisoners were not “devout 
religionists,” their letters to religious leaders in the West demonstrated skillful utilization 
of widespread antipathy toward Communism from a religious point of view.545 In an 
impassioned appeal to the Cardinal of New York District, the prisoners expressed their 
fear and distrust toward the U.N. Command, as well as their frustration with not being 
able to fight the Communists on the front. On January 25, 1952, Cardinal Spellman read a 
letter written by anticommunist prisoners in a speech before the New York State Bar 
Association:  
Cardinal, we oppose the ferocity of our enemies with Christian behavior. 
We escaped from the tiger’s jaws and surrendered to the UN forces. We 
now cast ourselves upon your charity and entreat your help. We fear that 
the UN authorities do not fully understand our dreadful plight—that they 
will deliver us back into the grip of our souls’ enemies. We beg them 
rather to put us in the front line of the UN forces in desperate attacks. Put 
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us where we can front the worst shocks of our detested enemy. We will 
prove our worth.546     
 
To put this appeal in the context of U.S.-East Asia relations since the mid-nineteenth 
century, the prisoners strived to appeal to the popular antipathy toward the Chinese 
Communists in America by drawing on the well-worn sentimental discourse of U.S. 
foreign policy with Asia.547 This particular thread of political rhetoric in America 
emphasized the special bond of sympathy with Asia, which American missionaries had 
cultivated. In the new era of the Cold War, this discourse advocated fighting against 
communism with a clear conscience and continued to play the role of “a defender of 
China against foreign aggression and an altruistic guide to democracy and 
modernizing”.548  
The prisoners’ petitions did arouse some international attention. On March 15, 
1953, Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic Presidential nominee of 1952, visited Cheju 
and inspected the United Nations prisoner-of-war camps and South Korean Army 
training centers.549 Anticommunist prisoners on Cheju Island serenaded him “with drums 
and bulges fashioned from tin cans”.550 International attention bolstered their spirits and 
renewed their determination. 
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Non-repatriated Chinese prisoners’ petition letters to  
military and political leaders in the U.N. Command551  
 
Most importantly, the anticommunist Chinese prisoners secured the stalwart 
support of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang showed himself to be keenly interested in the 
psychological warfare being waged against the non-repatriated Chinese. As early as 
February 28, 1952, the Nationalist government announced that it was prepared to receive 
in Formosa all Chinese Communist prisoners of war in Korea who opted to come to the 
island to join the cause of anticommunism.552 In the late half of 1953, Chiang decided to 
step up the psychological pressures that could be applied to the non-repatriates. On 
August 5, 1953, he offered them asylum, telling anti-Red allied prisoners that they could 
enter Formosa.553 The following radio message sent by Chiang demonstrated his 
determination to deploy his regime to back up these prisoners’ activities at Cheju:    
We wholeheartedly welcome the return of all of our captured personnel to 
the arms of the motherland; we have further guaranteed, in an agreement 
reached with the other side, that all captured personnel shall, after their 
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repatriation, rejoin their families to participate in peaceful construction 
and live a peaceful life.554      
 
Similarly, in a printed pamphlet distributed to the prisoners and broadcasted by 
the U.N.C., Generalissimo Chiang urged the prisoners to “stand firm…in your choice for 
freedom”.555 In addition to the soothing words uttered by the leaders of the 
anticommunist Formosa regime, the non-repatriated prisoners also received gift packages 
sent by the Mainland Relief Organization. Along with political pamphlets, edibles such as 
pork, bananas, pineapples, and cube sugar were sent by air. Taiwan sent two delegations 
to comfort the internees on Cheju Island, led by Ni Wenya and Fang Zhi, respectively.556 
All of the propaganda activities had a palpable effect on the men in confinement.  
On August 11, 1953, the Chinese Communists angrily protested that secret agents 
of Chiang Kai-shek were indoctrinating and coercing prisoners in the U.N.-Command 
camps.557 As a result, the prisoners were not able to make “a free choice for 
repatriation”.558 The Chinese government demanded the transfer of jurisdiction of the 
non-repatriated Chinese prisoners to the Indian government.559 
Later investigation by the Indian government confirmed the alleged activities of 
Nationalist agents among Chinese prisoners held on Cheju Island. The KMT government 
had sent two groups of agents to work with non-repatriated Chinese prisoners. The first 
group was comprised of twelve people, including Taiwan Foreign Service officers, 
government officials, and the Nationalist psychological warriors, while the second group 																																																								
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was made up of six men with similar backgrounds.560 These men carried out extensive 
propaganda campaigns in the camps: they gave indoctrination lectures on 
anticommunism, they widely distributed political pamphlets, and they heavy-handedly 
crushed the opposition with their arguments. These men dictated that every single one of 
them “must return to Formosa". They insisted,  
NO one will be allowed to go back to the mainland. If any one returned to 
Chinese mainland the communists will kill him or amputate parts of his 
body which were tattooed with Anti-Communist expressions.561  
 
As one escapee later testified to the N.N.R.C., special agents from Taiwan even 
taught prisoners how to murder those desirous of repatriation to China. Suspected pro-
Communists were usually found “strangled and a letter left in their pockets saying that 
they had committed suicide as their longing for returning to Taiwan had not been 
fulfilled”.562 On April 12, 1953, the United Nations Command in Tokyo reported that 
Chinese prisoners at Cheju Island camp had murdered a fellow prisoner who was found 
“battered and wrapped in a blanket” on April 9.563 Prisoner eyewitnesses said seventy 
captives had participated in the beating. The murdered man was presumed to be a 
Communist, as the camp was dominated by fanatical anticommunists who stated that they 
would rather commit suicide than go back to Communist China.564 On April 25, 1953, the 
U.N. Prisoner of War Command announced that anticommunist Chinese prisoners had 
beaten fifteen “unwanted Red agitators” in the supposed anticommunist compound on 
Cheju Island. Three suspected pro-Communists who had been beaten on their “lower 
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back and buttocks” died at the camp hospital.565 More gruesome murders were 
committed. “The bodies were thrown down in deep trench latrines,” witnesses later 
recalled, “Some people were hanged and it was said that the he had committed suicide. 
Some were killed while bathing in the sea and were reported to have been drowned.”566    
Besides teaching the non-repatriated prisoners how to kill and torture, the special 
agents from Taiwan also trained them on how to conduct themselves during the 
explanation sessions. These agents passed on tactics to resist the persuasion of the 
Communist delegates: when asked any question by the N.R.R.C. representatives, the 
captives should raise strong objections and then simply shout out, “Taiwan, Taiwan!” 
The KMT agents made a strenuous effort to teach every single prisoner to pronounce 
“Taiwan,” as well as how to spell it, since the majority of the captives were illiterate. The 
prisoners were told that they would have the right to fire a barrage of questions at the 
representatives during the interviews. Anticommunist prisoners were offered rewards for 
kicking a Communist representative. Colonel Robinette noticed that the “one-month 
forced rehearsal” of explanation sessions were “to school them on the questions that 
probably would be asked, and what pressures might be put on them”.567  
Granted, some of the self-professed anticommunist prisoners might have been 
merely opportunists who predicted that the U.N. would eventually win the Cold War in 
Asia. As one commentary in The Washington Post reported, “Undoubtedly many of these 
prisoners are rice-Christians, whose anti-Communist convictions have been determined 
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by good food and good treatment.”568 However, most of the prisoners, according to the 
American guards who ran the camps, were sincere anticommunists, and 80-90 percent of 
them “would prove it by jumping at a chance to join the Chinese Nationalist or Republic 
of Korea armies—knowing that recapture by the Reds would mean a hideous death”.569  
In one American officer’s eyes, the trouble within the camp was a matter of 
power struggles between competing cliques rather than irreconcilably ideological 
convictions, or with allegations of homosexuality usually associated with western 
prisoners:  
there is less sex-perversion than you could expect among European or 
American prisoners, but probably more squabbles and even riots among 
rival cliques for power inside the compounds. Occasionally these had led 
to gang murders and to killing when the guards have had to use riot tactics 
to restore order.570 
 
As this quote testified, the bitter struggle for political control often led to bloodbaths and 
terrorist activities. American guards who came to quell the rioting often found themselves 
encountering heavy resistance.  
 One major explanation of the high riots frequency among the pro-Communist 
prisoners had to do with the Communist standard of heroism. Many pro-Communists felt 
that they had already disgraced themselves simply by being captured, which was contrary 
to Communist standards. These prisoners felt that they might be accused of being 
“tainted” by American imperialists or even charged of serving as spies upon returning 
home. As a result, they would undoubtedly be subject to Communist reprisals should they 
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choose to return home. One American source revealed that eighty percent in the pro-
Communist camps were not actually “fanatic Communists”.571 However, as one 
commentary from The Christian Science Monitor aptly pointed out, “By sacrificing 
themselves and causing trouble their leaders [the POW leaders] feel they are proving they 
are loyal Communists, useful and worthy to return home.”572 The captives’ belligerent 
appearance and riot record would give them a political advantage upon returning to their 
Communist homelands.   
 
 
Explanations in the “No Man’s Land” 
In the middle of September 1953, a group of anticommunist Chinese prisoners 
plunged into chaotic violence outside of the so-called Indian Village, about a half-hour 
drive from Panmunjom. They had just taken the train to travel from Cheju Island to    
Panmunjom. Prisoners had extreme fear and apprehensions about their move to the 
Demilitarized Zone. They angrily ripped off their identification tags and threw them on 
the ground. At the entrance, upon seeing the observers and interpreters from Communist 
China, they became agitated and hurled rocks at them.573 According to the official history 
of the C.F.I., the anticommunist POWs  
explained [to the C.F.I.] that their objection to the presence of the 
Communist observers was based on the fear that individual prisoners 
would be identified during the process of taking over and then their 
families in China would get harassed or punished.574  
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The protests against explanations ushered in a volatile period that might be called 
“Un-repatriation Meets Brainwashing”. Within the compounds, Chinese nationalist flags 
and Korean banners flew high in the wind. Thousands of Chinese and North Korean non-
repatriates who were already in the neutral zone compounds not only greeted the new 
arrivals with “songs, cheers, and band music played on homemade instruments,” but they 
also started rehearing mock “explanation” sessions.575 
By September 26, American guards handed over the prisoners who had refused 
repatriation into the demilitarized zone from the camps on the islands of Koje and Cheju, 
as well as two mainland camps.576 In total, the U.N. handed over 14,704 Chinese and 
7,900 North Korean prisoners to the Indians, including nearly 1,200 who were sick and 
wounded.577 In the meantime, the K.P.A.-C.P.V. Command handed over to the C.F.I.s 
359 non-repatriate Allied captives, including 330 male and five female South Koreans, 
twenty-three Americans, and one British prisoner of war.578  
Within a few weeks, the town of Taesung-dong witnessed an influx of 
Communist explainers, non-repatriated war prisoners, and neutral observers from a five-
nation neutral commission. An enormous tent camp sprang up almost overnight in the 
hills of the demilitarized zone.579 The prison camp area covered five square miles of what 
was once “No Man’s Land”. The Indian guards called it “Shanti Nagar,” which meant 
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“Village of Peace”.580 The camp was subdivided into fifty-five barbed wire enclosed 
compounds, each holding 500 prisoners. Additional facilities accommodated guards of 
the Custodian Force India, members of the N.N.R.C., and Communist explanation and 
communications teams.581 The N.N.R.C. was a five-member arbitrating committee 
consisting of India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
In the following prisoner explanation program, United Nations and Communist 
representatives attempted to convince reluctant prisoners from their respective forces to 
change their minds. Any prisoner who did not desire to go back to his homeland would 
have to endure a minimum of nine months of imprisonment, with no guarantee that he 
would be set free even after that period. The explanations would start on September 22  
and continue until December 22, 1953. A political conference would be scheduled to 
decide the prisoners’ destination within thirty days. If no decision had been made by 
January 22, 1954, then 14,711 Chinese and 7,916 North Koreans would be released as 
civilians.582     
In August 1953, Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua led Communist persuasion teams 
made up of the C.P.V. Explanation Delegation of around a hundred party cadres, along a 
the truce negotiation delegation and journalist delegation. By the terms of the armistice, 
Communist persuasion teams would attempt to convince those Chinese prisoners who 
were balking at returning to Communism to come home after the interview. If the 
prisoners refused, they could eventually go to any nation that accepted them. On 
September 30, 1953, the Communist side announced that Peng Dehuai and Kim II-sung 
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had composed a letter to the prisoners of war, which was broadcasted in English, Korean, 
and Chinese, to woo them home.       
The northern camp was located close to the village of Songgong, where the pro-
Red POWs were housed. The U.N. captives who had refused to go back would undergo 
the “explanations” by which the U.N. officials hoped to persuade them to change their 
minds. The U.N.C. made very conspicuous plans for trying to reorient 359 pro-
Communist U.N. prisoners, including 335 South Koreans, twenty-three Americans, and 
one British Marine.583 Explainers from the U.N. side were chosen from “among former 
lawyers, teachers, ministers, salesmen … and soldiers—men able to think and talk on 
their feet”.584 Brig. Gen. A. L. Hamblen explained how he picked explainers from various 
sections of the United States: “Thus, a southerner may explain to any southern prisoner, 
Negroes will do the explaining to any Negroes in the group, Republic of Korea explainers 
will talk to the South Korean captives who refuse to return home, and so forth.”585  
At the final stage of the war, India emerged as a custodian of those prisoners of 
war in Korea whose future remained undetermined. India assumed three roles: it acted as 
an N.N.R.C. member, as a chairman and executive agent, and as a custodian of the 
prisoners of war.586 All prisoners of war on both sides who were desirous of non-
repatriation were transferred into the hands of the N.N.R.C., led by India. A POW 
hospital in the demilitarized zone was also under Indian custody. Additionally, India 
sponsored a program of education and recreation for prisoners which closely paralleled 																																																								
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the program provided by the U.N. Command in the past.587 Most importantly, India was 
tasked with administering a unique program that enabled representatives of the parent 
nations to offer “explanations” to the non-repatriated prisoners and to guarantee them 
“full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life” within the ninety days stipulated in 
the armistice agreement.588 This situation was a test of India’s stance of impartiality, as 
both sides wrangled over the petty technicalities of exchanging prisoners. General 
Thimayya, chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, acted as the 
fulcrum of the East-West see-saw.589 For the first time in modern times, India had to 
make worldwide decisions for other nations, and it acted as an intermediary between 
opposing world forces while simultaneously navigating different ideologies, principles, 
and ways of life. 
The philosophy that underpinned India’s foreign policy initiative was “neutrality”. 
Before the C.F.I. assumed its duties during the first week of September 1953, Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru exhorted the troops to view this mission as one of 
“peace and goodwill … with ill-will to none and categorical friendship to all”.590 He 
emphasized that India and the Indian Army “must always remember that they are to act in 
a completely impartial manner and carry the message of peace and friendship on behalf 
of India to that unhappy country”.591 The undertaking was “India’s first overseas military 
operation, undertaken as a peace-keeping mission to restore international peace in the 
war-torn Korean peninsula”.592 Gen. Rajendrasinhji, the Commander-in-Chief, also 																																																								
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pointed out that the C.F.I. went to Korea “on a unique mission,” which was “the first of 
the kind in history”.593 Indeed, the task of the Indian troops was “not to fight an enemy, 
nor to guard a ceasefire line, but to hold custody of 22,959 prisoners of war of various 
nationalities of the East and the West, and facilitate their repatriation or disposal 
otherwise”.594 
The C.F.I., as the executive agent of the N.N.R.C., carried out the organization’s  
orders. The main function of the C.F.I., which consisted of about 5,000 troops, was to 
implement the repatriation of prisoners and maintain both the southern and northern 
camps. Major General S. P. P. Thorat was the commander of the C.F.I. Indian Custodian 
Force, which flew from India (with a brief stop in Japan) and then transferred to D.M.Z., 
because Rhee would not allow the Indians to set foot on South Korea. The armed foreign 
troops in D.M.Z. included 5,000 troops from India and fifty each from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.              
How India viewed its own role can be characterized in the Menon Resolution, 
which stated that the “Repatriation Commission was to serve as a caretaker of the people 
who were on their way home and would receive the prisoners not on behalf of the 
detaining power but on behalf of the country of origin”.595 The Chinese POWs, as 
observed by General Thimayya, were “better disciplined, less noisy, and a bit more 
rational”.596 These prisoners were “lost and abandoned children,” whereas the Koreans 
“seemed like bewildered and angry children”.597 Taking the role of “a foster-parent for 																																																								
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frightened prisoners of war” was a “delicate and hazardous job”: India needed to “play 
the indispensable parts of the objective arbitrator and the trustworthy Samaritan, but also 
reduce the obligations of those other powers that are banded together for common 
defense”.598 Essentially, India was tasked with executing the terms of reference while still 
acting as a referee in a bitter game of political warfare.599 
Administration and discipline of the prisoners of war posed difficult and 
complicated problems for the C.F.I. Both the southern camps and northern camps held 
prisoners of the Korean War who were resisting repatriation to their native lands. Three 
key challenges during the explanation period involved “breaking up the existing 
organizations of the prisoners,” “bringing the prisoners out for explanations against their 
will,” and “segregating them in connection with explanations.”600 Indians found their 
operations punctuated by intervals of explosive violence instigated by the prisoners 
themselves. 
One of the foremost issues was to accurately screen the repatriates and non-
repatriates, which required separating the two groups. Like their processors, the India-led 
N.N.R.C. found it baffling to segregate the bona fide repatriates and non-repatriates:  
Some tattooed anti-Communists—reportedly more than 1,000—have 
changed their minds. Under rescreening they have rejoined the pro-
Communist group that awaits repatriation. Some reportedly are busy now 
obliterating their tattoos. Such men later may claim they were tattooed 
against their will. The scars might become a mark of distinction worn by 
some of the most “valiant” Communist of the future—like a Nazi prison-
camp tattoo. The changeableness of even a tattooed man illustrates how 
difficult it is to classify Chinese prisoners reliably.601       
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The fact that the prisoners who had been tattooed with anticommunist slogans and 
insignia eventually chose repatriation testified as to the coercive nature of the tattooing 
campaign. This incongruity created the impression that these men were tattooed by 
fellow prisoners in the camps against their unexpressed will. The prisoners who 
attempted to seek repatriation might be beaten up and even killed by if he failed in the 
attempt.  
 “Highly organized fanaticism” contributed to acts of violence and even murder in 
the southern camps.602 According to one Chinese report, at least four hundred agents 
from Taiwan were working in the south camp, which accounted for the discrepancy 
between the de facto number of Chinese non-repatriates (14,704) and the U.N. publicized 
statistics (14,235). Many of the agents had previously worked for the C.I.E. and had 
spread pro-KMT and pro-U.S. propaganda in POW camps. Now these agents were 
actually U.N. personnel working as interpreters.603 KMT agents allegedly swaggered 
through the southern camp compounds and intercepted messages, indicating the existence 
of strong organization within the camps.604  
        Messages intercepted by the Indians confirmed the existence of the surreptitious 
communication system in the southern camps. One letter written by anticommunist 
prisoners said that, “Communist bandits must die” and that Communism in China was 
“opposed by four classes (soldiers, farmers, workers and merchants), four seasons, four 
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seas, four directions, etc.”605 This letter stated that the Taiwan government planned to 
counterattack the mainland with the help of U.N.606 It said that the anticommunist 
guerilla on the mainland were very active and gaining strength. The prisoners were 
encouraged to keep daily dairies of the anticommunist activities inside the camps so that 
the U.N. could publish them for the rest of the world. The prisoners were also told that 
the Communist representatives were weak and that they [the prisoners] should beat them 
[the Communist representatives].607 Similarly, another intercepted letter urged prisoners 
to collect stones in the compound so they could throw them at the Communists whenever 
they saw them.608 It promised that if a prisoner kicked an explanation representative, the 
captive would be rewarded $200, followed by an additional reward after returning to 
Taiwan.                                              
          Strong anticommunist organizations among the south camp’s prisoners negated “all 
assumptions or assertions about Freedom of Choice… any prisoner who desired 
repatriation had to do so clandestinely and in fear of his life”.609 In a candid interview 
with the United Press, Lieut. Gen. K. S. Thimayya outspokenly criticized prison camp 
indoctrination: “As best as I could make out, these camps were filled with people from 
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South Korea and Taiwan who gave lectures to them [the POWs].”610 He went on to add, 
“You should never meddle with a prisoner’s mind.”611          
          However, the U.N.C. was not the only side “meddling with” prisoners’ minds. Lt. 
Col. Vaughn F. Meiserling, an American observer of an explanation session, commented, 
“It’s an awful thing to sit there helpless and watch mental torture like that…It’s like 
seeing a man killed before your eyes without doing anything about it.”612 The Communist 
commissioners depicted two contrasting lifestyles for the prisoners. Life under 
Communism would be “a peaceful life with your waiting mother and father and loved 
ones. They [the loved ones] were not killed despite propaganda [by the United 
Nations]”613 The repatriates would also get good jobs and enjoy the benefits of good 
crops, education, and reconstruction work.614 If the prisoners opted for repatriation, they 
would “go to a civilization of margarine, cars, pon-pon girls [prostitutes]”.615  
Each explanatory session was attended by the explainers, N.N.R.C. 
representatives, a representative of the detaining side, and press correspondents. Outside 
each explanation enclosure, two different exits awaited the prisoners: one for those who 
decided to apply for repatriation and the other for those who did not.616 On one exit gate 
hung a golden sign reading “bosom of motherland” in Mandarin and Korean, along with 
the Red flag and NPRK flag. The golden sign was also flanked by two slogans: “Long 
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live the DPRK” and “Long live the PRC”. Another banner reading “running for freedom” 
hung on the gate to Taiwan and South Korea.  
           In most cases, the explainers began the sessions with a benign, reassuring smile 
and soothing remarks such as, “We are here to welcome you back to the arms of the 
people of China. Your parents and your future await you.”617 The Communist persuaders 
pointed out that staying meant abandoning the prisoner’s families and being exiled from 
their homeland. The Chinese explainers also tried to lure the prisoners back home with 
the prospect of helping build a new Communist state. The prisoners, according to the 
explainers, would suffer no penalty if they went home; they would instead share in the 
blessings and advantages of the new Communist system.  
The anticommunist Chinese prisoners, however, viewed the explanation sessions 
as a golden opportunity to embarrass the Communist explainers.618 The prisoners usually 
came to the explanations docilely and then began to interrupt and change the tone of the 
conversation. In one case, when being questioned about his decision to go to Taiwan, one 
anticommunist prisoner quickly retorted: 
Yes…I know that. It [Taiwan] is tiny. But have you ever seen the sun? It 
is also tiny as we look at it from here, but the sun, anyhow, shines all 
around the world and that is Taiwan today. It shines also all over the 
mainland -- China …619 
 
Not every prisoner’s “counter-explanation” was as civil and mild as this one. Other 
captives screamed obscenities in Chinese and even scuffled with their Indian guards, 
acting as if they were trying to tear the explainers in half. As one British newspaper 
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described, most of the prisoners acted hysterically, “reeking of violence and long-drawn-
out misery”.620 However, even to those who defiantly rejected repatriation, the 
Communist explainers still repeatedly told the non-repatriates that if they or their follow 
captives ever had second thoughts about their decision, they just needed to ask the Indian 
guards to arrange for their repatriation.621 
In one particular case, anticommunist Chinese prisoners seemed to fly into a 
frenzy upon arriving the explanation tent. On October 17, 1953, one POW entered the 
tent and displayed the slogan “anticommunism and resisting Russia” written on his body 
in chalk. He began to sing anticommunist and pro-Nationalist songs at the top of his 
lungs and threw an iron chair at the translator. Another prisoner tossed an iron can at 
Miao Fujin, one of the Chinese explainers. These actions made it obvious that the 
prisoners refused to submit to arguments offered by spokesmen of the regimes they 
feared or disliked.622  
Outside the tents, the noise of shouting was similar to that of a livestock auction 
every day of explanation sessions. Shouts of “Death to Mao Tse-tung” and “Long Live 
Chiang Kai-shek” resonated through the camps.623 Men ranted and bellowed for Taiwan, 
using a barrage of inventive denouncing Mao and his Communist regime. The 
explanation tents resounded with shouts of “Down with the Soviet Union!” “I want to go 
to Taiwan!” and “Down with Communist bandits and Communist running dogs!”624 
Prisoners awaiting interviews sympathized by drowning out Communist broadcasts with 
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raucous screaming and singing.625 In one extreme case, a prisoner bitterly denounced 
Communism for an entire thirty-minute session. The Chinese persuaders could not get in 
a word as the prisoner insisted over and over again, “I want to go to Taiwan 
[Formosa]”!626 As The New York Times put it, “What is going on in the thirty-two 
explanation tents is a matter of raw, militant anti-communism that almost has to be seen 
to be believed.”627 
 
 
 
 
Caption: “We don’t understand why the war prisoners don’t want to come back. See, we 
have set up everything for them!”628 The two men in the middle under the banner “The 
Welcoming Committee” are Mao Zedong and Karl Marx. The man in the left front is 
labeled “The Soviet”. A Stalin portrait is presented next to the front desk, on which a pair 
of handcuffs and a pair of manacles are on display. In the back are a Marxist library and a 
labor camp. A barbed wire building on the right is labeled “The Stronghold Tenement”. 
Most importantly, the biggest banner in the middle says “Siberia Winter Sports Meeting”. 
The implication of this cartoon is that nothing but Communist slavery awaits the non-
repatriated prisoners. Moreover, they will be sent to Siberia for hard labor and will spend 
the rest of their lives in imprisonment.  
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John Randolph, a journalist from the Associated Press, witnessed a dramatic 
scene in which a North Korean explainer met a bewildered anticommunist prisoner from 
his own country. After the North Korean explainer greeted the prisoner as “comrade,” the 
prisoner screamed back, “You filthy sons of a dog. You dirty Communist trainer. You 
and your Russian Chinese barbarians. Don’t comrade me, you dirty Chinese lover. I spit 
on your father and your mother.”629 From five feet away, the prisoner spat straight at the 
officer, missing his face but soiling his uniform.630 Screaming with an implacable hatred, 
the captive struggled strenuously against the restraint of his Indian guards. 
According to Lieut. Gen. K. S. Thimayya, who supervised the controversial 
explanations, the prisoners’ “Hui Taiwan, Hui Taiwan” [To Taiwan, To Taiwan] 
campaign was a well-orchestrated show rather than a spontaneous outcry. He recalled 
that the Communist prisoners he met in Korea seemed to have been hypnotized by 
meticulously planned indoctrination:                 
These men and their staff officers seemed mere boys. They all had great 
dignity, but they strained, I felt, to give the impression that they were just 
plain simple types, ignorant of ostentation. There was a stoical sameness 
about them. It was difficult to view them as individuals. One saw them, 
rather, as a group of players acting out a carefully defined role.631       
 
To Thimayya, the North Korean and Chinese prisoners' responses were simply carefully 
conducted performances that were staged-managed by greater forces behind the scenes. 
They were absolutely not a group of individuals. Their carefully conducted performances 
were manipulated by the forces behind them. Life magazine editorialized that Thimayya’s 
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stance was influenced by Nehru, who told him that the anticommunist prisoners were 
“obviously held under duress”.632 
According to the C.P.V. explainer Miao, the U.S. let the Taiwanese agents play 
the role of being explaining representatives of the detaining powers, as well as being 
translators. Taiwanese agents not only permeated the southern camps and conducted 
indoctrination, but they were also present at the explanation sessions. The agents used 
hand gestures, nodding, winking, and frowning to send signals to prisoners and disrupt 
the explanation process. Miao’s observation was reconfirmed by members of the 
N.N.R.C., who unanimously agreed, “overzealous United Nations Command observers 
have, in some cases, obstructed the course of the lectures”.633       
General Thimayya and the N.N.R.C. that he led were keenly aware of the fact that 
the southern camps were saturated with Taiwanese agents. These agents’ main goal was 
to convert the maximum number of prisoners to anticommunism and to prevent them 
from electing repatriation. In a letter to United Nations Command, the N.N.R.C. 
addressed the ongoing concerns regarding prisoners’ shouting of “I shall go to Formosa”:  
the Commission, on the basis of its experience of explanatory work on 15th 
and 17th October respectively, does not feel justified in assuming that a 
prisoner’s shouting of words “Taiwan, Taiwan” constitutes the final and 
conclusive proof of his intention. The Commission observed that even the 
prisoner… (who) entered the tent by shouting ‘Taiwan, Taiwan,” … 
eventually elected to be repatriated.634 
 
Within the five-power neutral nations’ group, representatives from anticommunist 
members, Sweden and Switzerland, voiced different opinions regarding the existence of 																																																								
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secret agents. Armand Daeniker, a senior Swiss Diplomat, believed that it was the 
Communists’ strategy to “mask their failure to convince a substantial number of prisoners 
to return home by falsely putting the blame on agents planted in the prison camps”.635 
Swiss and Swedish representatives admitted the existence of strong POW organizations 
in the camps; however, they asserted, the prisoners still had fair chances to opt for or 
against repatriation, as “shown by the not inconsiderable number (726*) of prisoners who, 
in the period of custody, actually were repatriated”.636 
Representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland also held 
divergent views on what would constitute an acceptable supervisory team, how the 
explanation should be handled, and whether or not the N.N.R.C. should use force against 
the prisoners. A Swiss representative complained about the internal tension of the 
N.N.R.C.: “It is more like a bridge game, with the Swiss and Swedes on one side and the 
Czechs and Poles on the other. It is very discouraging.”637 On one hand, the Communists 
insisted on speaking to the prisoners individually because in groups the men were subject 
to the influence of “bosses” planted among them by the Allies; on the other hand, the 
U.N. command preferred group persuasion, as it would not be possible to directly 
intimidate a single individual at all times.638 Both sides argued that the other system 
offered greater a chance for “coercion or direct threats to the prisoners”.639 The U.N. 
command also declared that anticommunist prisoners who did not want to listen to 
explanations should not be forced to do so.640 When 8,000 North Koreans flatly rejected 
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to come out of their compounds and attend the explanations, the N.N.R.C. was deeply 
split—Czechoslovakia and Poland opted for the use of force, whereas Sweden and 
Switzerland opposed it. The Communists also requested that repatriates be separated 
from non-repatriates, as well as segregating the explained from the unexplained. This 
proposal was shot down by General Thimayya, as “there were no spare compounds” and 
there was a shortage of men to guard them.641            
Explanations to the Chinese prisoners were delayed when the Chinese insisted on 
individual interviews rather than group persuasion. The Chinese explainers did not come 
face to face with anticommunist Chinese POWs until October 15. The explanation 
sessions were further delayed and broken off three times; as a result, they did not take 
place during fifty of the days during the seventy-day period in question.642 On December 
23, the U.N.C. unilaterally announced the termination of the explanation. The Chinese 
Communists received 160 prisoners who had escaped from the Indian custodian oversight 
and ninety more after the Indians transferred the custodian power back to the U.S.643 
Only three percent (more than 600) of the C.P.V. prisoners interviewed by Communists 
had agreed to return home and openly declared that they genuinely desired repatriation.644  
Chiang’s welcome proclamations inspired bold confidence and determination 
among the non-repatriated Chinese prisoners, while the Voice of Free China broadcasting 
constantly admonished the non-repatriate Chinese to cooperate with the guards and 
remain loyal to the Nationalist cause. On November 25, General Chiang welcomed 
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14,000 Ex-POWs in Free China.645 General Chiang Ching-kuo, Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek’s eldest son, who was in charge of the anticommunist prisoner project in 
Taiwan, announced that the prisoners “would be free to enter the nationalist army or do 
anything else they wished … there did not seem to be any reason for questioning their 
loyalty”.646 In particular, President Chiang’s letter generated a flurry of excitement that 
broke the monotony of the prisoners’ daily routine and rekindled their hopes to go to 
Formosa after the war. On the night of December 17, 1953, Madame Chiang broadcasted 
a message to the 14,600 Chinese prisoners at Panmunjom, saying, “I shall see you in 
Formosa.”647 A UP report on December 1953 recorded how the Beijing government 
protested against such psychological warfare activities in Panmunjom camp and claimed 
that an “illegal” radio receiver was smuggled from Tokyo to Korea.648  
Regardless of how the Communists interpreted the outcome of the “explanations,” 
the results of the stormy interviews were significantly favorable to Nationalist Chinese 
and South Korean governments.649 The heart-rending prisoner of war problem in Korea 
ended with the majority of anticommunist prisoners of the United Nations in Korea 
forfeiting the opportunity to return to their Communist homelands. Ultimately, 440 
Chinese filed to repatriate back to mainland China, fifteen died under India’s jurisdiction, 
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and 14,235 ended up going to Taiwan.650 Twelve Chinese and eighty-nine Koreans, 
thoroughly tired of the pro- and anticommunist struggle, said they wanted to start life 
anew in a neutral country.651 These twelve Chinese and seventy-four of the Koreans 
eventually left for India. Twenty-two Americans, one Briton, and seventy-seven South 
Koreans preferred to seek a better life on the other side of the Iron Curtain of the Far 
East. 
 
 
India’s Experiment in Neutrality       
Even though the prisoner-of-war issue was handled with impartiality and empathy 
under his jurisdiction, Gen. Thimayya held strong reservations about the policy that he 
had been instrumental in executing. About three quarters of the Chinese prisoners had 
refused to go back to Communist China. In the meantime, 347 former Allied soldiers, 
including twenty-one Americans, had renounced their homelands to become Communist 
“peace fighters.”652 However, Thimayya doubted that many of these men “deserted their 
own flags for ‘ideological’ reasons.”653 “As a solider,” he said, “I am dead against it [the 
principle of voluntary repatriation] … Once we accept that an army can go across and 
desert its country, it becomes a frightful precedent.”654  
Lieut. Gen. K. S. Thimayya supervised the controversial explanations session, 
which became known as one of the “most explosive phases of the Korean armistice 																																																								
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agreement”.655 Thimayya 's elaboration on his understanding of Asian psychology is 
particularly perceptive, as his biographer recorded:  
The Chinese and North Koreans were motivated less by individual rights. 
In Asia, a person had powerful obligations to his family, clan, caste, or 
community, and his personal desires generally were subordinate to the will 
of his group. The group protected the individual, who invariably felt a 
strong attachment to it. On this basis, the Communists took the stand that 
to separate a person from his group was the worst possible cruelty. Even if 
the U.N.-held non-repats were not being detained by physical force, the 
Communists said, they had endured mental coercion which amounted to 
the same.656           
 
Thimayya was stunned by Americans’ shocking ignorance about Asian culture 
and customs. “A lack of understanding of Asia and Asians was the greatest deficiency of 
the U.N. commanders,” he observed.657 Initially, he had thought the Americans were 
merely being polite, but later he “realized that they knew appallingly little about our past 
of the world”.658  
On the contrary, the Indian Army guards were able to cultivate a sense of 
friendship without compromising key principles of the N.N.R.C. The C.F.I., under the 
leadership of Thimayya, acquired the “diplomacy, sense of humor and swift force” to 
successfully handle the Chinese non-repatriation prisoners, who would riot if given the 
slightest chance”.659 The guards actually treated the anticommunist prisoners as 
“bewildered children“.660 In a protest against the repatriation of a fellow prisoner, who 
was named Wang Hsu, several violent non-repatriated Chinese dragged Major H.S. 
Grewal of India into their compound and held him hostage. Grewal was dramatically 																																																								
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rescued after General Thorat and a small group of armed Indian soldiers dashed into the 
prisoner compound. Thorat simply remarked tauntingly, “What sort of Chinese are you? 
What is your hospitality and where are your manners? We have been here for an hour. 
You might at least offer my men tea or cigarettes.”661 Thorat earned respect from the 
suspicious anti-Red Chinese prisoners and soon returned with the Major.  
The Time of India reported that the Chinese prisoners were impressed by the 
“neutrality and impartiality” of the Indian troops.662 The Indians treated their captives 
with hard candy and cigarettes and played a volleyball game with the prisoners.663 
General Thorat and his staff officers were even invited by the Chinese into one of the 
compounds and presented with “crudely made artificial flowers and a ring the captives 
had hammered from a silver buckle”.664 The Indians concluded that an important factor in 
winning over the Chinese prisoners was having their own neutral Chinese interpreter in 
the Indian ranks, since Indians did not use interpreters from either the U.N. side or the 
Communist side.665 This particular Chinese interpreter proved to be highly valuable in the 
negotiations with the prisoners, causing the captives to develop trust in the Indian 
guards.666  
The hard-pressed Indian custodian force also learned to deftly manage opposition 
from different directions. One such dispute arose involving the result of the explanations. 
The Communists objected that the majority of prisoners had not chosen to return to their 
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homelands because 85% of the non-repatriates had not heard the explanation at all. As a 
result, 14,000 non-repatriates had been stripped of their rights of voluntary repatriation 
under neutral custody and had been forcibly sent to Taiwan by the U.S. troops.667 
Conversely, the U.N.C. protested to the N.N.R.C. that the Communist explainers had 
violated the rules of the procedure by sending in unauthorized explainers, insulting 
neutral nations’ representatives with obscene curses and trying to forcibly drag a non-
repatriated Chinese prisoner through a door for repatriation.668 The U.N. also complained 
that some anticommunist prisoners had been confused by the word “repatriation” and had 
opted for repatriation despite the fact that they had really wanted to go to Formosa or 
South Korea.669 In a letter to Thimayya, General Mark Clark told the Indian custodian 
that these 22,500 Chinese and North Koreans had already made their choices a few 
months ago and would “stick to it until coerced”.670 Furthermore, the South Korean 
National Assembly Committee charged that Indian guards had killed anticommunist 
prisoners at “Indian Village” and coerced prisoners to be repatriated in collaboration with 
the Communists.671 
Thimayya believed that even though both sides presented their cases with cold 
logic and legal hairsplitting, they did not really care about the wellbeing of the prisoners.  
Humphrey Evans recorded Thimayya’s thoughts when writing his memoir: 
The Communists wanted to refute the propaganda by proving that the non-
repats had been coerced. The U.N. people were equally anxious to prove 
that their non-repats were genuinely anti-Communist. To the extent that 
such attitudes dominated the thinking of both sides, the non-repat 																																																								
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prisoners were given little personal consideration; they were pawns in the 
ideological cold war. Thimayya became anxious to see for himself the 
non-repat prisoners who were the cause of so much acrimony.672        
Obviously, as Thimayya observed, both the Communist countries and U.N. 
Command were eager to prove that the non-repatriated prisoners wholeheartedly chose 
their side, whereas the non-repatriates themselves became victimized by the East-West 
see-saw.673   
In a similar fashion, Thimayya found himself in a very delicate situation 
maneuvering complicated power relations, as he lightheartedly commented on: 
I always got the impression that my personal stock went up and down 
strictly in accordance with the value of my decisions to the UN side. The 
press followed these ups and downs, and exaggerated them. It was 
something of a strain to be always a hero or a villain—never anything 
between.674          
 
Thimayya’s troops won much praise for their “tact and impartiality, as well as their 
determination to carry out a most invidious task in spite of very kind of external 
pressure”.675 The American officers of the United Nations Command developed 
considerably better feelings toward the Indian troops and eventually endorsed India’s last 
screening effort despite initial criticism of India’s pro-repatriation stance.676 The Korean 
and Chinese Nationalist governments established an alliance of anticommunist 
brotherhood and made stinging verbal attacks at the India’s custodian forces.677 More 
dramatically, Rhee threatened to drive the C.F.I. out of Korea by force of arms.678 On the 
Communist side, though the angry remonstrations persisted, both China and North Korea 																																																								
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understood there was nothing they could do about them. The prisoners themselves, 
particularly the Chinese prisoners under U.N. control, were reported by the Indian media 
as being impressed with “the neutrality and impartiality” of the Indian troops.679 
The success of India in the field of diplomacy lay in the fact that India understood 
the Asian psychology. North Koreans and Chinese were deeply rooted in family and 
kinship. Their mindsets were embedded in pragmatism rather than Cold War games of 
clashing ideologies. Thimayya commented, “It is also curious that in these Asian 
ideological conflicts, the stated war aims, as differentiated from the unstated and basic 
aims, were in blunt pragmatic terms, rather than in high-sounding ideological phrases.680 
In Thimayya’s opinion, the Korean War, as the first open hostility between Communism 
and liberal democracy, was “a microcosm in which the overall conflict could be seen”.681 
Thimayya stated that if both sides realized, “at least subconsciously, the futility of the 
military function in this ideological struggle, then the value of my country’s neutrality 
policy, as a constructive force, was considerably increased”.682  Though suffering heavy 
criticism from American press and the South Korean government, the Indian troops won 
praises and prestige among the prisoners, as well as the British newspaper The Observer, 
which praised them as being “honestly neutral,” and “doing a job no other nation could 
do”.683 
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The Situation in Korea—Four Views: America: “No fish in a dry sea” (Hesse in The St. 
Louis Globe-Democrat); British: “Careful, glasses are more precious than prisoners” 
(Cummings in The London Daily Express); French: “Where did I put that armistice 
convention?”(Nitro tn Aux Ecourtes, Paris); Indian: “Will you please keep that brat of 
yours quiet.” (Ahmed in the Hindustan Times, New Delhi).684  
 
 
 
Exodus to Formosa 
For the United Nations, the defection of approximately 21,000 Chinese and North 
Korean POWs was huge blow to Communism and thereby celebrated as the “greatest 
propaganda victory,” a victory which “firmly established the ‘principle of non-forcible 
repatriation.’”685 The man behind the POW orientation program, Monta L. Osborn, 
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received the “Distinguished Civilian Service Award” in January, 1956. Osborne was the 
Chief of the Operations and Policy Division, Psywar Section.686 Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
American Ambassador to the United Nations, commented that the event proved that 96 to 
97 percent of those who had lived under Communism would not return but would choose 
freedom.687 The release of the anticommunist prisoners “vindicated the UN Command’s 
stand for the humanitarian principle that ex-soldiers should not be forced against their 
will to return to their countries of origin” but should have the right to seek political 
asylum.688 One American observed that particularly for the United States, the prisoner-of-
war issue reinforced American commitment to freedom and democracy in Taiwan, and it 
urged Taiwan to take the initiative to stimulate and maintain the momentum of 
anticommunism: 
Americans cannot fight for you Taiwanese people. However they might 
fight for the freedom and democracy in Taiwan, even sacrifice for such a 
role model for the world as a democratic and free country.689 
 
After weary months of waiting, the Chinese prisoners of war who desired freedom 
rather than the return to their communist homelands finally arrived, escorted by U.S. 
marines. Seven United States Air Force planes flew the first batch of 142 sick and 
wounded released prisoners to Formosa from Seoul. Chiang extended greetings to the 
arrivals, bringing with him a large entourage—Lt. General Chiang Ching-kuo, the 
Secretary of Defense; General Chen Cheng, the Chinese Nationalist Prime Minister; 
George Yeh, the Foreign Minister; and American Army, Navy, and Air Force attaches. 																																																								
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Pretty Chinese girls came out to greet the repatriated prisoners, dressed in rustling silk 
dresses and walking on stilts to appear more attractive. An estimated 100,000 people in 
Taiwan from all walks of life lined up around the street corners in the city of Taipei, 
waiting in the chilling rains to give the anticommunist Chinese ex-prisoners a hero’s 
welcome. The 4,692 returnees, as the first contingents of the 14,000 ex-prisoners, arrived 
at Taiwan’s northern port of Keelung, waving Nationalist flags and vowing loyalty to 
Chiang and the Nationalist cause. There they were greeted by “exploding firecrackers, 
lively band music, and ringing cheers”.690 The rest of the non-repatriated Chinese would 
arrive within the next two days.  
In Taiwan, the prisoners were given redemptive opportunities to join Chiang’s 
cause of “retaking” the mainland and fighting against Communism. As General Chen 
Cheng announced passionately on their arrival date: “We shall give you all opportunities 
to serve your country and erase the humiliation you have gone through.”691 These “stout 
hearted men,” as Chiang himself addressed them, were said to have “made history” by 
their decision and actions, and Chiang said that the freedom-loving Chinese people of 
Formosa welcomed them back with “warmth and admiration”.692 These non-repatriated 
prisoners, numbering more than 14,000 people, converted to civilian status and were 
taken by 225 U.S. Army trucks from the Indian Village on January 23, 1954. This epic 
day was declared to be “Anticommunist Freedom Day”. Premier Chen Cheng hailed the 
day as “The Communists’ Doomsday”.693 
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Only three days before, the N.N.R.C. had transferred the jurisdiction of the 
southern camps from the Indians to the U.N. Command, which was responsible for 
transporting the 14,000 non-repatriates to Taiwan.694 Lai Ming-Tang, a top official in the 
R.O.C. Department of Defense, directed this operation, while Lt. General Chiang was 
responsible for absorbing the ex-prisoners into life in Taiwan.695 Ninety-six North 
Koreans and Chinese who wanted to start fresh in a neutral country were made subject to 
the ruling of a political conference.696  
The choices made by these prisoners, Chiang declared, proved that the Chinese 
people in the mainland would rise up against Communist totalitarianism if they were 
given an opportunity:  
The vehemence and determination with which they objected to being 
returned to Communist enslavement leaves no room for doubt that were 
the people on the mainland given the same chance they would not hesitate 
to fight for their freedom in the same heroic manner as has been 
demonstrated by these compatriots.697 
 
On February 3, 1954, Chiang received 120 representatives of 14,000 anti-Red 
Chinese War prisoners sent from Korea in January 1954 in Taipei. It was Chiang’s first 
personal meeting with any of the former prisoners.698 “You are kidnapped sons,” he 
proclaimed emotionally, “…who have returned home after a long bitter battle against     
your abductors.”699  
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Under the sponsorship of the Nationalist government, the Free China Committee 
for Aiding Anticommunist Chinese POWs in Korea launched a spectacular global and 
domestic political show. The Committee had been organized during the period when the 
prisoners were transferred from Cheju Island into neutral custody. Chaired by Ku Chen-
kang, the committee was coalesced by the Free China Relief Association (led by Fang 
Zhi), the Friends of the Army Club (led by Jiang Haidong), and 446 other civic bodies 
and was formally inaugurated on September 26, 1953.700  
In the minds of the anticommunist prisoners, the Nationalist government in 
Taiwan’s psychological warfare initiatives had became increasingly energetic, which 
greatly strengthened the “‘heroes’ determination to ‘Come Back to Taiwan”.701 The 
Committee had also influenced the prisoners through the aforementioned Voice of Free 
China and taped records of anticommunist broadcasts, which had been propagated 
throughout the United Nations Command camps. After the prisoners relocated to Indian 
Village, the Committee had solicited 150,000 comfort letters from Taiwan and overseas 
and delivered them in batches through the Republic of China Embassy in Korea.  
Internally, the committee initiated a series of exhibitions and events to display the 
prisoners’ blood letters and their homemade flags dyed red with blood, enhancing public 
awareness. The committee report stated that more than 100,000 people had attended the 
exhibitions in major cities such as Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung. In less than one 
year, the Committee sponsored two fundraising campaigns with a sum of 
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TW$1,678,889.2 (approximately $51,623.19) and TW$908, 805.06 (approximately 
$27,936.76), respectively.   
The Committee garnered extensive international attention through a series of 
appeals to more than fifty Free China-sympathizing American congressmen, including 
Walter H. Judd and William F. Knowland.702 Both Judd and Knowland were prominent 
members of the so-called “China Lobby” in the U.S. Congress during the postwar period 
of 1949-1954. The Lobby exerted significant pressure on U.S. foreign policy regarding 
China. The prisoner-of-war issue became exploitable for China Lobby to advocate a pro-
Chiang Kai-shek China policy in the U.S. Congress. During Vice President Nixon’s 
goodwill visit to Taipei in mid-November 1953, Chairman Ku Cheng-kang presented a 
memorandum and a visual exhibition of the anticommunist prisoners’ living situation, 
and he received Nixon’s immediate assurance to carry through American promises to the 
prisoners.703 
The Committee also exploited the prisoners’ situation to increase the 
anticommunist psychological warfare initiatives toward oversea Chinese living in 
Southeast Asia, the United States, and Japan. Broadcasts narrating the living conditions 
of these anticommunist Chinese were transmitted in English, Japanese, Malay, 
Cantonese, and Fujianese. A delegate of twenty ex-prisoners was sent in four groups to 
make a whirlwind tour in Philippe, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan.704 On August 8, 1954, 
a fifth group of seven ex-prisoners, accompanied by two consultants, started their three-
month visit to the United States, Canada, Cuba, and Europe.705 In this way, the prisoner-
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of-war issue became a strategic topic that promoted and strengthened “the unity of the 
democracies” in Asia. 
The way in which the Nationalist Chinese government exploited the result of the 
explanations galvanized the anticommunist movement in Asia and the United States. The 
propaganda value of the non-repatriate ex-prisoners was extracted maximally—they were 
celebrated by the regime as true “heroes behind barbed wire” and the “living symbols of 
the struggle between freedom and tyranny”.706 The heightened voice among the 
anticommunist non-repatriate prisoners not only re-energized the beleaguered Nationalist 
cause, but it also accelerated the momentum of anticommunism in the United States, 
Japan, and Southeast Asia. The propaganda tours of ex-prisoners effectively spread the 
Nationalist government’s political influence among overseas Chinese and weaned them 
away from the Communist forces. In particular, extensive publicity campaigns identified 
the anticommunist prisoners’ cause with American ideals and commitment to democracy 
and advocated continuing support from the United States to Chiang’s goal of recovery of 
mainland China from Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. The prisoner-of-war issue 
became a magic wand for Chiang Kai-shek to call on anticommunist Chinese in Taiwan 
and abroad to step up preparations for his counterattack against the Communist-
controlled China mainland.  
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”Free China’s Freedom Day Campaign” This political advertising advocated the general population 
collectively rising up to support the anti-righteous men’s cause. More than 100,000 people gathered 
in front of Taipei Zhong Shan Hall to celebrate Freedom Day. Students, workers, and children all 
demonstrated their enthusiasm. Zheng-feng Chang, a Peking Opera superstar, gave a charity 
performance to express support. Radio stations in Taiwan produced all kinds of political publicity 
programs on Freedom Day.707 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion  
 
This prolonged struggle over enemy prisoners of war provocatively demonstrated 
the connections between Cold War legitimacy and Cold War power. Superpower rivalry 
between the East and the West imposed Cold War boundaries on decolonizing nations 
like Korea, Vietnam, and China, further complicating the fratricidal Asian civil wars. The 
Cold War was a transnational phenomenon, but it was also a way of life, especially for 
the prisoners of war, who were caught in the clash of the geostrategic rivalry and Cold 
War calculations. Their fates were entangled with nationalism, prestige, legitimacy, and 
Cold War ideologies. 
The international spotlight was focused on the U.N. captives and the cruelties they 
suffered at the hands of the enemy. Appalling living conditions resulted in part from the 
lack of good nutrition, causing many to lose the will to continue living. In these extreme 
circumstances, American servicemen behaved selfishly, occasionally stealing from and 
committing murder against their fellow prisoners. Additionally, U.N. prisoners of war 
along the Yalu River were subjected to lengthy lectures capsulizing capitalist evils and 
Communist virtues; this ideological education was soon entitled “brainwashing”. After 
enduring constant harping on the theme of revolution and peace, twenty-one American 
G.I.s and one British marine willingly switched sides and crossed the Iron Curtain. 
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This mind-boggling act of the twenty-one who opted for non-repatriation, 
especially in the heyday of McCarthyism, threatened U.S. interests and challenged 
American way of life in America. China, dominated by a “brainwashing” political 
regime, was rated as the country that most threatened U.S. interests domestically and 
overseas. Journalistic CIA agent Edward Hunter, who coined the term “brainwashing” in 
the English language, warned American people in his testimony to the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities that brainwashing would subjugate America to a “new world 
order” benefiting the Soviet Union and that the ultimate goal of brainwashers was to 
conquer America. Hunter continued, “The United States is the main battlefield… the 
people and the soil and the resources of the United States”.708 Half a century later, Tim 
Weiner wrote, “It took Mao’s China the forced ‘confessions’ of some American prisoners 
of war during the Korean conflict to make brainwashing a centerpiece of 1950s 
culture”.709 
More than 14,000 Chinese prisoners’ loud and ferocious refusal was deeply 
intertwined with America’s imperial hegemony in East Asia and hardened the Cold War 
division in East Asia. A vicious struggle between organized pro-and anti-Communist 
factions ensued after the U.N. built their prisoner of war camps in Koje-do and invited 
interventions from outside. Spasms of rioting periodically exploded behind the barbed 
wires, which served as violent demonstrations of their professed allegiance to one China 
over the other, one Cold War ideology over the other. Ideological slogans were tattooed 
on the Chinese prisoners’ bodies as well as emblazed to their personhood. Their twisted 
faces and deformed bodies bore witness to the extreme violence they inflicted against 																																																								
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each other. Besides Chinese prisoners’ side-switching and reenlisted stances, the 
administrative and organizational shortcomings on the U.N. side unfortunately 
exacerbated the intensity and frequency of prison rebellion and riots. Accounts of 14,321 
non-repatriates who had foresworn Communism, describing their loud and ferocious 
refusal, deeply intertwined with America’s imperial hegemony in East Asia and hardened 
the Cold War division in East Asia. Social scientists, media celebrities, and 
anticommunist heroes traveled to and from Taiwan in a series of solidarity citizens’ 
diplomacy tours. 
The Communist China only applied the unsuccessful ideological indoctrination 
and lenient policy on a micro level; for example, the policy of releasing UN prisoners on 
the front line demonstrated the Chinese’ unfamiliarity with international law norms and 
practices. At the same time, the Chinese side lacked a coherent and systematic POW 
policy and an international outlook. Though the internal historical continuities of CCP 
policy could be traced back to the Chinese Civil War and China’s War against Japan, 
there were no systematic rules regulating their own POWs during the Korean War. The 
old and insufficient rules of handling returned POWs would not work during the new 
period of an ideological Cold War.  How to handle the returned POWs became a 
complicated question when the POWs themselves blurred the line between hero and 
traitor.  
The American psychological warfare experts were able to successfully maneuver 
and exploit for their own agenda the situation of large numbers of former-Nationalist 
soldiers being captured as prisoners of war, placing the issue of America’s crusade 
against Communism on a global scale. Despite the losses of face on a micro-level during 
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the Dodd Incident and the twenty-one non-repatriates being the collateral damage of the 
voluntary repatriation policy, America-led psychological warfare was employed 
successfully on the macro and strategic level. As the brainchild of Brigadier General 
Robert McClure, U.S. Army’s chief of psychological warfare, the U.S.’s policy of 
voluntary repatriation was a stroke of brilliance, which highlighted the tremendous 
difference between the democratic ideas and the totalitarian Communism. The argument 
that the enemy prisoners embraced freedom of choice to defy the Communist totalitarian 
state was cogent and powerful, aligning with America’s grand strategy in the Cold War. 
The fundamental essence of U.S. policy lay in the fact that America would not 
acquiescence to the systematic slaughter and oppression of ordinary people by their 
totalitarian government. Even the prison riots and violence were exploited by America, as 
they perfectly demonstrated that the stakes were high and that the prisoner situation was 
in great need of American intervention. President Harry S. Truman himself nicely 
summarized the situation:  
It is perfectly clear that thousands and thousands of prisoners we hold 
would violently resist being returned to the Communists because they fear 
the slavery or death which would await them. It would be a betrayal of the 
ideals of freedom and justice for which we are fighting if we forced these 
men at bayonet point to return to their ex-masters. We won't do it. We 
won't buy an armistice by trafficking in human slavery.710 
 
Similarly, in the words of Secretary of State Dulles, “no Red Army prisoners who want 
freedom will be sent back to captivity”. A State Department release insisted that “the 
																																																								
710 Harry S. Truman, “Address at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of the United States Military Academy, 
May 20, 1952,” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14119 (accessed Jan. 17, 2017). 
	 178 
principle that force shall not be used to compel resisting prisoners to go home excludes 
every form of coercion”.711  
On the prisoner-of war issue, American domestic Cold War policy and foreign 
policy in East Asia became enmeshed with each other and reinforced each other, 
succeeding in accomplishing the overall goal of discrediting Communism both within 
America and in East Asia. Following World War II, U.S. foreign policy redefined itself to 
focus on the role of the defender as one who protects not only of the freedom of its own 
citizens but also of the freedom of people everywhere. American intervention 
fundamentally altered the historical trajectories of Korea, China, and Taiwan in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. In the psychological warfare dimension, ideas and 
ideology were waged as essential weapons in Cold War confrontation. The policy of 
“voluntary repatriation” was tailor-made for the ex-Nationalist soldiers among the 
Chinese prisoners and achieved spectacular success with the employment of Nationalist 
infiltrators. One government source points out that “Chinese enlisted men were found the 
most amenable to UN psychological warfare messages, while the hard-core North Korean 
officer corps were least inclined to believe or act on such appeals”.712 U.N. leaflets, radio 
broadcasts, and loudspeakers had a decisive impact in converting surrendered prisoners, 
as POW interrogation records indicated that one in three Communist prisoners had 
admitted their decision to surrender was influenced by leaflets.713 Prior to the release of 
prisoners, USIA sent information specialists to Korea to ensure that the press, radio, and 
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motion pictures in the U.S. received full coverage of the propaganda victory.714 In the 
months following the release, USIA sought to propagandize, especially to the people of 
Asia, the stories of the prisoners who voluntarily chose freedom as way of life.715   
The policy manifested both mental dexterity and ideological sophistication, as it 
sought to forever shatter the myth that the Chinese troops consisted of volunteers. 
“Nothing can restore it [the myth].”716 A Voice of America broadcast on May 4, 1952, 
told the world that three-fourths of Chinese POWs refusal to go back to their “police-state 
homeland exposed “the fiction of the Chinese volunteers”: 
That means that there are14,900 who are through with communism, 
14,900—75 per cent who want no further part of the so-called enlightened 
regime of Mao Tse-tung… They [Moscow and Peiping] insisted that they 
[14,900 captives] were volunteers, and volunteers of their own free will … 
Now Moscow and Peiping are seeing some real volunteering! Now 
Moscow and Peiping are seeing them volunteer out.717  
 
The ruling family in the displaced Taiwan regime always saw itself in exile, 
dreaming to recapture the mainland with American patronage. After 1949, the United 
States blamed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose government was riddled with self-
interest, corruption, and incompetence, for America’s “loss of China” to the Soviet 
Union.718 Despite receiving lavish American aid, Chiang’s nationalist government had 
appeared more interested in fighting Chinese Communists than in confronting the 
																																																								
714 “Probable Action Regarding Release of 22,000 Non-Repatriated POWs and Preliminary Checklist of 
Measures to Exploit the Situation,” Operations Coordinating Board, Jan. 15, 1954, pg. 2 of 4; Ike-Jackson, 
CD Record, Box 5.  
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CD Record, Box 5.  
716 “Red Truce Delegates Rebuked: Fantastic Propaganda Tokyo, May 18,” South China Morning Post, 19 
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718 United States Department of State, United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the 
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Japanese Army directly. When the Korean War broke out, Communist China was in the 
midst of preparing for the liberation of Taiwan in a final campaign of its protracted civil 
war. Chiang first harbored the delusion that he could send troops to Korea to enlarge the 
scale of the war.719 Later, he attempted to become included in the armistice negotiations, 
to no avail. 
Chiang finally set his eyes on a new goal: the prisoners of war. Chiang came to 
realize that if he could maneuver tens of thousands of CPV POWs to Taiwan, they would 
be a great addition to the existing Taiwanese military manpower. In the meantime, for 
propaganda purposes, he circulated the rumor that tens of thousands of Communist CPVs 
had “volunteered” to go to Taiwan rather than Mainland China, thus reinforcing the 
illegitimacy of the Communist regime in the eyes of Chinese people. 80 Taiwanese 
agents facilitated American CI&E officers in interrogation and translation.720 The 
Taiwanese agents often secretly brought to the camps recent copies of the Taiwanese 
newspaper Zhongyang Ribao (Central Daily News) and Hong Kong publications such as 
Xinwen Tiandi (News World) and Ziyou Huabao (Central Illustrations) so that the 
prisoners would realize the Taiwan regime was supporting the cause of the 
anticommunist prisoners in the camp.  
The Republic of China seized the opportunity presented by their American patron 
and began to wage unremitting psychological warfare as a life-or-death struggle with the 
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regime at stake. The drawn-out prisoner repatriation operation offered the previously 
faltering Nationalist government a golden opportunity to play the role of a faithful ally, 
one which stood by the United States and staunchly fought against Communism. At the 
end of the Korean War, the Taiwan regime rose up to be a bastion of anticommunism in 
East Asia, boosting its prestige on the international stage and further aggravating its 
relationship with Mainland China. The fact that 14,321Chinese prisoners of war refused 
to return to the mainland created a spectacular propaganda triumph for the Republic of 
China regime and provided a great boost to the anticommunist momentum in Asia. 
Taiwan elevated the non-repatriated Chinese to the status of national heroes, galvanizing 
the anticommunist sentiment on the global scale. Chiang’s regimes made a spectacular 
propaganda show out of these “anticommunist righteous men” by sending them on a 
blizzard of publicity tours to Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States. 
Taiwan’s rash gamble finally reached its happy conclusion at a time when the U.S. signed 
a Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954. The recent development of U.S.-R.O.C. 
relations significantly boosted anticommunist Chinese prisoners’ morale. The prisoners 
subsequently became emboldened by the upcoming U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty, 
as well as the founding of the Anti-Righteous Men and Women Alliance Association (Fu 
lian hui).721 
In the aftermath of the Korean War, America found itself committed to a region 
where it had never been deeply involved before. Shortly afterward, the Chinese Civil War 																																																								
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temporarily broke out again around the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, where the 
People’s Republic bombarded the Nationalist troops, sparking the first (1954–55) and 
second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises. The Eisenhower Administration applied the policy of 
“massive retaliation” to formally defend the island of Taiwan. In addition, the same 
administration provided Taiwan $1 billion in financial aid, which laid out the foundation 
for Taiwan’s postwar economic development.722  
The returned American ex-POWs soon found themselves entangled in bitter 
ideological arguments and never received the “hero’s welcome” which their WWII 
predecessors received.723 They were referred to as “communists in olive drab” by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, who waged an implacable war against Communists and Communist-
sympathizers on the home front of the Cold War.724 Claude J. Batchelor and Edward S. 
Dickenson, the first returned non-repatriates, were hastily court-martialed and sentenced 
to life in prison. The U.S. Army was dogged by McCarthy’s moribund accusations and 
was quick to find scapegoats to prove its political correctness. In 1956, the Army sent 
Major William Ewin Mayer on a speaking tour across the country to prepare Americans 
mentally and psychologically for the Cold War. In his well-publicized lecture, he that 
charged one-third of American POWs had succumbed to Communist brainwashing 
without coercion or torture. Mayer deftly “shifted the blame from the Communists to the 
soft liberalism of the United States, charging that the permissive society had raised a 
generation of weaklings and men prone to communism”.725 The military forces, social 																																																								
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scientists, and media celebrities in postwar America embarked on a soul-searching 
mission to exhibit its ideological stronghold to its own people and society.  
The repatriated Chinese prisoners suffered severe discrimination as authorities 
marginalized them in civil society, excluded them from politics, and placed them under 
surveillance. Prioritizing economic reconstruction and political consolidation, the new 
Chinese Communist regime finally decided to abandon these repatriated POWs and 
labeled them as contaminated elements, thereby shutting down the potential floodgate of 
having to confront the issue of the 14,321 non-repatriated POWs who opted to go to 
Taiwan. It was the time when the Republic of China in Taiwan was the only legitimate 
representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations. The repatriated POWs 
constantly served as a reminder that the non-repatriates posed a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the communist regime, and this led the regime to suppress their voices and 
to even disown the repatriated POWs.   
Maybe it is appropriate to end by contemplating a quote from a speech given by 
Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, in 1951: “Let us 
not imagine that foreign policy is like a game of chess played by superior statesmen 
sitting in their chancelleries. It is much more complicated than that.”726 Many pictures 
come to mind for those who contemplate the plight of the POWS: pictures of haggard 
U.N. POWs limping in the “death marches,” dying prisoners fighting for scraps of food 
in Communist-run prison camps; an American POW wearing a Mao suite and cap, toeing 
the party line and lecturing fellow prisoners on the topics of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; 
faceless Chinese and North Korean Communist prisoners, with their twisted arms and 																																																								
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28, 1951,” in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: 1949-1953, by Jawaharlal Nehru (Publications Division, 
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tattooed bodies, uttering unspeakable words as they shout and protest; prisoners of both 
sides in explanation interrogation rooms defying the final pleas of their countries of 
origins, in the presence of neutral Indian guards in Panmunjom; and statesmen holding 
earnest conversations in the boardrooms in Washington to contrive psychological warfare 
strategies. In this tug-of-war to win hearts and minds of prisoners, American 
policymakers learned about the Communist idea that the prison camps—both U.N.-run 
and Communist-run—served as an extension of military battlefields. Through 
manipulating POW issues, American policymakers not only solidified the ideological 
apparatus at home but also deepened America’s commitment to East Asia 
unprecedentedly. However, the prisoners themselves—of both U.N. and Communist 
sides—with their wrenching choices and experience, became sacrificed at the altar of 
ideological madness—Communism and McCarthyism in Cold War era. The choice 
presented in the prisoner-of-war camps was symbolic of the choice confronted by 
ordinary people worldwide in the Cold War in a microcosm. The binary ideas of Cold 
War politics were made into lived reality.  
As Claude Batchelor came to the painful realization, after being behind bars for 
five years after repatraition, that his “suicidal” political innocence was “seen more sinned 
against sinning”.727 Batchelor, the “young Lenin” to his Chinese guards, looked back at 
his POW days when he struggled “toward the light” and “floundered amid suicidal 
capitalist, black-marketeering diplomats, and problems of Leninism”:728  
… he was plummeted into the works of Lenin, into Socialism and the 
Individual. He struggled to understanding meaningless phrases. “The 
emancipation of the masses is the main condition of the emancipation of 																																																								
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728 Ibid, 266. 
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the individual.” He moved his lips over unfamiliar words, “metaphysical,” 
“proletariat,” “oligarchy,” “collectivization.”729 
 
This “young Lenin” had been promised a high-ranking position after orchestrating 
a communist overthrow of the United States government two years after the conclusion 
of the Korean War. Batchelor, however, grew uneasy wearing the mantle of Lenin and 
decided to switch sides again at the end of the ninety-day explanation session in 
Panmunjom. Henry Luce’s Time magazine compared Batchelor to an unabashed seal, 
who flipped from democracy to Communism, and when the circumstances suited his 
needs, flopped right back to the western camp again.730 Speaking at a press conference 
with blatant political innocence, Batchelor gave the Time reporters a glowing account of 
his role in the Communist-run prison camp:  
I just wanted to be a peace fighter. I just wanted to help the Communists 
advance some of their ideas—such as that America was an aggressive 
nation and the Soviet Union was peaceful.731 
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